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Abstract 
 
This dissertation studies individuals’ attempts to prevent war. It introduces the concept of human 
agency to the literature on preventive diplomacy, asking how individuals have attempted to prevent 
war historically, and to which extent their actions can account for the outbreak, or absence, of war. 
The following work consists of three parts: philosophy, history and practical theory. In the first part, 
this dissertation argues that preventive diplomacy can best be studied at the individual level of 
analysis, because individuals are arguably the most important causes of war. The empirical part of 
this thesis traces six case studies of individuals attempting to prevent war. The final part of this 
dissertation proposes the tentative foundations of a practical theory of preventive diplomacy. This 
dissertation contributes to knowledge by providing an agent-centric account of war, which looks to 
individuals as its ultimate cause, and the only hope for its prevention. It also features primary source 
research, including interviews with policy-makers, which cast light on forgotten efforts to prevent 
war. The case studies on Taiwan, Kenya and Georgia draw on new or under-studied material. 
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 1 
Introduction 
“Though I have been trained as a soldier, and  
participated in many battles, there never was a  
time when, in my opinion, some way could not  
be found to prevent the drawing of the sword.”  
– Ulysses Grant 
 
A British tank commander was at the vanguard of NATO forces in Pristina, Kosovo. He was tasked 
with securing a strategic airport. Upon arriving at the airport, he was greeted by two hundred 
Russian soldiers with their weapons aiming at his unit. When peace parlays collapsed, a general 
ordered him to “destroy” the enemy.1 The Cold War had ended ten years earlier, but NATO and 
Russia were on the brink of their first military clash. Captain Blunt refused the order to attack. 
Shortly thereafter, a British general joined Blunt in his refusal: “I’m not going to have my soldiers 
start World War Three!” He proposed encircling the airfield instead. This strategy paid off when the 
isolated Russian soldiers began running out of food and water. The Pristina incident of June 1999 
was resolved peacefully by an insubordinate soldier named James Blunt.
2
  
That a lone soldier (and soon-to-be singer-songwriter) helped to prevent a great power war says 
as much about the causes of war as it does about its prevention.  Throughout history, the peace of 
the world has hinged upon such minuscule actions. A well-placed bullet has sparked wars; a well-
timed message has prevented others. Experience tells us that war and peace hinge upon the actions 
of human agents like James Blunt. But forests of academic papers tell us that war and peace hinge 
upon much broader, impersonal forces which have little to do with individuals like James Blunt at 
all. International structures, states, institutions, alliances, culture and social norms are the most 
common units of analysis in International Relations (IR) scholarship.  
One prevalent IR theory, balance-of-power realism, assumes that individuals are practically 
powerless to control the outbreak of war.
3
 “Wars are normal,” some scholars claim, and are beyond 
the direct control of human beings.
4
 Some go so far as to claim that structural forces pre-determine 
the outbreak of war.
5
 In this worldview, the actions of individuals are almost completely crushed by 
the weight and power of the impersonal forces of history. Some historical actors have ratified this 
view. Sir Edward Grey, for example, insisted that his failure to mediate the July 1914 crisis was due 
not to his actions, but rather to “the deliberate, relentless strokes of Fate, determined on human 
misfortune, as they are represented in Greek tragedy.”6 Scholars and former leaders often espouse a 
view, usually in hindsight, which makes war appear inevitable or beyond the power of human 
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agents to prevent. Fate or some other concept, it would seem, imposes war upon unwilling and 
powerless human agents, who meekly carry it out.  
There is something missing in this picture. It fails to account for the agency of those wingless 
bipeds that give the order, fight and die in wars.
7
 Individuals are often the forgotten actors in 
international politics.
8
 As Renshon notes, the “importance of individuals…is contrary to many 
mainstream theories of international relations,” even though “individuals do, in many 
circumstances, exercise vast influence over the course of events.”9 Comparing the Balkan crises of 
1914 and 1999, human agency might explain why one ended violently and the other peacefully.
10
 
This view assumes that human beings, acting individually or collectively, are the ultimate source of 
most change in international politics.
11
 In this view, humans no longer appear to be the passive 
vessels of impersonal forces, but the masters of their fates.
12
 Or, to put it another way, the James 
Blunts of this world may not be the puppets, but the primary causes of war and peace.  
In this dissertation, I argue that the latter is a more compelling conclusion. This thesis draws on 
the philosophy of agency, free will and contingency, six empirical case studies, and inductive logic 
to argue that humans – rather than forces beyond their control – cause wars and prevent them. This 
would seem like a platitude, were it not so consistently overlooked or downplayed in the academic 
literature on International Relations and, in particular, preventive diplomacy.
13
  
One scholar described the field of preventive diplomacy as a “scattered literature”.14 Emma 
Stewart concurs that it is “a notoriously fuzzy concept.” 15  Scholars specialising in conflict 
prevention and its sub-field of preventive diplomacy appear to agree on only one point: that there is 
no generally accepted definition of these concepts.
16
 Definitional confusion has often hindered 
substantive discussions on the originality and utility of this concept.
17
 According to a well-
established distinction, preventive diplomacy is a short-term, operational response to an 
international crisis.
18
 It is distinct from long-term, structural prevention. The United Nations defines 
preventive diplomacy as “diplomatic action to prevent or mitigate the spread of armed conflict.”19  
                                                          
7
 Socrates famously defined humans as “wingless bipeds”. 
8
 Hudson and Vore (1995: 210). 
9
 Renshon (2006: 15). 
10
 Breuning (2007: 14).   
11
 Ibid. 
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 Churchill (1941). 
13
 CHAPTER 1 will explore the contributions of IR theorists to the literature on the causes of war, including that of 
Kenneth Waltz, which does consider an individual level of analysis, but largely dismisses it.  
14
 Lund (2009: 305). 
15
 Stewart (2003: 2). 
16
 See McHugh (1995: 15-17), Wallensteen (1998: 33-35), Ackermann, (2000: 18); Aggestam, (2003: 12-13). 
17
 Aggestam, (2003: 13) and Stewart (2003: 3, 15). 
18
 The basic conceptual division is between operational and structural prevention. The former consists of short-term 
actions to prevent imminent violent conflict. The latter consists of long-term strategies aimed at addressing the 
underlying causes of conflicts. See Carnegie Commission (1997: 40, 48). 
19
 As defined by United Nations (2011: 1). 
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This definition is narrow enough to be useful.
20
 It contains two elements: 1) attempting to 
prevent a dispute or crisis from escalating to war, and 2) mitigating the spread of armed conflict 
once it has arisen. Therefore, although an attempt to prevent war may fail, attempts to prevent it 
from escalating may still be referred to as preventive diplomacy. At the same time, preventive 
diplomacy does not seek “to resolve all outstanding issues of disputes but rather to control and 
remove all imminent causes to violent escalation both within and between states.”21 As Zartman 
stresses, “it is the violent expression of conflict that is most properly the focus of preventive 
diplomacy.”22 Preventive diplomacy does not aim to prevent all forms of socio-political conflict, 
only its violent expression. 
James Blunt’s actions in Pristina help us to articulate a problem in the academic literature on the 
causes of war and the possibility of preventing it: the seemingly irresolvable tension between 
structural and agent-level theories. This forms a central element of the present study on preventive 
diplomacy; only with a sound understanding of the causes of war can we reasonably contemplate its 
prevention.  I will return, in the next chapter, to a deeper theoretical discussion of the causes of war. 
For now, we are equipped to articulate the research problem and questions of this research project. 
 
RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
This dissertation focusses on the role of agency in preventive diplomacy. Agency can be understood 
as the idea that, as human beings, “the conscious exercise of our capacities makes us the source of 
what happens in society.” To possess agency is to exercise “a causal impact on our social world.” 23 
Agency can be observed at the individual level of analysis – by focussing on people. This 
idiographic approach to the social science presumes a large degree of human agency, in contrast to 
nomothetic attempts to discern law-like regularities in human affairs.
24
 However, this is more than a 
methodological problem of choosing one’s preferred level of analysis to study war and peace. One’s 
methodological choice has potent philosophical implications. This is a profoundly metaphysical 
problem, which leads directly to questions of free will and determinism.
25
 
Thinkers from Antiquity to modernity have attributed the outbreak war to forces beyond human 
control, such as gods, the laws of history, or the structure of international politics. Montesquieu, for 
example, argued that if a particular battle resulted ruined a State, “a general cause was always 
                                                          
20
 See United Nations (1992), Wallensteen (1998: 33-34), Weiss (2006: 73), Lund (1996: 37), Ramcharan, (2008: 8) 
and Zartman (2001: 3). 
21
 Aggestam, (2003: 14). 
22
 Zartman (2001: 3). 
23
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24
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25
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responsible for the fact that this State had to be ruined by a single battle.”26 That is, the general 
cause – whatever it may be – was always going to ruin that state. In this conception, the choices of 
the sovereign, the general, and even tactical commanders on the battlefield are of little importance. 
That State’s loss of the battle, and its consequent collapse, were determined by a general or 
structural cause which social scientists may presumably uncover. Hence, focussing on a higher level 
of analysis implies that the actions of individual humans may be determined by larger structural 
forces, which we may simply be unable to conceive, let alone understand.
27
  
This research problem grows out of the tension between two levels of analysis: the structural and 
the individual. Let us return to our previous example to articulate the problem. If we zoom out of 
Pristina to a higher level of analysis, NATO and Russia appear to be agents in their own right, 
posturing and interacting within structural constraints (such as the balance of power). But if we 
zoom in to the airport scene, as in the above example, the agency of NATO and Russia dissolves. 
Instead, we see human beings posturing, interacting and negotiating. 
The basic research problem is that each level of analysis reveals a potential ‘agent’ having a 
causal impact on the social world. Both NATO and James Blunt are plausible agents. But there is 
no firm basis upon which to decide which of the two ought to have analytical primacy, or which 
agent is the more causally efficacious.  
There are only three possible ways out of this dilemma. The first is to imbue concepts such as 
‘NATO’ or ‘the international system’ with causal efficacy, and to downplay James Blunt’s agency, 
therefore giving the structural level primacy. This implies, perplexingly, that human agents have 
little or no causal power over war and peace. This is not a straw man; it is a strongly-defended view 
in International Relations, philosophy and sociology.
28
 The second solution is to empower James 
Blunt with causal efficacy, and to deny NATO’s agency. This gives primacy to the causal power of 
humans over that of higher-level structural forces. The third solution is to attempt to reconcile 
NATO’s agency with that of James Blunt, that is, to share the causal power between a structural 
concept (NATO) and a human being (Blunt).  
I seek to tackle this philosophical problem, in the belief that it has practical implications. 
Although this research problem delves into some deep recesses of metaphysics, it does so based on 
the belief that these are not idle questions of purely esoteric interest. Although I dive deep into these 
questions, I have attempted to remain tethered to practical experience.
29
  
The above problem has at least two real-life implications for diplomatic practitioners. Firstly, 
how scholars and practitioners conceive of the causes of war frames policies to prevent it. If we 
                                                          
26
 Cited in Ned Lebow (2010: 257). 
27
 Elder-Vass (2010: 180-181). 
28
 See CHAPTER 1. 
29
 I owe the metaphor of research as exploring a dark cave, with a weak light on one’s head, to Nicholas Taylor, a 
colleague and friend. 
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believe that over-population is the root cause of all wars, then we are liable to recommend that 
governments forcibly limit births to prevent it.
30
 If we understand war as resulting from a vitamin 
deficiency, we might recommend vitamin pills to prevent it.
31
 If we understand wars as resulting 
from deep structural causes such as poverty, we are likely to endorse broad policies to prevent it, 
including “prudential crop and forest management, targeted development aid, and reformed 
structures of governance.”32 This research project, though at times highly abstract, has a clearly 
practical goal: to understand the role of agents in causing war, with a view to understanding how 
they might prevent it.   
The ultimate goal of this dissertation is to lay the foundations of a practical theory of preventive 
diplomacy. To paraphrase the theorist of war, Carl von Clausewitz, such a theory aims to guide 
those who wish to learn about how war has been prevented in the past, and to help them to avoid 
pitfalls in attempting to prevent it in the future.
33
 I do not presume to propose a coherent and final 
theory of preventive diplomacy. Achieving that objective may take decades or more of collaborative 
research and exchanges between theorists and practitioners. Instead, I aim to make the more 
targeted contribution of theorising on agency, and arguing that it belongs at the core of preventive 
diplomacy. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
This introduction began with the intuition that structural explanations of war may ignore the role of 
individuals in causing it and, thus, in potentially preventing it. The James Blunt anecdote revealed a 
fundamental dilemma about how we discuss agency in International Relations. Either the broader 
concepts which scholars routinely discuss – including states, structures and alliances – cause wars, 
in which case individuals have little power to prevent it, or vice versa. Or individual agents 
determine war and peace. Alternatively, agents and structural forces may causally co-determine 
war, in a generally unexplained and taken-for-granted interaction. I seek to resolve this dilemma by 
answering a two-part question: 
 
How have individual agents attempted to prevent war historically, and to what extent did 
individuals causally determine the outbreak, or prevention, of war? 
 
In the first part, I ask the empirical question of how actual people have historically attempted to 
prevent war. The second part asks the philosophical question of which role individuals played in 
                                                          
30
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31
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determining the outcome of a crisis. Following Diagram 1.1, these two parts are designed to 
intersect to produce insights into the practice of preventive diplomacy.  
This relatively abstract problem is important to both scholars and practitioners, since it might 
have life-or-death implications for vulnerable people in potential war zones. The stakes are high, 
because this debate informs policy-makers designing solutions to prevent armed violence. The 
study of International Relations is notoriously disconnected from policy-making.
34
 However, 
debates on conflict prevention and the causes of war appear to influence practitioners’ thinking, 
albeit in a confused manner.
35
  
In the next chapter, I argue that IR theorists should give similar consideration to human agency 
among the causes of war. For now, I will justify my statement that agency is downplayed in the 
literature on preventive diplomacy by reviewing the major metaphors of war which permeate it.  
 
THREE METAPHORS OF WAR 
 
When pondering the causes of war, and how it might be prevented, scholars have long resorted to 
metaphorical language. I now explore three popular metaphors for war: war as a disease, an 
engineering problem or a duel. I argue that the first two are deeply misleading. Instead, I will argue 
that the notion of war as a duel is the most appropriate. I conclude that metaphors have often 
clouded discussions on the causes of war,
36
 and occulted the role of individuala s in causing it.  
Metaphors have a profound impact on how we understand the world. A metaphor, like a solar 
eclipse, “hides the object of study and at the same time reveals some of its most salient and 
interesting characteristics when viewed through the right telescope.”37 Metaphors may serve to 
simplify reality, to justify a course of action, and to imply a policy as self-evident. They tend to dull 
critical thinking.
 38
 This is particularly obvious in foreign policy. As Fred Iklé argues, “metaphors 
always pose dangerous traps for the policy analyst.”39 Seeing communism as an infectious disease, 
for example, naturally led to aggressive policies to contain and eradicate it.
40
 In 2014, U.S. 
President Barack Obama used a similar metaphor in committing the U.S. air force to “eradicate” the 
                                                          
34
 See, for example, Walt (2005: 23-48). 
35
 I personally witnessed, at two diplomatic conferences (in Manila in October 2014, and Suva in May 2015), numerous 
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36
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“cancer” of the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS).41 To the extent that they may frame 
certain policies as natural, metaphors may truly have life-and-death consequences. 
One of the most enduring metaphors is of war as a disease. In his 1623 scheme to prevent war, 
The New Cineas, Éméric Crucé adopted this metaphor.
42
 Crucé did not propose a scheme for peace 
which involved “eradicate[ing] the Turks in four years or thereabouts”, as was popular in his day.43 
Instead, he conceptualised humanity as “one body”, so that the disease of one member would 
always spread to others.
44
 Instead of killing Turks, Crucé proposed killing bacteria-like intruders in 
this body: mainly warriors, but also savages, thieves and brigands.
45
 Kings should “cleanse the sea” 
of pirates, too, for good measure.
46
 This metaphor has endured to the present day. 
One of the earliest books in the literature adopted this extended metaphor. Preventive diplomacy 
could be understood as preventive medicine, it argued.
47
 The root cause of war, in Cahill’s 
diagnosis, was “incubating prejudices and injustices that inevitably breed hatred and conflict.”48 
Another clinician argued that conflict was “cancerous” to the body politic.49 Politicians deal with 
social illnesses, just as doctors deal with physiological illnesses.
50
 To prevent them from becoming 
virulent, politicians ought to tackle “not the circumstantial causes, but the deep-seated ones.”51 Kofi 
Annan advised that peacekeeping was “like a form of chemotherapy” which might “prevent 
metastasis” and “bring the disease into remission.” 52  This metaphoric language has unsettling 
practical implications.  
Firstly, this metaphor reduces war to “a primitive and repugnant anachronism,”53 like Polio or 
the Spanish Flu, caused by “evil forces”.54 This not only over-simplifies, but conflates all wars as 
War, a singular, universal, monolithic Thing. But wars are vastly different, context-dependent 
phenomena. The analogy of war as a disease implies that War might have one rationally 
discoverable antidote. In looking for a universal solution to War, we may resemble the hawker who, 
following the Lisbon earthquake in 1775, sold anti-earthquake pills to survivors.
55
 
Secondly, understanding war as an evil in itself does not do justice to human experience. This 
metaphor erases, for example, any distinction between wars of conquest and wars of national 
                                                          
41
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survival. It tells both conqueror and conquered that the activity of war itself – not the intentions of 
the participants – is an evil and primitive act. Both the Finnish war of self-defence and the Soviet 
war of aggression are equally condemned. In other words, this metaphor hides the fact that certain 
wars may, at times, be just.
56
  
Finally, the analogy of war-as-disease divorces the activity from the belligerents. War appears as 
a Thing apart from the wills, intentions and actions of Soviets and Finns. The most disconcerting 
omission in this picture is that the agents in question – the belligerents – are invisible. The issue is 
precisely that certain actors, at certain times, do want to fight, for a range of reasons. Thus, the 
medical metaphor fails to accurately represent the world, because individual people are unlike 
pathogens, germs and diseases.  
I now turn to an equally influential metaphor: war as a mechanical failure. According to this 
metaphor, the tentative preventer of war is no longer a medical doctor, but an engineer. As one 20
th
 
Century writer put it, the forces conspiring towards war resemble 
 
a condition of molecular tension in the minds of the Nations…which may at any moment bring about an 
explosion which they will be powerless to control. The case is identical with that of an ordinary steam boiler, 
delivering so and so many pounds of steam to its engines as long as the envelope can contain the pressure but 
let a breach in its continuity arise – relieving the boiling water of all restraint – and in a moment the whole mass 
flashes into vapour, developing a power no work of man can oppose.
57
 
 
War, in this view, is a natural – perhaps uncontrollable – force. In a 1944 pamphlet by the U.S. War 
Department, war is explained in such mechanical terms. Like the engineers who “looked for the 
bugs in the models” of planes until they could design one which actually flew, all that was needed 
was to study errors in previous models.
58
 The most popular model of preventive diplomacy is 
imbued with this mechanical metaphor, which works in more subtle ways than that of war-as-
disease.  
The analogy of a “toolbox” is popular in the literature on preventive diplomacy. The idea is that, 
in this toolbox, a diplomat or leader may draw specific policy “instruments” and “tools” to use in 
specific crises.
59
 Michael Lund argues that scholars should catalogue such tools into a “codified… 
[and] unified classification scheme.”60 Most of the literature focusses on the effectiveness of generic 
techniques.
61
 Across seven key texts, the description of preventive diplomacy as a tool recurs over 
                                                          
56
 See, for example, Walzer (1977). 
57
 Emphasis added. Col. Maude, cited in Clausewitz (1982: 84). 
58
 American Historical Association (1944: 3, 4, 23).  
59
 Carnegie Commission (1997: 39-67), Lund (2002: 170-172, 179). 
60
 Ibid. 169. 
61
 As Hampson (2002: 151-152) concludes, however: “In spite of the wealth of research, there are no simple lessons that 
can be taken off the shelf and plugged into official (diplomatic) and unofficial (e.g. NGO) practices and behaviour.” 
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one hundred times.
62
 Evidently, no scholar or practitioner intends it literally; but it is nevertheless 
noteworthy for what it hides.
63
 
This metaphor frames preventive diplomacy as policy engineering, and assumes that war is 
mechanical. The assumption is that, if the context is x, policy instrument y may prevent war.
64
 This 
metaphor assumes a deterministic chain of causation between the preventer’s action and its effect, 
and thus, an essential predictability.
65
  Just as a hammer’s effectiveness in driving in a nail may be 
mathematically calculated, so the mechanical metaphor assumes that diplomatic tools may have a 
predictable effect.
66
 Even if war is complex, by corroborating lessons learned we could eventually 
discover its inner mechanics and craft better tools to prevent it.  
It is hardly surprising that the search for “mechanisms for preventive diplomacy” is a popular 
trope in the literature.
67
 It reveals our search for control over events. The toolbox metaphor 
intuitively reveals our deep urge to grasp tools with which to manipulate the causes of war. This 
desire for control is understandable; that is what policy-making is about. However, while agents 
may exercise control over their actions, the effect of that action may be neither predictable nor so 
easily controllable.
68
 
A third issue with the mechanical metaphor is its misrepresentation of agency. The actual agents 
– those driving a crisis or fighting a war – are more in focus in this mechanical metaphor. However, 
it is still the preventer’s agency which appears to count the most.  In contrast, the belligerents or 
parties to a dispute are passive figures in this mental picture: nails and bolts. They can only be fixed 
by external intervention. This instrumentalised view of agency is misleading. James Blunt, in 1999, 
was no more a bolt than a surgeon; the Russians were neither microbes nor a glitch. They were 
much more than that. 
A minority viewpoint in the literature treats war, and its prevention, as a question of strategic 
interaction. As Lund asserts, “prevention is an idea in search of a strategy.” 69  Scholars and 
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practitioners have endorsed with this view.
70
 There cannot be generic preventive strategies, since 
the context of every conflict is so radically unique. Stephen Stedman argues that preventive 
diplomacy should not only be understood as context-specific, but relational and dynamic. The 
belligerents have a say, too. “The single largest error in the conflict prevention literature,” Stedman 
argues, “is the tendency to analyse conflict as something divorced from its antagonists.”71 Stedman 
critiqued the common metaphors of war as a disease, and of prevention as something mechanical 
“such as fixing a leaky faucet.”72 When taken too literally, such metaphors could mislead policy-
makers about the difficulty of preventive diplomacy. 
 
Because they deny agency to the actors who are in conflict and who decide whether and how to use violence to 
pursue their goals, such analyses tend to create an illusion of ease about conflict prevention. Properly 
understood, conflict prevention is about convincing human beings, who strategically calculate how to achieve 
their goals, and who may possess incommensurable worldviews, that their interests can be and should be 
pursued while refraining from violence.
73
 
 
This is a sobering counter-point in a field lacking cumulative theoretical insights.
74  
Stedman 
isolated one of the most troubling omissions in the literature: human agency.
 75
 The question of 
strategy, when we add the missing element of agency, has a different flavour. Rather than dealing 
with war as static, we now see war as a dynamic, unpredictable phenomenon of strategic interaction 
between living beings.
76
 
 As another study suggested, the very act of intervening diplomatically in a conflict, even to 
prevent it, becomes a part of the dynamics of the conflict.
77
 Various metaphors obscure the fact that 
“both conflicts and conflict prevention…result from relationships among people.”78 Seyom Brown 
emphasises the “crucial role of leaders and decision makers in propelling their countries into 
avoidable wars and escalation.”79 The reason it is so difficult to prevent war is because people often 
resort to it purposively.
80
 However, Brown argues that, even when all the structural conditions for 
war are present, the resort to the use of force is never inevitable.
81
 “The material may be 
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combustible,” he analogises, “but someone still has to light the fire and fan the flames.”82 Human 
agency is what may ultimately light it. 
This view of preventive diplomacy confirms a conclusion reached by the Prussian general two 
centuries ago. Carl von Clausewitz offered a third metaphor. “War is nothing but a duel on an 
extensive scale,” he writes.83 Warriors are akin to wrestlers, using violence to compel an adversary 
to submit to their will.
84
 War is not separate from its participants. It is a dynamic, non-linear and 
unpredictable activity carried out by conscious human beings. War may be nothing but a strategic 
interaction between agents. This idea informs the next chapter on agency.  
In this section, I briefly reviewed the literature on preventive diplomacy through the lens of 
various metaphors of war. I argued that human agency is a missing link in the literature, which I 
devote this dissertation to exploring. Stedman’s critique did not extend to constructing a positive 
account of human agency and its centrality to preventive diplomacy. This is the crucial theoretical 
contribution which I aim to make. I seek to challenge the assumptions about agency which underpin 
existing scholarship on the causes of war, and to place agency at the core of preventive diplomacy.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The above discussion justified the intuition that human agency a concept which is strangely missing 
from IR debates on the causes of war and its prevention. Unlike historians, who sometimes overplay 
the importance of agency,
85
 IR theorists drawn to the search for law-like generalisations in human 
affairs often efface it. In a laboratory test involving IR theorists and historians, Tetlock and Lebow 
uncovered fascinating cognitive tendencies. “Generalisers” who report a need for psychological 
closure “tend to rely on prior beliefs in solving unfamiliar problems,” and prefer “deterministic 
accounts that downplay probabilistic qualifiers.”86 In marked contrast, “particularisers”, especially 
historians, tend to be receptive to the roles of agency, chance and contingency in international 
politics, and are “open to the possibility that a potpourri of processes” may determine particular 
historical events, rather than parsimonious, general causes.
87
 
This methodological debate relates directly to my research question, which is part empirical, part 
conceptual.
88
 As I argued above, one’s position in the idiographic-nomothetic divide is much more 
than a methodological issue. “Theory-driven” historical research may suffer from the fallacious 
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certainty of hindsight, for example,
89
 effectively shaping historical events around one’s theory of 
the general causes of war. One such theory is neo-realism, which, despite its long disciplinary reign, 
one historian critiqued as basically “unhistorical, perhaps anti-historical”.90 Conversely, historians 
who do not lay their methodological cards on the table risk smuggling theoretical assumptions 
under the label of objective historical facts.
91
 Since this dissertation borrows both from historical 
and social scientific methods, the risks of methodological confusion are great.  
As Max Weber warned, a sharp distinction between concepts, which he called “ideal types”, and 
history is “the hair-line which separates science from faith...”92 As he wrote: 
 
It is a great temptation for the theorist to...mix theory with history and indeed to confuse them with the each 
other...there is an almost irresistible temptation to do violence to reality in order to prove the real validity of the 
construct... [But concepts] are pure mental constructs, the relationships of which to the empirical reality of the 
immediately given is problematical in every individual case...
93
 
 
Weber succinctly explained the proper role of concepts in historical research. Historical problems, 
he wrote, “form themselves ever anew and in different colors” in an “infinite stream of concrete 
events which…are constantly subject to change.”94 The “purity” of a concept is an effort to impose 
clarity upon the chaos of that endless stream of events.
95
 Weber worried that social scientists would 
confuse theory and history, believing that a concept was the real force “which operates behind the 
passage of events and which works itself out in history.” 96   Concepts, for Weber, are mere 
analytical constructs intended to aid us to understand the chaotic stream of events we call history, to 
measure reality, and to impute an historical event’s “real causes”. 97  Without such a rigorous 
yardstick, scholarship can easily become “a profession of faith”.98 
In this dissertation, I draw on the mixed methods of historical research, and the conceptual 
methods of social science and philosophy. I use the concept of agency to impute causal weight to 
individuals in the outbreak and prevention of war. And I heed Weber’s warning, attempting to use 
the concept of agency as a measuring stick, always remembering that any concept is a “utopia” 
which “cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality.”99  This concept, like all others, must be 
amended or dispensed with as soon as it violates empirical reality, rather than bending reality to it. 
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To reduce the chances of methodological biases, I will first explain how I intend to develop a 
definition of agency in the next chapter. Consequently, I will spell out how I will go about 
attempting to substantiate that certain actions in each case study can be understood as the conscious 
actions of agents who had other choices, using the method of counter-factual analysis. 
Above, I spoke of agency being the causal oomph which individuals bring to the world. A more 
detailed definition may be that agency refers to the causal power which individuals appear to exert 
in the course of historical events in general, and war in particular. The principal trait of agency is 
its human face. Essentially, every mentally-capable individual person is an agent. While this is a 
debated question, as the next chapter explains, I assume that abstract groups of people (such as 
Great Britain) or even higher-level abstractions (such as NATO) cannot be classified as agents. 
James Blunt is a typical agent: an individual who appears to exert considerable power in shaping the 
course of events. How much causal power we can attribute to any individual agent, and how much 
to structural forces, is an empirical question, to decide on a case-by-case basis. But theoretically, at 
least, the concept of agency in its purest form is boundless. If this appears prima facie utopian, that 
is precisely the point, as Weber argued. We cannot find conceptual ideal types in the real world. 
Instead, the above is merely a concept of agency which I substantiate in the next chapter.  
At the outset, we face an empirical problem. There is no empirically-verifiable way to enter 
James Blunt’s brain, measure the sum of internal and external influences upon his decision, and 
accurately report what precisely caused his action to disobey orders. A brain scan would not reveal 
the intricacies of Blunt’s mental processes prior to and during his key decision. This neural picture, 
and other physiological data, would not tell us anything meaningful about why Blunt acted as he 
did, and whether he could have acted differently. There is no getting around the problem that we 
cannot enter Blunt’s mind and observe his stream of consciousness. Instead, we can only rely on the 
crude methods of historical research – assessing Blunt’s self-reporting, interviewing him, studying 
his personality – guided by conceptual gut feeling. In short, no amount of empirical study can 
validate any conception of agency. Agency – like its philosophical parent, causation100 – is not 
observable to the naked eye.  
But this does not mean that we need abandon empiricism and retreat to pure metaphysical 
speculation. Instead, this dissertation seeks to test the plausibility of one concept of agency with 
reference to real-life cases of preventive diplomacy. As such, the next chapter will bring the above 
concept of agency into confrontation with various critiques. The goal will be to hone and sharpen 
my concept of agency. In the case studies which follow, I will contrast this concept with real-life 
empirical events to determine whether it accurately captures reality. This mixed philosophic-
historical approach is a tight-rope act. There is one crucial method which, if performed correctly, 
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may help to ensure this dissertation walks the narrow path of logical rigour and empirical 
plausibility.  
 
COUNTER-FACTUAL ANALYSIS 
 
By its very nature, preventive diplomacy, when it succeeds, generates little media coverage. As 
former UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim once noted: “If it goes well, the crisis is averted, and 
no one is the wiser. If it goes badly, it is merely dubbed another UN failure.”101 Studying the 
prevention of war presents logical as well as empirical challenges. How to prove that preventive 
diplomacy actually succeeded is a logical problem which calls for a counter-factual solution.
102
 As 
Bruce Jentleson writes, counter-factual analysis is ideally suited to studying cases of preventive 
diplomacy.
103
 In cases of failed preventive diplomacy, the onus falls on the counter-factual analyst 
to prove that there were missed opportunities and peaceful alternatives. In cases of presumed 
success, the scholar must substantiate that agents’ purposive actions were an essential ingredient in 
preventing war.
104
  
Another advantage of this method is that it reveals the contingent nature of history, and the 
importance of human agency in preventing wars. As Charles S. Maier wrote, “[for] history to 
provide insights applicable to present conduct, it must explain why other outcomes did not 
prevail—not in the sense that they could not, but in the sense that they might well have...” Studying 
history in this way “thereby suggests how freedom of action is foreclosed or seized.” 105  This 
method may therefore help us to study the causal role of individuals in war and peace. But its 
scientific rigour is contested. 
Much maligned by sceptics, counter-factual analysis is frequently the target of historians and IR 
theorists who deem it unscientific. One historian warned against luring colleagues down the 
“metaphysical rathole” of free will and determinism.106 Many historians have been “pathologically 
hostile” to counter-factual analysis, as Robert Hume writes.107 One infamously called this method 
“unhistorical shit”.108 This hostility is all the more confounding since, as Tetlock and Belkin point 
out, counter-factual thinking is the only way to draw any practical lessons from history.
109
 Policy-
makers resort to it on a daily basis, asking what would happen if they implemented one particular 
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policy rather than another.
110
 And it is vital to the scientific endeavour of discerning plausible 
cause-effect relations.
111
 As partisans of counter-factual analysis point out, the real question is not 
whether or not to do it, but whether to do it well or poorly.
112
 
Weber was one of the earliest scholars to link causal analysis to counter-factual analysis. He 
dismissed determinists’ claims that asking counter-factual questions is a waste of time.113 History, 
to Weber, was simply not the domain of determinism. Scholars should judge historical possibilities 
from the perspective of the person who actually lived it, rather than from the privileged platform of 
historical hindsight.
114
 And that person had “an attitude and will of his own,” Weber stressed.115 
History, if it aspires to be a science, is precisely about the scholar’s “judgments of possibility”.116 
That is, rather than simply ratifying the past from the perspective of the present – as determinists do 
– the scientific analysis of history aims to attribute causal relationships between historical events. 
And, in so doing, it aims to infer historical possibilities. The entire study of history, Weber is 
suggesting, is the study of contingency. 
Since causality is a product of the mind,
117
 we can only ever infer causal relations, not observe 
them in nature. However, to get closer to the true causes of historical events, Weber pointed out, we 
rely on counter-factual thinking. “In order to penetrate to the real causal interrelationships,” he 
wrote, “we construct unreal ones.”118 To deduce the effects of President Kennedy’s foreign policy 
on relations with the Soviet Union, for example, we may ask what would have happened if his 
assassin had narrowly missed him. Counter-factuals, if performed poorly, it is true, may descend 
into “epistemological slumming”.119 Thankfully, there has been a recent proliferation of scholarly 
prescriptions for rigorous counter-factual analyses. 
As Richard Ned Lebow points out, the “contingency of our world should be self-evident to any 
serious reader of history.”120 But the empirically untestable nature of history – we can never rewind 
the tape of past events, alter one condition, and study what changes in the present – means that 
many scholars do contest the open-ended, contingent nature of history. Hence, we need rigid 
standards to ensure that “unreal” counter-factuals can credibly challenge historical determinism. 
                                                          
110
 Ibid. 11. 
111
 Ibid. 6. 
112
 As Robert Fogel argued, the only alternative to explicit counter-factual analysis may is a concealed model,  which is 
often poor in design and execution, and serves as a rhetorical device rather than a rigorous method. Ibid. 4.  
113
 Weber (1949: 164). 
114
  “If history is to be raised above the level of a mere chronicle of notable events and personalities,” he wrote, “it has 
no alternative but to pose such questions.” Ibid. 165. 
115
 Ibid. 165. 
116
 Ibid. 173. 
117
 Ibid. 185-187. “Cause is a metaphysical doctrine,” as James Maxwell wrote. Cited in Lebow (2014a: 1). I return to 
this debated philosophical argument in the next chapter.  
118
 Emphasis in original. Weber (1949: 186). 
119
 Tetlock and Belkin (1996: 37). 
120
 Lebow (2010: 17). 
  Preventive Diplomacy 
16 
Scholars have proposed many criteria to ensure that counter-factuals remain logically credible and 
empirically valid. I synthesise these proposals into four general guidelines, and four specific 
methods. 
Firstly, as Bruce Jentleson suggests, counter-factual scenarios should generally be: specific; 
require minimal historical extrapolation; demonstrate plausible causal logic; be thinkable and open 
to the agents at the time; and be realistic.
121
 In one word, they must be plausible.
122
 This is an 
important guideline, but not an iron law. As Lebow argues, implausible “miracle counterfactuals 
can help us identify, highlight, and work through analytical as well as ethical problems.”123 It may 
be analytically useful to ask, for example, whether the West would respond differently to the Syrian 
civil war if Syrians were endangered elephants.
124
 While these are obviously absurd scenarios, 
which may be causally impossible to rationally justify, miracle counter-factuals may serve a useful 
purpose. 
Secondly, a crucial rule to craft rigorous and plausible counter-factuals is to be explicit about 
how changing the antecedent (cause) might modify its consequents (effects). And we need to rely 
on evidence and theories of social and international behaviour to justify that causal relation. An 
historical example can translate this into plain English.  
Suppose that Franz Ferdinand had not been assassinated at Sarajevo – this was a very likely 
outcome
125
 – and had returned to Vienna safely. Would Austria still have attacked Serbia? It seems 
unlikely, for a variety of historical reasons.
126
 But the point is that, in order to convincingly link an 
altered cause (a failed assassination) to a specific effect (no First World War), we must bring ample 
evidence to justify the proposed connection between cause and effect. Useful evidence may include, 
in the July 1914 case, Franz Ferdinand’s personality, policy preferences and role in Austrian 
politics. But we may also draw on existing theories of “the ways in which human beings are prone 
to react under given situations” or “nomological knowledge,” as Weber suggests.127 Even if human 
behaviour is not governed by deterministic causal laws – which appears to be an inescapable 
implication of counter-factuals – existing theories and empirical evidence may still generate useful 
generalisations on patterns of human behaviour. 
A third guideline, stressed by Niall Ferguson, suggests the guiding notion that counter-factual 
scenarios should explore “only those alternatives which we can show on the basis of contemporary 
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evidence that contemporaries actually considered.”128 Ferguson’s imperative that we only do this 
may be too rigid.
129
 If relaxed, Ferguson’s criterion that we focus particularly on those actions 
which historical actors actually conceived and planned is sound advice. In so doing, we are likelier 
to find strong empirical support for our counter-factuals, thereby reinforcing their credibility. 
Hence, while not an iron law, this guideline gives bonus points to a counter-factual’s plausibility. 
A final guideline, simple as it sounds, is to rebut serious critiques. The most obvious critique of 
counter-factuals is known as a “second-order counterfactual”. In effect, sceptics may always argue 
that, even if the proposed counter-factual is plausible, “history would have been thrown off track 
only temporarily, and the proposed changes would have had little long-term significance.”130 For 
example, even had Franz Ferdinand lived, a critic might respond, some other catalysing event may 
have sparked the First World War anyway. Ironically, this is itself a counter-factual argument, 
albeit a poor one which provides no logical argument or empirical evidence. Disconcertingly, even 
IR experts and historians – according to lab experiments – tend to dismiss counterfactuals which are 
hostile to their pre-existing theories, while affirming those which support their beliefs.
131
 The 
positive news is that asking academics to consider various counter-factuals tends to soften the grasp 
of theory-driven preconceptions, and to open them up to the various contingent possibilities in 
history.
132
  
Therefore, the most effective response to poor second-order counter-factuals – the instinctual 
war-would-still-have-occurred reaction – is to propose better second-order counter-factuals. To 
rebut this critique, a counterfactual analyst must construct detailed, plausible accounts of exactly 
how the course of historical events could have changed, and what the knock-on effects of those 
changes could be over time.
133
 The counter-factual which provides the most logically-coherent and 
empirically-valid case should naturally prevail in scholarly disputes.
134
 
The above guidelines set the methodological boundaries around the use of counter-factuals in 
this dissertation. Briefly, there are four specific counter-factual techniques which will reoccur in the 
following case studies. I use these to attempt to measure the agency – or causal oomph – of key 
individuals in each case. One key method is to hypothesise the death, disappearance or 
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incapacitation, at a critical moment, of a key individual. The individual-level of analysis, which this 
dissertation privileges, is replete with such potential contingencies.
135
 This is one of the most 
straight-forward methods to test the agency of individuals in a given historical case: by 
hypothesising their disappearance or reappearance at critical points in time. We can call this method 
the Houdini. 
A second method to test agency is to inject the intervention of highly-plausible, contingent 
events into historical events. I name this the sleeping monarch method. For example, if a monarch 
were sleeping during key political deliberations, we can hypothesise that many factors – a 
nightmare, a bird or a storm – could have woken them up prematurely. This method must be in line 
with everyday assumptions (nomological knowledge) about human behaviour: nightmares wake 
people up all the time, for example.  
A third method to measure the agential power of key individuals – and, therefore, the 
contingency of history – is to act out those intentions, designs and plans which they considered. As 
the cases below demonstrate, historical actors generally consider numerous possible courses of 
action, as they assume an essentially open and contingent future. While they ultimately choose one 
specific course of action, it is analytically fruitful to explore – following Ferguson – those paths 
which they seriously considered and almost took. This is one of the weightiest sources of empirical 
evidence in measuring contingency and, with it, the causal power of individuals in history. We can 
name this the forking paths method, paraphrasing Jorge Louis Borges.
136
  
 A fourth method, which may be original to this dissertation, is what I call the cameo method. 
This consists of figuratively transplanting one character into another’s shoes; in other words, 
imagining that one key individual had a different personality or set of beliefs. What if, for example, 
the generally weak-willed Nicholas II of Russia had had the pushy determination and stubbornness 
of Count Tisza of Hungary in late June 1914? Would a mere tweak of Nicholas’ character have 
sufficed for him to stare down his hawkish generals and reassert control over Russian mobilisation 
in the crisis? If we can bring logic and evidence to justify such arguments, this method could reveal 
the importance of individuals’ personalities on the course of world history.  
There are other methods to test contingency and the causal power of agency, but these four 
methods will suffice for now. In short, counter-factual analysis is a crucial method for this study. It 
is a method which we intuitively use to prove, to the extent that we can, causality.
137
 In so doing, 
counter-factuals reveal that events of enormous historical significance, such as wars, may not be 
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driven by deterministic, underlying causes at all, but by nonlinear, contingent events.
138
 In other 
words, this method reveals that “international relations is an open system whose outcomes are 
sensitive to…chance, agency and confluence.”139 As a result, counter-factual analysis may be one of 
the most useful methods to measure agency, understood as the causal power of individuals in 
history. It is, therefore, my method of choice in this study of individuals’ efforts to prevent war. 
 
CASE STUDY METHOD 
 
In each of the following case studies, I will first narrate the empirical events of how certain 
historical actors attempted to prevent the recourse to war. Next, returning to the conceptual part of 
my research question, I will assess the actions of that individual against the concept of agency 
which I propose and refine in CHAPTER 1. In this chapter, I will set out a clear and detailed 
explanation of my conception of agency, and what it may resemble in real life, to allow critics to 
falsify any conclusion which may appear spurious. The objective is not to make historical events 
conform to a conceptual mould, as Weber warned, but to judge whether the mould accurately 
captures reality. If it does not, or does so imperfectly, CHAPTER 8 will refine it or, in extremis, 
discard it. 
The upcoming historical case studies serve the explicit purpose of refining a useful concept of 
agency in international relations. In these case studies, I analyse primary and secondary source 
material in order to reconstruct the actions of individuals attempting to prevent war. In the two final 
cases, I have relied on interviews with diplomats and policy-makers to discover original details 
about attempts to prevent war. For these two cases, U.S. embassy cables leaked by WikiLeaks 
proved particularly insightful in piecing together a coherent and detailed picture of events. Using 
these sources is not a tacit endorsement of the illicit means which this organisation used to acquire 
these classified cables. Rather, using this leaked material only implies an acceptance of the reality 
of their existence, and a professional duty to carefully marshal, contextualise and weigh all the 
available evidence. If scholars abdicate this duty, more sensationalistic writers will happily take 
their place. 
I structure the body of my dissertation using the case study method. I will now explain, in finer 
brushstrokes, the logic governing my use of case studies. This work consists of six case studies 
exploring the actions of diplomats, bureaucrats and leaders who once attempted, in a specific time 
and place, to prevent war. I have used six diverse case studies to attempt to increase the analytical 
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leverage of this work. Much like counterfactuals, the scientific rigour of the case-study method in 
the social sciences is controversial.  
In 1808, William Blake argued that to “generalize is to be an idiot.”140 But generalising appears 
to be inescapable. Our limited minds may simply not be able to comprehend the nuance and 
complexity of social relations in their totality. This may be why we resort to conceptual language to 
understand reality, as Weber suggests. However, Blake’s satirical quip141 may prove devastatingly 
true of the goal of uncovering deterministic laws which allegedly govern human behaviour. In this 
tradition, J. S. Mill saw the goal of the social sciences being the same as that of the natural 
sciences.
142
  This assumes – as Mill assumed143 – that people are deterministic machines, which 
neither the natural nor the social sciences have so far justified.  
IR theorists have, thus far, failed to build reliable, predictable theories of international relations, 
raising questions about whether this is possible.
144
 If the above discussion on counter-factuals is 
correct, the limitations of predictive theorising in IR may be due to the innate contingency of 
history and the irreducible role of human agency, which many theorists choose to downplay. I 
assume that the social sciences should not aim to discover the nomothetic laws governing human 
nature, as these may simply not exist. 
Even if the above argument – which I will justify in the next chapter – is correct, social science 
still has a purpose. The purpose of the case study method is to search for similarities and differences 
in the human experience across diverse times and historical contexts. This does not imply that any 
objective laws govern the behaviour of humans; we need not be predictable machines.  
In this dissertation, I attempt to follow the rigour of Mill’s case study method, while rejecting his 
deterministic assumptions about the nature of the universe.
145
 Specifically, I follow Mill’s case 
selection “method of difference”. This method compares cases with similar characteristics (an 
individual attempting to prevent war) but different results.
146
 For this reason, I selected case studies 
reflecting a broad geographical and historical spread. Geographically, the cases studied occurred in 
North America, Western Europe, Africa, the Caucasus and East Asia. They are broadly spread in 
time, with two cases in each of the 19
th
, 20
th
 and 21
st
 Centuries. Finally, the cases represent a spread 
of various results: one clear success,
147
 one qualified success,
148
 one qualified failure,
149
 and three 
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clear failures.
150
 This might lead a reader to wonder why a study on preventive diplomacy studies 
more failures than successes. Failures are particularly interesting for two reasons.  
Firstly, major diplomatic failures usually attract more recriminations between the actors, 
historical disputes and, therefore, material to study. In other words, failures are better documented; 
they are clearly demarcated in time and space, since a war subsequently broke out, clearly 
announcing the failure. In contrast, as Kurt Waldheim suggested above, successful attempts to 
prevent war are much more easily forgotten, seldom documented and, for many historians, are 
uninteresting to study. Sceptics may always charge that a war was not really going to break out 
anyway, thereby effacing or downplaying the agency of key actors. A second reason that failures 
are good teachers is that they expose the role of individuals in events; they reveal the faces behind 
the veils of states, organisations or other faceless groups. The agency of individuals, 
metaphorically, stands exposed to the observer’s eye, more easily weighed against other factors, as 
more details of the historical event are generally known. 
I will now briefly explain the inner mechanics of how I will carry out case studies. Each case is 
broken into the two halves of the research question: historical and philosophical. In the first half, I 
narrate the findings of my empirical research. In the second half, I analyse the causal influence of 
individual agents in each separate case study. It is in this second, analytical section that I use the 
counter-factual method. In general, I will follow Alexander George and Andrew Bennett’s method 
of “structured, focused comparison”.151 This requires that researchers ask the same questions of 
each case, and deal only with a certain aspect of each case study. This method is particularly 
relevant to policy-oriented research, since it marshals historical experience to inform the practical 
experience of the present.
152
 Each case study will ask the following questions: 
 
1. What was the historical context of this specific crisis?  
2. How did specific individuals attempt to prevent war?  
3. How, if at all, did specific individuals attempt to cause war? 
4. To what extent did the agency of individuals determine the result of the crisis? 
5. How would the crises have ended, had agents acted differently? 
6. To what extent might structural forces account for the result? 
 
The first three questions are empirical, and the remaining three are theoretical. All six questions 
thus work towards answering the general research question spelled out above. I conclude this 
section with a final note on the style of the case studies.  
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The level of analysis I have chosen – individuals attempting to prevent war – has implications 
for the style of each case study. Case studies, at this level of analysis, must be rich in detail. A 
detailed sketch of the environments and constraints in which individuals acted, and how their 
interactions in turn constrained their actions, will give us a well-rounded view of agency. Too little 
detail might encourage the assumption that structural historical forces govern the actions of 
individuals. As Vladimir Nabokov advised, “one should always notice and fondle details,” arguing 
that details should precede generalisations. “There is nothing wrong about the moonshine of 
generalization when it comes after the sunny trifles of the book have been lovingly collected,” 
Nabokov concluded.
 153
 In this spirit, each case study invites the reader to enter a complex and 
unique microcosm, treating each as unique in principle. 
 
STRUCTURE AND ARGUMENTS 
 
I will now set out the overall structure of this dissertation. CHAPTER 1 establishes the theoretical 
framework through which I study various individuals’ attempts to prevent war. This chapter 
consists of debates in philosophy, historiography and International Relations on the question of 
agency. I follow the view that a broad array of disciplines should be marshalled to understand the 
causes of war. “Philosophy, theology even, might come in usefully,” as Virginia Woolf wrote.154 
After considering various deterministic explanations for war, I explain why agency is a major cause 
of wars, and should therefore be central to efforts to prevent it. I set out the view that this agent-
centric view of war can be justified by four inter-locking philosophical concepts: contingency, free 
will, agent-causation and methodological individualism.  
CHAPTERS 2 to 7 consist of historical case studies of agents attempting to prevent war. The first 
case study, CHAPTER 2, discusses an obscure border incident between the U.S. state of Maine and 
the Canadian province of New Brunswick which almost escalated to great power war. In this case, I 
trace the actions of General Scott in mediating the crisis. CHAPTER 3 explores U.S. Secretary of 
State William Henry Seward’s desperate efforts to prevent a fratricidal civil war during the 1861 
secession crisis. CHAPTER 4 shifts attention to one of the most dangerous crises in modern European 
history: the July 1914 crisis. This case study focuses on two actors who foresaw the potentially 
catastrophic war which might result, and acted purposively to prevent it. In CHAPTER 5, I focus on 
UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld’s efforts to prevent a Sino-American war during the First 
Taiwan Strait Crisis. CHAPTER 6 studies the role of the Chairman of the Electoral Commission of 
Kenya, Samuel Kivuitu, in attempting to prevent violence in Kenya’s 2007 contested presidential 
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elections. Finally, CHAPTER 7 focusses on Western peace initiatives during the escalating Abkhaz-
Georgian dispute in 2008.  
CHAPTER 8 will synthesise the findings of the above cases concerning preventive diplomacy. 
This chapter consists of my major original contribution to knowledge. In it, I argue that the 
purposive actions of agents in each crisis are needed to explain why some crises end in war and 
others in peace. Even within the narrowest social constraints and the severest crises, I argue, human 
agents are always masters of their fates. Agents attempting to prevent war were often constrained by 
the actions of other individuals. However, this points not to the historical inevitability of war, but to 
the conclusion that individual people – not invisible structural forces – cause wars. I conclude that 
purposive actions to prevent war may, within limits, help to neutralise antagonists’ will to fight.  
Finally, CHAPTER 9 questions the practical implications of the above historical and philosophical 
insights. It dilutes these findings into a policy-oriented method of diplomatic contingency planning 
inspired by the military arts. The conclusion draws out the broader implications of this research for 
scholars, policy-makers and lay readers. 
 
CAVEAT LECTOR 
 
In summary, this dissertation is a philosophical argument with historical illustrations.
155
 Its overall 
objective is to aid the judgments of practitioners of preventive diplomacy, and to advance the debate 
on preventive diplomacy in an unexplored direction. Before reaching the promised practical 
implications of this work, by way of the firm ground of historical experience, I ask for the reader’s 
patience. The next chapter will walk readers through some of the densest and most intractable 
disputes of philosophy. A critical reader may ask why such a task is necessary and how, if at all, 
philosophy can enlighten practice. An evasive response would be to quote a French ambassador, 
who noted, with wit: “Yes, it works in practice, but does it work in theory?”156 Instead, I answer 
that philosophy is not necessary for practitioners, just as a lumberjack may spend his entire life 
without pondering how basic physics relates to his work. Similarly, a soldier need not read 
Clausewitz’s On War to learn basic drills. But the philosophy of war may assist his or her judgment 
in apprehending the complex, living and breathing human element of his work. Experience and 
philosophy should not be seen in opposition to each other, Clausewitz emphasised, but as mutually-
supportive.
157
 I therefore ask the reader to follow me through the weak substitute for experience that 
is philosophy. 
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PART I 
Philosophy 
 
 
“You are interested, I know, in the prevention of war,  
not in our theories, and I keep this fact in mind.” 
- Sigmund Freud 
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Agency in War and Peace 
 
  
“How can people who we call philosophers and searchers of 
truth…have abandoned themselves to the opinion that everything 
is produced due to necessity and fate?”1 
- Alexander of Aphrodisias 
 
 
This chapter will explore what role human agency plays in attempts to prevent war. It begins by 
exploring the origins of the concept of agency itself. This takes us to Ancient Greece, where 
Aristotle’s notion of contingency contended with the popular doctrine of fatalism. In the second 
section, this chapter explores scientific forms of causal determinism, which deny the causal power 
of human agents. Here, I argue that determinism is a philosophical critique, not an uncontested 
scientific truth, and that free will is at least as plausible. Next, I argue that the IR literature has 
shown ambivalence on the role of human agents in the causes of war. In response, I defend the 
position of agent-causation, which states that agents are the ultimate causes of their own actions. 
This view remains extremely unpopular. Fortunately, truth is not a popularity contest. In the 
penultimate section, I explore nuanced sociological critiques of agency which attribute more (or 
equal) causal power to social structures. I set out the view of methodological individualism, which 
sees war as reducible to individual people. Finally, I explain how the above cluster of inter-related 
concepts provides a useful framework to study preventive diplomacy.  
I offer two caveats before continuing. Firstly, this is, to be sure, an eclectic mix of concepts. 
Critics may charge that this is an indigestible philosophical buffet. But it is intended as a 
complementary à la carte menu. The above four concepts are designed to reinforce each other, 
giving philosophical and empirical validity to an agent-centric theory of war. This rich conceptual 
chapter is therefore necessary to justify the arguments to come.  
Secondly, the concept of agency could be summed up in one paragraph. This would miss crucial 
details, including why it remains controversial, and how it relates to the causes of war. Most 
importantly, this philosophical foray is justified because the current literature has not made much 
progress in exploring questions of agency in preventive diplomacy, as I argued above. Part of the 
issue is that preventive diplomacy is a specialised field, which has isolated itself from IR debates on 
the causes of war, on causation writ large, and on the concept of agency. No matter the depth of the 
philosophical discussion to come, I ask the reader to trust in the strength of the tether which will 
bring us both back to the surface of the real world at the end of this chapter.  
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THE ORIGINS OF AGENCY 
 
The concept of agency arose as a critique of determinism. Determinism can be defined as the idea 
that “the events of the present are causally necessitated in all their details by those of the past in 
accordance with the laws of nature.”2 The philosopher Simon Blackburn defined fatalism as the 
idea “that the future is already written, that what will be will be, with all our efforts to avoid it 
doomed to failure.”3 Philosophers are divided on how, if at all, determinism and fatalism differ.4  
According to Aristotle, determinism and fatalism are two strands of the same philosophical 
argument.
5
 Either way, each doctrine comes to the same basic outcome for human agency. 
Determinism and fatalism say the same thing, reversing the direction of the force allegedly 
determining an agent’s choices. Determinism imagines an unbreakable and irresistible chain of 
causation from the past pushing agents forward. Fatalism imagines an inevitable future pulling an 
agent forward. Both suggest that humans are the passive recipients of forces beyond their control. I 
will now explore how these views influenced early ideas on the role of human agency in causing 
war.  
The earliest forms of determinism were rooted in mystical or religious fatalism. A popular theory 
on the causes of war, in the Bronze Age, held that war was inevitable due to cosmic forces beyond 
the control of feeble humans. We see one example of this theory in the Baghavad Gita, in which the 
warrior Arjuna gazes at two armies ready for battle. He asks his charioteer, Krishna, why the war is 
necessary.
6
 The charioteer slowly reveals himself to be Vishnu, Lord of the universe, mover of men, 
destroyer of worlds.
7
 Krishna tells the trembling Arjuna that the death of enemy soldiers is 
foreordained regardless of his actions.
8
 Krishna reveals that humans are simply powerless pawns in 
a foreordained plan. Another example of this theory of war is found in Homer’s Iliad, in which the 
gods cause and prevent wars.
9
 The gods, in this ancient epic, deliberate on war and peace and 
determine human affairs. “O host, that which is ordained to happen by the gods,” Herodotus wrote, 
“man cannot avert.”10 Any efforts to prevent, avoid or escape war, if contrary to the will of Zeus, 
were in vain.  
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The belief in the powerlessness of humans over war and peace dominated Roman thinking 
influenced by Greek Stoicism.
11
  Cicero thought that “everything is from all eternity predestined 
according to fate.”12 Statius, a Roman poet, wrote: “From the beginning of the world, this day was 
appointed for war, and nations born to fight.”13 “Does anyone think he has such power that he can 
even overcome fate?” asked the Roman poet Ovid.14 Tacitus responded: “that which is destined to 
happen, even if foretold, cannot be evaded.”15 The emperor Marcus Aurelius, a follower of Stoic 
teachings, was also beholden to fatalistic thoughts.
16
 Neo-Stoic philosophers, such as Justus 
Lipsius, focussed on how citizens could best cope with recurrent wars and man-made disasters, not 
on how they might be prevented. “War, tyranny, slaughter and death hang over your head, which 
are things truly sent from above, and do not in any way appertain to your will or pleasure,” he 
writes. “You may fear, but not prevent; fly, but not avoid them.”17 The intellectual roots of fatalism 
run deep across world cultures, religions and civilisations. 
Numerous sections of the New Testament,
18
 the Old Testament,
19
 and the Quran,
20
 for example, 
are steeped in fatalism. This belief may have practical implications beyond the spiritual realm. In 
many wars throughout history, one or both sides have variously believed that the gods were on their 
side. In 1095, for example Pope Urban II exhorted his flock to fight for their almighty 
“Commander”21, Jesus Christ, for example. “It is the will of God!” his followers bellowed.22 In this 
period, the idea that humans might control their own destinies was widely considered to be 
“heretical”.23 Martin Luther famously revolted against such a notion.24 Luther extended his critique 
of agency to a rhetorical sermon dismissing any effort to prevent war: 
men write and say often what a curse war is. But they ought to consider how much greater is that curse which is 
averted by war. Briefly, in the business of war men must not regard the massacres, the burnings, the battles, and 
the marches, etc. – That is what the petty and simple do who only look with the eyes of children… we must look 
at the business of war or the sword with the eyes of men… It will be shown that it is a business, divine in itself, 
and as needful and necessary to the world as eating or drinking, or any other work.
25
 
 
This deterministic view of war dominated human thinking for centuries. It also served to legitimise 
many conquests as moral, as we saw above. Aristotle, who grew up in the aftermath of a terrible 
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war, was one of the earliest critics of determinism.
26
 Aristotle detailed three causes which, he 
argued, break the chains of causal necessity: human actions, unusual accidents and chance.
27
 
Referring to political deliberations, he argued that “nobody deliberates about things that are 
invariable, or about things that he cannot do himself.”28 Thus, he points out, nobody deliberates 
about solstices, droughts, or heavy rainstorms, “for none of these results could be effected by our 
agency.” 29 Aristotle’s view of human agency was revolutionary. It implied that humans – not gods 
– were solely responsible for their actions, in fact that we are the sole living beings capable of 
action.
30
 He wrote: 
Therefore virtue lies in our power, and similarly so does vice; because where it is in our power to act, it is also in 
our power not to act, and where we can refuse we can also comply... the actions whose sources are in us are 
themselves in our power, i.e. voluntary.
31
  
 
A corollary of this argument was Aristotle’s analogy of a future naval battle. In On 
Interpretation, Aristotle made the famous point that one of the two following propositions must 
logically be true: either there will be a sea battle tomorrow, or there will not be. However, although 
one of the two events must occur, neither is necessarily bound to happen.32 This seemed to defy the 
rules of logic. Aristotle solved the problem by explaining the contingent nature of future events. He 
rejected the “impossible conclusion” that the future was pre-determined by a force beyond human 
agency. Since “we see that both deliberation and action are causative with regard to the future,” he 
wrote, “there is potentiality in either direction.” In creating his sea battle analogy, Aristotle had 
determinism in his sights. There “would be no need to deliberate” if determinism were true. 33 This 
concept of contingency ran contrary to centuries of determinist thought. It insinuated, radically, that 
a potential future sea-battle was determined not by Fate, or the will of Zeus, but by human agency 
alone.  
The above discussion raises a practical question: Does it really matter whether Aristotle or 
Homer was right about the causes of war? The short answer is that it matters immensely, insofar as 
people tend to act on their beliefs. Some theorists have argued that the deterministic belief in the 
inevitability of war is, ironically, a major cause of war. With reference to the Peloponnesian war, 
Joseph Nye points out that “the belief that war was inevitable played a major role in causing it.”34 
During the 1890s, the fatalistic belief of the German elite in the inevitability of war contributed to 
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its outbreak.
35
 For example, an influential militarist, General von Bernhardi quoted the 
aforementioned view by Martin Luther approvingly. Such religious fatalism influenced von 
Bernhardi’s belief in the “inevitableness, the idealism, and the blessing of war,” which he saw as 
“an indispensable and stimulating law”.36 Berhardi theorised that statecraft, including war, is “a tool 
of Providence, which employs the human will to attain its end.”37 Other German proponents of the 
inevitability of war preached similar sermons of divinely-ordained war, indirectly contributing to its 
outbreak.
38
 
More recently, George Bush explained that it was God’s will to order the invasions of 
Afghanistan and Iraq.
39
 “Fatalism therefore has a detrimental effect on maintaining peace,” some 
argue, “since the widespread belief among certain groups in society that war is inevitable in the near 
future may well contribute to its outbreak.”40 Niall Ferguson is even more scathing: “Probably as 
many people have been killed by the unintended consequences of deterministic prophecies as by 
their self-fulfilling tendencies.”41 We find support for this argument in the case study of the July 
1914 crisis, during which several important decision-makers appeared beholden to fatalistic 
thoughts. 
To modern readers, fatalism might amount to no more than obscurantist dogma and, thus, a straw 
man. But the above section was useful in demonstrating the historical and philosophical origins of 
the concept of agency. I now leave fatalism behind, since it is not a widely-held theory of war 
today. I nevertheless argue that we can see in modern determinism a discoloured fatalism, one in 
scientific rather than religious garb. I will now turn to the theory of causal determinism, which is a 
much more potent – and popular – critique of human agency. The next section picks up the debate 
with philosophers and scientists who deny the possibility of human agents exercising free will. 
Without this controversial ability to do otherwise than they actually do, agency might only mean 
that humans only sheepishly follow their mental states, without being able to resist them. I argue 
that we can reconcile our understanding of the natural world with free will.  
 
CAUSAL DETERMINISM 
 
In mystical accounts of determinism, external agents, such as Zeus or Krishna, played the role of 
puppeteer, sending soldiers to their deaths at will. In causal accounts of determinism, it is agents’ 
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internal beliefs, neurons and states of mind which control them like marionettes. As Thomas 
Williams complained, “[it] is no better to be a hand puppet than a marionette.”42 I will now explore 
the modern accounts of causal determinism which challenge the Aristotelian idea of agency. These 
diverse threads form one core argument that humans may have agency, of some kind, but that it is 
not free agency. In sum, they argue that humans do not possess the capacity for free will. I will 
argue that these critics appropriate the authoritative weight of science for philosophical arguments 
which remain empirically untestable.  
Thomas Hobbes, a central figure in International Relations theory, proposed a much more 
sophisticated critique of agency than fatalism. Hobbes did not appeal to God to critique free will.
43
 
He appealed to science and, specifically, to the analogy of the laws of physics. Hobbes conceived of 
acts of will as caused by appetites which the agent did not choose freely. An agent’s action was 
merely the result of an “alternate succession of contrary appetites, the last is that which we call the 
will.” 44  The conclusion appeared inescapable: “And therefore also voluntary actions are 
necessitated.”45 J. S. Mill subscribed to a similar view. “A volition is a moral effect,” he wrote, 
“which follows the corresponding moral causes as certainly and invariably as physical effects 
follow their physical causes.”46 It is worth reflecting on this theory, since its implications for agency 
are serious. 
Hobbes reduced humans to mechanical, pre-programmed machines.
47
 Our actions were merely 
the unfurling of the causal laws of the universe, linking past and present in one infinite chain. 
Pierre-Simon Laplace similarly argued that “we may regard the present state of the universe as the 
effect of its past and the cause of its future.”48 He continued:  
 
An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all 
items of which nature is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough to submit these data to analysis, it 
would embrace in a single formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest 
atom; for such an intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past would be present before its 
eyes.
49
 
 
This was the promise of Newtonian physics: to unlock the secret laws of the universe, which 
contained within themselves the mathematical predictability of all things. Carrying on the 
Hobbesian theory of action, some scientists believed that even human action lay within the scope of 
this scientific promise. Only our own cognitive limitations prevented us from being able to decipher 
the causal mechanisms which linked our actions into the great chain of determinism. In this sense, 
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causal determinism reaches remarkably similar conclusions to fatalism. Human agency, understood 
as the ability to act purposively in the world, is pulverised.  
Some would argue that modern scientific advances have vindicated Hobbes’ causal determinism. 
According to Konrad Lorenz, for example, aggression is an inherently natural phenomenon, in 
accordance with the laws of nature.50 More recently, some neuroscientists have argued that science 
proves that violent behaviour is reducible to biological factors. Sam Harris, for example, sees free 
will as “illusory”, arguing that this insight is “exculpatory” of murder.51 If an agent assassinates a 
president, and if the agent’s decision was determined by neural activity – then the agent was never 
free to do otherwise.
52
 If this is true, Abraham Lincoln’s assassin could not have done otherwise 
than he actually did. In a recent book, Adrian Raine presents a biologically reductionist argument 
that “biosocial forces”, such as an impaired prefrontal cortex, may explain why certain individuals 
commit violent acts.
53
 This theory applies to organised violence.   
A causally deterministic account of war might consider individuals as interesting but impotent 
actors in a developing drama; extras rather than protagonists. A causal determinist is committed to 
the view that James Blunt’s actions were not truly his own, in the sense that he could at no point 
have done otherwise. Some philosophers push the point to its logical conclusion that “no 
punishment or reward is ever ultimately just.”54 If James Blunt was not actually the cause of his 
own actions at Pristina, then we can neither praise his bravery nor blame his insubordination. 
Determinism relieves all human agents of responsibility in bringing about or preventing war. It is, 
in some mystical sense, out of their hands. A deterministic view of war looks the same regardless of 
the force imagined to determine an agent’s action. Whether the locus of determinism is Zeus, or in 
the neurons firing in one’s brain, the result is exactly the same:  
 
Man is caught in a causally closed material universe in which individuals and people do not forge their own 
destinies, and war, or its causal factors, is an inevitable event... Strictly speaking, determinists cannot hold wars 
to be human events, for men are merely reactive materials incapable of choice… In a determinist universe 
without conscience, beliefs or purpose, wars can only be an emanation of behaviour caused by prior physical 
processes.
55
 
 
Alexander Moseley’s portrayal of a causally deterministic view of war is true by definition; a 
determinist cannot deny its truth without disavowing determinism itself. Determinists see no point 
in deliberating on what should be done; they can only do what they actually do.
56
 They deny 
Aristotle’s point that deliberation is causative with regards to the future, and that the future is 
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contingent. A deterministic theory of agency must endorse Augustine’s confusing explanation that 
humans are “freely in bondage” to the laws of universe.57 Immanuel Kant critiqued this attempt to 
subsume human agency under the laws of nature: “For, if freedom were determined according to 
laws, it would no longer be freedom, but merely nature.”58 There is one more critique which we 
must tackle before moving on.  
Kant raised the possibility of property dualism – the existence of an immaterial world separate 
from the material world.  The strongest critics of free will, those committed to materialism,
59
 deny 
the existence of mental states, beliefs or even consciousness.
60
 Instead, they argue that all actions 
are reducible to the biological properties of the physical brain. And, as John R. Searle wrote, “the 
philosopher who objects to materialism must be endorsing some version of dualism, mysticism, 
mysteriousness, or general antiscientific bias.”61 Materialists, Searle argues, is primarily motivated 
by a “terror of consciousness”.62 If Blunt’s actions were not reducible to physical causes, this would 
render his actions mysterious. However, it takes a metaphysical leap of faith to equate materialism 
with science.  
Biological reductionists argue that the mental is always reducible to the physical. This technique, 
known as “eliminative reductionism” seeks to prove that every conscious mental state can be 
explained in purely neurological terms.
63
 But as Searle responded, consciousness is merely “an 
ordinary biological, that is, physical, feature of the brain,” albeit a “higher level feature”.64 In other 
words, Blunt’s consciousness was the locus of his ability to do otherwise. Materialistic determinism 
need not lead us to conclude that Blunt was mindlessly following his own biological impulses. 
These are two distinct levels of analysis, and they only collapse if we deny that consciousness 
exists.  
The sceptic may argue that free will requires being “aware of all the factors that determine your 
thoughts and actions,” and having “complete control over those factors.”65 Some determinists argue 
that if an outcome (i.e. war) depends on whether certain neurons fire or not (in James Blunt’s brain), 
then the agent must be able to make those neurons fire to be responsible for the outcome.
66
 This is 
akin to arguing that one must be able to exert purposive control over the ocular processes in one’s 
eyes to be able to see, which we obviously do not. And yet we see.  
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 No proponents of free will claim that it requires omniscience. This is a straw man. As Robert 
Kane concludes, we “don’t have to micromanage our individual neurons one by one to perform 
purposive actions.”67 This critique is unpersuasive since free will is not a mystical phenomenon 
hostile to science.
68
 Free will is loosely synonymous with the conscious, higher faculties of the 
brain, including self-reflexivity, intentionality and foresight. In short, it is short-hand for the causal 
power which humans bring to the world.  
None of this proves that agents like Blunt truly possess free will. Instead, this section was 
intended to substantiate two arguments. Firstly, I argued that attempts to subsume human action 
under causal determinism only produces parodies of what we ordinarily mean by agency. Secondly, 
I argued that the deterministic explanations of war resembled fatalism in all but name. This section 
sought to demystify free will, demonstrating how it might be scientifically explicable. I cannot do 
justice to the millennia-old debate on free will in this chapter. As Rumi wrote in the 13
th
 century, 
this “is a disputation that will continue till mankind is raised from the dead.”69 The contribution I 
make is not intended to solve this debate, but to link it to the debate on the causes of war. 
 
THE CAUSES OF WAR 
 
I began this chapter by exploring fatalism and Aristotle’s sea battle analogy, which stressed the 
contingency of future events. In the second section, I argued that free will is at least as convincing 
as determinism. If true in general, these two arguments would imply the following two conclusions 
about the Pristina incident: 1) that James Blunt’s decision not to attack the Russians was not 
inevitable; and 2) that this decision was at no point causally determined by prior events beyond his 
control. However, an important question remains unanswered: What exactly caused Blunt’s 
decision to spare the Russian soldiers’ lives? 
Above, I critiqued the explanations that Fate, or his last mental state, or his neurons caused the 
British soldier to refrain from killing. However, we are still left in the dark about the origins of an 
agent’s causal power, and its relation to the causes of war. In this section, I seek to demonstrate the 
relevance of agency by arguing that it is a missing piece of the puzzle. In order to substantiate this 
argument, I briefly review what key IR theorists have written on the causes of war. This is not an 
authoritative or comprehensive literature review on this complex topic. Instead, it is a brief sketch 
of how theorists of the causes of war have explained – or obscured – human agency.  
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It is useful to begin with an important distinction in the IR canon on the causes of war: that 
between its structural and immediate causes. Although it is not always spelled out, this is also a 
distinction between causes which are assumed to be beyond, and those within the control of human 
agents. A. J. P. Taylor offers a useful analogy delivering the same point: 
 
Wars are much like road accidents. They have a general and particular cause at the same time. Every road 
accident is caused in the last resort by the invention of the internal combustion engine… [But] the police and the 
courts do not weigh profound causes. They seek a specific cause for each accident – driver’s error, excessive 
speed, drunkenness, faulty brakes, bad road service. So it is with wars.
70
 
 
Historians look for specific people to assign the specific causes of specific wars. The social 
scientist, in contrast, often looks for the general causes of war. The IR literature features an 
enduring debate over which type of cause – general or specific – to privilege in explaining the 
outbreak of war. Over two millennia after the fact, scholars are still debating what caused the 
Peloponnesian War. At least two explanations are in irreconcilable tension in Thucydides’ classic 
History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides the theorist argued that a great power or hegemonic 
war between Athens and Sparta was inevitable due to structural imbalances in the relative 
distribution of power.71 “What made war inevitable,” in Thucydides’ immortal phrase, “was the 
growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.”72 Thucydides downplayed the 
incidents leading to war as superficial.
73
 He saw the actions of leaders as fleeting details behind 
which “the real reason for the war [was] disguised.”74 (Recall Weber’s warning about confusing 
concepts with history). Structural forces beyond human control, according to Thucydides, caused 
the war.  
However, Thucydides recounts events which suggest an alternative explanation for the war. As 
Richard Ned Lebow argued, Thucydides’ evidence contradicts his judgment. 75  His evidence, 
untainted by his theory, leads us to conclude that there was nothing inevitable about this war.
76
 This 
competing explanation does not deny that certain structural, social or political pressures constrained 
the choices of decision-makers in 431 BC. But it does deny that these forces had the causal power 
to determine leaders’ choices. Leaders were “not merely a transmission belt” of abstract structures 
in the unfolding crisis.
77
 Similarly, it does not seem coincidental that peace was restored soon after 
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the death of pro-war leaders on both sides, and after a new generation of pro-peace leaders took 
their places.
78
 From this viewpoint, individuals caused the war. 
These accounts appear irreconcilable. Some IR theorists have attempted to reconcile them into a 
hierarchy of causes of war. Kenneth Waltz made one such effort.
79
 He began his seminal inquiry by 
raising doubts that human agency could fully explain wars.
80
 He split his analysis into three levels 
of analysis: the individual, domestic politics and the structure of the international system.
81
 
However, his analysis was unclear on the relative importance of each level. Waltz called structural 
forces, such as international anarchy, the “permissive or underlying cause of war.” But the direct 
cause of wars, he conceded, were “a number of special circumstances”. 82 Waltz called these the 
“immediate, or efficient, causes of war.” This led Waltz back to individual people. States, he wrote, 
were only motivated to go to war “by the reason and/or passion of the comparatively few who make 
policies for states and of the many more who influence the few.” 83 Several pages after concluding 
that individuals cause wars, Waltz reverted back to structural determinism: 
  
It is true that the immediate causes of many wars are trivial. If we focus upon them, the failure to agree to 
settlement without force appears to be ultimate folly. But… [since] it is not simply specific disputes that produce 
wars, rational settlement of them [by human agents] cannot eliminate war.
84
 
 
After almost endorsing individual agents being the primary causes of wars, Waltz practically 
rejects his own prior conclusion, and takes refuge in determinism. He even quotes a rhetorical 
flourish by Churchill to emphasise the point that “the destiny of mighty races of men,” rather than 
“trifles”, causally determine wars.85 Agents are swallowed up by Churchill’s destiny of mighty 
races. Waltz’s theory of the causes of war cannot explain the causal weight of individuals, 
relegating it to mere trifles behind the greater causes of history. Waltz ultimately joined 
Thucydides’ camp, but his prevarication remains puzzling. 
Hidemi Suganami argues that Waltz consistently dismisses the individual level of analysis, “as 
though he were waging a smear campaign against it.”86 He engages, writes Suganami, in “[p]ositive 
discrimination in favour of the third level.”87 Waltz privileges a structural explanation of the causes 
of war.
88
 However, structural causes – such as anarchy – tell us remarkably little about why specific 
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crises end in war, and others do not. It is just as meaningful to state that the existence of human 
beings, and their ability to kill each other, is a structural cause of war.
89
 At most, anarchy is a 
necessary but never a sufficient condition of war, since it “does not make war inevitable.”90 The 
confusion in Waltz’s analysis partly arises from confusing the causes of war in general with the 
causes of specific wars.
91
 As Suganami writes, “it is unnecessary to know about wars in general to 
be able to give an account of specific wars.”92 This conclusion has three important implications for 
agency. 
Firstly, it goes significantly further than Taylor’s car crash analogy by challenging the argument 
that structural causes add much to our understanding of war. Suganami’s conclusion “is consonant 
with historians’ usual claim that every war has its own unique cause.”93  Secondly, it suggests that 
there are multiple potential causal paths to war.
94
 Finally, Suganami’s conclusion rehabilitates 
Waltz’s first image and, with it, the causal power of human agents. He concludes that “all war 
origins are alike in that every war results from a conscious decision, however reluctant, on the part 
of the key decision-makers to go to war.”95 He also anticipates an obvious critique: 
 
All this, it may be objected, is to overestimate the degree of freedom national leaders enjoy…their freedom of 
action is so circumscribed that they cannot reasonably be expected to have acted in any significantly different 
way. They do not choose to go to war, but rather the choice is imposed on them by the nature of the system they 
work in.  But this line of thinking in turn exaggerates the strengths and uniformity with which the 
system…curtails national leaders’ freedom of action.96 
 
Suganami places human agency – and responsibility97  – at the heart of causal accounts of war. 
Some IR scholars remain ambivalent on how much causal weight to attribute to humans agents, and 
are particularly wary of discussing moral responsibility. John Vasquez, for example, is critical of 
Suganami’s agent-centric theory of the causes of war, warning against “succumbing to a witch hunt 
for war guilt that would destroy all hope for objectivity.”98 By objectivity, Vasquez was referring to 
quantitative studies using statistical methods to deduce the correlates of war.
99
 However, he was not 
clear on how much causal weighting individuals have in determining war.  
Vasquez defined the relationship between the causes of war as follows: “fundamental 
causes…set off a train of events (the proximate causes).” 100  This suggests, perplexingly, that 
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fundamental causes cause the proximate causes of war. Specific actions by specific human beings 
are traditionally described as proximate causes. Hence, in Vasquez’s formula, individuals would 
seem to be on board the train which is put into motion by fundamental causes. This is problematic. 
Human agency is again chained to the (obscure) fundamental causes of war.   
Vasquez explicitly eschewed the “mechanistic” and “Newtonian” connotations of causal 
arguments.
101
 “Rather than seeing war as caused in this mechanical sense,” he sees war “as 
something which flows out of a set of actions.”102 In a later discussion, however, he speaks of crises 
leading to war as “a long train of events that the decision makers and their followers are unable to 
avert.”103 He nevertheless advises policy-makers on how to prevent war,104 implying that decision 
makers can avert the events leading to war. While critical of Suganami’s “witch hunt” for 
individuals responsible for causing wars, Vasquez does not provide a more compelling causal 
account of agency. 
The IR literature is generally vague or inconsistent on the role which agents – human beings like 
James Blunt – play in causing or preventing wars. Jack Levy and William Thompson provide a 
series of conflicting conclusions on human agency. While leaders’ beliefs are more important 
causes of wars than structural conditions,
105
 structural causes may still “induce” a state to go to 
war.
106
 While “individuals sometimes play a key role…by making decisions that send a state down 
the path to war,” structural “forces probably have a greater impact than particular individuals on 
the…underlying processes leading to war.”107 While individuals may have had a greater impact on 
the onset of war several centuries ago, before the rise of bureaucracies and mass politics, “the 
impact of individuals…usually increases as a dispute or crisis moves closer to final decisions for 
war.”108 
This see-saw regarding the role of agents in the causes of war does not reflect a flaw in the 
authors’ logic, but rather a deeper ambiguity in the IR literature on agency. Levy and Thompson 
conclude that, because of scholarly disagreement over which is the more important cause of war, it 
is more useful to ask questions about how the levels interact.
109
 However, this second question can 
only yield useful results if we provide tentative answers to the first question. If agents simply make 
no causal difference to war, then there is little point discussing how they interact with structural 
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forces, and vice-versa. I argue that there is scholarly value in remaining focussed on the question of 
the relative causal weight of each level of analysis, and on  the individual level of analysis in 
particular. 
As Lebow concluded, “agency is important because it is never fully a response to underlying 
conditions.”110 Despite its role as a cause of war, agency remains notoriously understudied in IR. 
Colin Wight has called it “a dereliction of duty.”111 Theorists of war frequently attribute causal 
importance to partial slices of agency.
112
 But these studies have not advanced our theoretical 
understanding of agency as a concept. This suggests that the unanswered question of how much 
causal influence human beings have over war and peace, no matter how vexing, is worth asking. 
This section has provided a first sketch of role of agency in IR debates on the causes of war. 
Although only cursory, it sufficed to substantiate the point that agency is often overlooked. In this 
debate, Suganami clearly identified agency as an important cause of war. Yet this position is 
unpopular for focussing too narrowly on individuals’ responsibility for war. In the next section, I 
argue that Suganami and Taylor are justified in attributing causal power to agents for causing wars. 
I add to current debates by placing human agency squarely at the heart of the causes of war. To 
substantiate this argument, we must take a brief philosophical detour. Reader beware, we briefly 
dive down the metaphysical rabbit hole, or rat hole to some.
 113
 This is necessary to engage with the 
difficult concept of causation, which is the key to understanding how agents can cause war.  
 
AGENT-CAUSATION 
 
In the introduction, I defined agency as the causal oomph which human beings exert in the world. I 
also suggested that agency’s parent concept is causation. To make sense of this concept of agency, 
we must be able to explain it causally. The risk is that tying agency to causation risks chaining the 
former to causal determinism. There is a conceptual solution to this problem, which has gone 
unnoticed in the IR literature. It may explain how James Blunt could act to prevent war, without his 
action being determined by prior causes. In other words, it offers a way to reconcile human agency 
with causal analysis. Although they often grapple with causation, IR theorists seldom descend into 
the philosophical morass of this question.
114
 Perhaps they wilfully stay out of this morass knowing, 
as David Hume noted, that this debate “caus’d more disputes both among ancient and modern 
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philosophers” than any other.115 Or perhaps some avoid it, like Hume, preferring that all remotely 
metaphysical concepts be “committed to the flames”.116  
Whatever the reason, the end result, in IR and the broader social sciences, has been the 
remarkable predominance of Hume’s notion of causation. This approach to causation frames 
debates on the causes of war, and chains human agency to causal determinism. But this is not the 
natural, uncontested concept of causation. I propose an alternative below, drawing on earlier notions 
of causation. In this section, I integrate human agency into a theory known as agent-causation. If 
successful, this concept may help to explain the causal power of agents in world affairs, while 
freeing them from the shackles of Humean causal determinism.  
Philosophers speak of causation as the law-like connection between one event and another.
117
 
This reflects an essentially Humean “regularity-deterministic” theory of causation.118 Hume defined 
cause-and-effect as a “necessary connection” which the human mind discerned by directly 
observing such “constant conjunctions” in nature.119 Hume built on the works of Descartes, Hobbes 
and Locke, all of which rejected the orthodoxy of Aristotle’s complex, metaphysical notion of 
causation.
120
 Despite attempting to restrict all talk of causal relations to observable regularities, 
Hume ultimately appeared to accept that causation occurred in a reality independent of our sensory 
perception.
121
 In short, Hume’s concept is no less metaphysical than any other. 
There are many nuances in this fractious dispute which I cannot explore in this section. We are 
less interested, here, in the exact tenets of Hume’s concept, than in its effects upon how IR theorists 
treat the causes of war today. The descendants of Humean causation – most of the quantitative and 
positivist schools in IR – have distilled his view of causation as an essentially deterministic one. 
The universe, according to this theory, is a “closed system”, in which causal regularities point to 
deterministic laws in the social world, which we may objectively measure.
122
 By discovering such 
laws, Humean causation implies, we may predict future human behaviour. Humean causation has 
become so “internalised” in the social sciences, according to Kurki, that it has simply become 
equated with any and all causal analysis.
123
 This is particularly clear in IR, in which this regularity-
deterministic understanding of causation is simply taken for granted by mainstream theories of 
IR.
124
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This was not always the case. Earlier theorists, including classical realists and idealists – 
including E. H. Carr, Hedley Bull and Hans Morgenthau – strongly rejected this regularity-
deterministic theory of causation. These writers employed the methods of diplomatic historians in 
searching for the context-dependent causes of specific wars, rather than the cause of war in 
general.
125
 In sharp contrast, later theorists such as Waltz and Vasquez, who sought to study 
“general patterns, not the unique” causes of war, relied upon a Humean concept of causation.126 
Their assumptions, as I demonstrated above, leave little room for human agency. Agent-causation, a 
competing idea reaching back to Aristotle, provides a more compelling theory of how agents may 
cause war. It is no more mysterious, no more metaphysical than Hume’s own reductionist, 
deterministic theory of causation. 
Agent-causation is the simple idea that the causal buck stops with human beings. It is a 
deceptively simple idea: an agent is “the uncaused cause” of her actions. 127 In other words, a 
person’s actions are “held not to be themselves effects of prior causes,” as Clarke explains.128 If this 
were not the case – if Humean determinism were true – agents could never be said to act freely, 
since their actions would be the necessary effects of prior causes beyond their control. Logically, 
Humean causal determinism must hold that every agent’s action is the result of prior causes, in an 
endless chain of causation stretching back to the distant past. In short, causal determinism, if true, 
deprives agents of “morally responsible agency”, since their action is never really theirs in a robust 
sense.
129
 Agent-causation rehabilitates a strong concept of agency, and seeks to reconcile it with our 
understanding of causation. 
At first sight, this concept appears plainly tautological. After all, an agent-causal explanation 
might be as simple as: James Blunt caused James Blunt’s decision not to shoot Russians. But agent-
causation is a contentious idea, as it appears to challenge the doctrine of universal event causation. 
In the 18
th
 Century, most philosophers – even supporters of free will – believed in the idea of 
universal event causation. This principle held that every event had a prior cause.
130
  When Thomas 
Reid denied that human actions were causally determined by prior causes, his critics charged him 
with suggesting “that our free acts of will are totally uncaused events.” Reid replied that “the cause 
of the volition is the [hu]man that willed it.”131 In modern terms, as Mawson memorably put it, this 
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theory holds that agents are not merely acted upon by the causal laws of nature, but “add their own 
causal oomph to the world.”132  
Agent-causation has spawned an obtuse debate; I cannot descend into its minutiae here.
133
 Three 
points suffice to shore up this concept. Firstly, proponents of a Humean view of causation are quick 
to reject agent-causation as a threat to universal event causation.
134
 But it is not so. Universal event 
causation, as Clarke argues, need not necessarily be deterministic. It is entirely plausible to 
understand causation in probabilistic rather than deterministic terms.
135
  Every event (such as a war) 
has prior causes, but this need not imply that those causes were deterministic and fore-ordained. 
Universal event causation survives probabilistic causation; Humean determinism does not.  
Secondly, a common critique of agent-causation is that it is inherently “mysterious” or 
“magical”, in that it violates our taken-for-granted assumptions about causation. 136  That these 
assumptions are so internalised does not make them true, of course. But the critique stands. In fact, 
agent-causation is no more mysterious than Humean causation, since the former relies on exactly 
the same kind of causal logic as the latter.
137
 Both are irreducibly metaphysical. Proponents of 
causal determinism forget that causation is not an unambiguous, natural phenomenon. It is a 
profoundly philosophical concept. Physics has no general theory of causation, and some physicists 
remain sceptical of it.
138
 Causation may therefore be, as Lebow asserts, “not a feature of the [social] 
world but a concept we impose on it.”139 Science cannot be invoked as an infallible arbiter in this 
metaphysical dispute, since Humean causation stands upon no higher a scientific leg than agent-
causation.
140
 
Finally, this agent-causal concept of action is intuitively in line with our everyday assumptions 
about our causal place in the world.
141
 Agent-causation also explains how self-reflexive, conscious 
human beings fit into a causal understanding of world politics. As Lebow writes 
 
The major difference between the physical and social worlds is agency. Human actors and their collectivities do 
not merely convey forces like electrons, or respond to them like billiard balls; they have goals of their own and 
idiosyncratic understandings of context.
142
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This assertion leads Lebow to propose that Humean regularity-deterministic causation might simply 
be inapplicable to international relations. In its stead, he offers the concept of “singular causation”, 
which rests on an understanding of an “open-ended, non-linear, and reflexive political world.”143 
This concept echoes the probabilistic theory of causation outlined above. International relations 
may simply consist of a string of “one-offs”, as Lebow suggests.144 In short, agent-causation may 
explain how historical events could be so indeterministic and contingent so as to defy prediction. 
While this theory may appear novel, even radical, in contradicting Humean orthodoxy, it predates 
Hume. Agent-causation harks back to concepts of causation which Hume and his followers 
committed to the flames.  
Aristotle, as I explained above, saw agents as one of the main causes of change in the world.
145
 
His view of causation suggested that multiple, complex causal chains could “mesh together” or 
“coincide” to create non-recurring, contingent and inherently unpredictable events.146  Tethering 
agency to causal determinism, Aristotle thought, would make humans no different to inanimate 
objects. But the distinction between both is obvious: consciousness. As Aristotle wrote: 
 
The stick moves the stone and is moved by the hand, which is again moved by the man; in the man, however, we 
have reached a mover that is not so in virtue of being moved by something else.
147
 
 
The actions of human beings cannot be explained away by the physical laws of nature. Agency is 
what distinguishes humans from inanimate objects and even animals. As Aristotle said, “we do not 
say of any of the others that they act.”148  In short, the causal buck stops with human beings. Agent-
causation has at least three counter-intuitive implications. Firstly, the causal power of agents makes 
the future inherently unpredictable.
149
 The second implication is that the future cannot be said to 
have any causes.
150
 A third implication is that agents not only affect a causally-undetermined future, 
but they can never cause another free agent to do anything at all. Humans may be primary movers 
unmoved, as Aristotle called them.
151
 There are many critiques of this argument, which I will return 
to in CHAPTER 8. For now, the above suffices to prove that agency need not be beholden to causal 
determinism.  
The concept of agent-causation explains the causal oomph which individuals bring about in 
international affairs. Existing theories of IR demonstrate a deterministic bias at worst, and 
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ambivalence at best, on the relation between agency and causation. They are therefore ill-equipped 
to study preventive diplomacy. We should be clear on what agent-causation does not mean. Firstly, 
it does not imply that individual humans ever control crises and wars in a linear manner. Rather, all 
agent-causation implies is that any given individual – if he or she is not cognitively-impaired or 
physically compelled – is in ultimate control of their own actions. Secondly, agent-causation does 
not mean that individuals control the consequences of their actions. For example, Gavrilo Princip
152
 
only controlled his trigger finger on 28 June 1914, but in no way controlled the causes of the First 
World War. Finally, agent-causation implies that agents ultimately act freely, but never 
unconstrained. The next section will explain how structures constrain agents, without determining 
their actions.  
 
METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM 
 
Even if IR theorists take agent-causation seriously, the debate is not over. Even if our lone 
individual can exert some kind of causal power in the world, it would seem severely limited in the 
face of the larger units which appear to determine war and peace. Many IR theories imply that 
“structural factors are overpowering, and the opportunities and constraints they create translate 
directly into foreign policy decisions.”153 From this perspective, agents “carry relatively little causal 
weight,” and may simply “serve as conveyor belts for causality that rests with structural factors.”154 
If this is the case, the above philosophical foray was in vain. Even if agent-causation is true, 
structural constraints may imply a soft form of structural determinism. 
This debate is about “how we define our basic units of analysis and what we think the most 
important causal processes are,” as Wight defines it.155 More generally, it represents “a battle for the 
heart and soul…of the social sciences.”156 Individual-level theories of war, in contrast to structural-
level theories, reject the “deterministic link” between structures and agents.157 In this section, I 
argue that the concept of methodological individualism
158
 lends credence to the individualist 
position. I begin by exploring the philosophical implications of the levels-of-analysis problem. 
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Secondly, I follow Herbert Butterfield and John Elster in arguing that history is reducible to the 
individual-level of analysis. Finally, I answer prominent critiques of this argument. 
Waltz’s level of analysis framework gives us a useful starting point. One way to imagine these 
levels is to picture oneself observing a miniature replica of Earth on a petri dish. This microscope 
has at least three levels of magnification: international, social, individual. Waltz argued that the 
fundamental causes of war could be seen at the first level: the structure of the system.
159
 At the 
second level, we begin to see the contours of the national and cultural sub-divisions of humanity. 
This is the social realm. I will compare this level of analysis with the individual level, which zooms 
in to discern specific individuals, like James Blunt, in specific places, like Pristina. I will explore 
the tension in causal explanations at both levels of analysis. 
Structural theorising is the rule in IR; individual-level theory is the exception. In the Humean 
tradition, Waltz searched for the causes of war in the structure of society, not the individual.
160
 This 
is part of a long line of thinking in sociology, heavily influenced by Marx’s structural 
determinism.
161
 E. H. Carr argued that focussing on individuals obstructed historical 
understanding.
162
 For Carr, “individuals are social phenomena.” 163 From a structuralist perspective, 
individuals are the products of deeper historical forces. They are never perfectly free to act as they 
wish, but act “in the context, and under the impulse, of a past society.”164 If individual behaviour is 
so strongly determined by structural forces, agent-causation may be an empty consolation prize. 
Some historians have echoed this line of theorising, using an array of methods for “reducing or 
nullifying agential power.”165 Such methods include explaining Stalin’s actions as imposed on him 
by structural forces which “possessed” him.166 A similar technique is to portray Stalin’s actions as 
“dictated by the moods, needs, and pressures of the vast political machine.”167 In another egregious 
example, one historian explained Hitler’s foreign policy as the result not of his own intentions, but 
of the collective intention of “virtually all Germans.”168 Hitler was merely transmitting the social 
forces of the collective.  
Isaiah Berlin memorably compared proponents of historical determinism to “astrologers and 
magicians” who “speak in immense, unsubstantiated images and similes, in deeply misleading 
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metaphors and allegories, and make use of hypnotic formulae with little regard for experience.”169 
Another historian, Herbert Butterfield, argued that these structural forces are merely concepts. 
Concepts, he argued, like Weber, exert not causal power upon individuals: 
 
The genesis of historical events lies in human beings. The real birth of ideas takes place in human brains. The 
reason why things happen is that human beings have vitality... If we... think of the French revolution as a 
‘thing’... above all, if we start imagining that the French Revolution stood up and did something as though it were 
a self-acting agent (when we really mean that a certain man or men came to some decision or other) ... then we 
are moving into [a] world of optical illusions...
170
 
 
Butterfield concludes that “everything in history is ultimately referable to individual people.”171 The 
attempt to abstract general knowledge from history “irrespective of personalities and incidentals”, 
he warned, presents a distorted view of individuals “moulded by circumstance, as creatures 
manufactured by history, rather than as makers and choosers of their course.”172 This deterministic 
bias is evident in teleological theories of history.
173
 In reality, Butterfield argues, no deterministic 
law guides the historical process, “for the wills and choices of human beings here in the present are 
always interposed between the two.”174 No historian has the “data which would authorize him to 
prejudge the question of human free will and responsibility,” which are not reducible to structural 
forces.
175
  
Returning to the 1999 Pristina incident helps to reinforce this point. IR theorists, like legal 
scholars, personify states as “a useful fiction, analogy, metaphor, or shorthand for something 
else.”176 For the sake of convenience, for example, we may speak of NATO and Russia as if they 
were unitary, strategic, purposive agents. But it is a bridge too far to reify these concepts as if they 
were actual people,
177
 so that the will of these titans absorbs those of the individuals composing it. 
At the structural level of analysis on our microscope,
178
 NATO appears to be a plausible agent. 
However, a problem arises when we look for evidence of NATO acting consciously. As I argued 
above, consciousness is the locus of free will, giving human agents their causal power. NATO does 
not pass this basic benchmark of agency.  
This conceptual issue demands that we adjust our lens to a lower level in searching for agency. 
The individual-level of analysis reveals not only the causal power of individual agents, but a more 
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subtle, nuanced and realistic picture of the world. A structural-level explanation of the 1999 Pristina 
incident would have to appeal to abstractions, such as the balance of power, attributing innate 
“causal properties” to such concepts.179 This is to forget, however, that the balance of power is an 
arbitrary construct, or an ideal type as Weber wrote. Or, to return to Butterfield, concepts such as 
the balance of power “do not exist except as abstract terms and convenient pieces of short-hand.”180 
Closer inspection of the Pristina incident reveals this to be the case. 
James Blunt was not the only individual who helped to prevent a clash in Pristina. The actions, 
stubbornness and numerous phone calls of General Jackson – who resisted General Clark’s orders 
to attack – are a necessary part of any causal story of how war was avoided that day.181 Even more 
telling is the part played by a little-known Russian general, who allegedly manoeuvred intentionally 
to bring this entire crisis about in the first place. General Viktor Zavarzin was Russia’s first 
representative to NATO. He was due to receive a promotion when NATO began bombing Serbia in 
1999. His superiors were livid that Zavarzin failed to warn them of NATO’s actions, and intended 
to sack him. Russian sources allege that Zavarzin masterminded the Russian paratroopers’ surprise 
storming of the Pristina airport, persuaded the Chief of the General Staff to support it, who 
presented it to Yeltsin for approval half an hour before the operation. When this plan was approved, 
it became “the pinnacle of an otherwise obscure…career.”182 Zavarzin was finally promoted for his 
wild gamble. 
A structural-level explanation of the Pristina incident would either ignore or explain away 
Zavarzin’s individual actions as responses to structural forces. However, an obscure bureaucrat’s 
career path, his grievances and burning ambition appear to be divorced from structural explanations. 
We cannot so easily dismiss this individual’s actions, which appears central to the causes of the 
Pristina incident. Moreover, Zavarzin reappeared in Pristina itself and, after negotiations with 
General Jackson – aided by the latter’s offer to share his flask of whisky183 – agreed to a peaceful 
de-escalation. Only the individual level of analysis can reveal the causal complexity of international 
relations, and the crucial role of individuals in war and peace. Since they omit individuals’ career 
ambitions, personal grievances and flasks of whiskey, structural theories cannot adequately explain 
the causes of this crisis. 
This individual-centric view of history links back to Aristotle’s concept of the contingency, 
openness and indeterministic nature of the future, and on the probabilistic nature of causation.
184
 It 
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emphasises upon how “small a pivot the grandest kind of history sometimes turns.”185 This concept 
has been termed methodological individualism. Jon Elster, one of its main proponents, defines it as 
the idea that 
 
all social phenomena can in principle be explained without referring to anything but individuals – their actions, 
properties and relations. Social aggregates have no explanatory power over and above that possessed by the 
individuals who make them up.
186
 
 
This may well be “trivially, indeed boringly true.”187 Elster labelled as “mysticism” theories which 
cast social structures as exercising causal power over individuals.
188
 Without explaining how they 
work at the individual level, he wrote, structures “are condemned to remain at the level of 
speculation.”189 The “elementary unit of social life is the individual human action,” Elster argued.190 
Lebow similarly argued that “human beings [may be] about the only things in the social world that 
might conceivably be described as a natural kind with causal properties.” 191  Methodological 
individualism is logically consistent with the preceding concepts in this dissertation: contingency, 
free will and agent-causation. This collection of concepts fully explains the causal power of 
individual agents over war and peace. However, individualism faces at least three serious critiques, 
which I will briefly address. 
A first critique concerns the problem of eliminative reductionism. Just as biological reductionists 
argue that mental states are reducible to physical processes, individualists reduce the causal powers 
of social structures to individuals.
192
 However, individualists, Elder-Vass argues, cannot justify why 
we should remain at the individual level of analysis. Therefore, they cannot stop an infinite regress 
since the same logic can reduce humans’ causal power to their cells, down to their molecules, which 
are further reducible to atoms, etc.
193
 Why we should draw a line between the individual and any 
further levels of analysis above (social) or below (biological) therefore seems ad hoc.
194
 It is 
relatively straightforward to explain why this choice is warranted. We may justifiably halt at the 
individual level of analysis because agency is rooted in an individual’s consciousness, as I argued 
above.
195
 International systems and states, like molecules and atoms, do not display consciousness 
and self-reflexivity. Individuals are unique in that regard.  
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A second critique holds that individualism mirrors the excesses of structural determinism.
196
 
Wight makes a similar argument.
197
  If both positions are mutually-exclusive, it only seems rational 
to reach a compromise in the middle.
198
 However, attempts to combine structural and agential 
explanations are often ambiguous on exactly what is causing a social outcome. Despite rejecting 
“rampant individualism,” Wight concludes that structures only “decisively influence” agents.199 
Elder-Vass makes a similar argument that agents are “affected by social causes without being fully 
determined by them.”200 More balanced accounts of structure suggest that “agency is located in 
structure, but is not determined by it.”201  
Such definitions of social structure, purged of determinism, are compatible with 
individualism.
202
 But, in such diluted form, structure becomes a euphemism for social context. It is 
emptied of its causal properties. No compromise solution seems to give structuralist and agent-level 
theorists what they want. Either structure, watered down, loses its deterministic edge, or a weakened 
agency loses any meaningful causal power. Such a bargain need not be struck. It does not logically 
follow that, because these two viewpoints are antithetical, the truth must be somewhere in between. 
Max Weber critiqued attempts to compromise on “the middle course” between opposing viewpoints 
in science, which he said “is no truer even by a hair’s breadth”.203 Individualism must make a major 
concession to structuralism, I argue later in this dissertation.
204
 But this concession comes in light of 
the empirical findings in case studies to come, and it not evident at this conceptual stage of the 
discussion. 
A third critique of individualism holds that James Blunt’s actions in 1999 were at least partly 
caused by the prior actions of “macro actors” like NATO and Russia. Elder-Vass argues that events 
like wars reflect the causal power of macro-actors which “act through individual humans” 
simultaneously.
205
 On this account, “we must accept that organisations are causally responsible for 
the behaviour of their members...”206 Elder-Vass argues that we can meaningfully speak of an army 
exerting its causal power through the minds and bodies of individual soldiers.
207
 When they are 
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charging into battle, soldiers are unwittingly conduits of the army’s structural power.208 On this 
view, world leaders only exercise “some personal influence” in world politics, and only “on behalf 
of the states”.209 Social structures therefore act through agents’ consciousness. The example of a 
military charge provides a fitting note on which to end. 
Armies spend considerable energy instilling obedience into recruits, attempting to turn them into 
cogs in a machine. In a limited sense, soldiers do represent social structures. But to argue that these 
collectives fully or partly cause the individual’s behaviour is a bridge too far. Clausewitz mocked 
attempts by theorists to treat an army “like an automaton…intended to unwind its activities like a 
piece of clockwork,” without factoring in “the free activity of the mind[s]” of the soldiers.210 His 
portrait of actual battle dispels this mechanistic image, and captures the elements of chaos, choice 
and chance in every war.
211
 Secondly, James Blunt’s insubordination suggests that, if his act of will 
was enough to overcome the influence of his army training, structural forces do not exert irresistible 
force upon individual. Elder-Vass concedes that social norms, institutions and pressures only “tend 
to” encourage certain behaviours.212 Whether, and to which extent, they comply with this pressure 
is clearly up to individual agents. Thus, the causal power of social structures is that of a non-
deterministic influence upon agents’ behaviour. We can therefore conclude that individuals are the 
fundamental units of social life, and the direct causes of war and peace. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has contributed to explaining why agency is critical to understanding the causes of 
war, and efforts to prevent it. I began this chapter with the case of how James Blunt may have 
prevented a NATO-Russia war in 1999. I then proceeded to discuss various forms of determinism. 
Following Aristotle, I argued that agents act causally in the world, but that their actions are not 
determined by prior causes. This is due to the contingency of history. Secondly, I argued that free 
will was a scientifically plausible, if not more compelling, possibility than causal determinism. This 
paved the way for my discussion of the causes of war, in which I supported the position of agent-
causation. Finally, I argued that history is fundamentally reducible to individuals, and that agents 
are the most efficacious causes of war and peace, a position known as individualism.  
The above four concepts combine into the guiding assumption of this entire dissertation: human 
beings like James Blunt are the ultimate causes of war and peace. This conclusion will allow me, in 
the follow historical case studies, to focus narrowly on six agents and their efforts to prevent war. 
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Unlike many IR studies, I self-consciously eschew structural deterministic explanations of history. I 
instead follow the philosophical conclusion that we must look to individuals for the causes of war 
and peace. This chapter has served to justify my chosen unit-of-analysis – the individual – which I 
argue has the greatest causal impact on the social world. I conclude, with Elster, that this is almost 
“boringly true.” However, I argue that this boring truth needs a strong defence team, as it has almost 
been run out of the social sciences.  
The next six case studies take us to moments of historical crisis, spread out across three 
centuries, four continents, with contexts ranging from great power crises to an electoral crisis. The 
only constant across these six cases is my focus on the actions of specific individuals, to try to 
apprehend the causal influence of agents on the course of events. The above philosophical 
framework directly informs my assumptions and methods. On this understanding, we now leave the 
dark well of philosophy, pulled up by the empirical tether I promised earlier. The first real-life 
individual whose efforts to prevent war we study is General Winfield Scott. 
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PART II 
History 
 
 
“Economic factors, financial situations, wars,  
political crises, do not cause anything, do not exist  
except as abstract terms and convenient pieces  
of short-hand... It is [people] who make history.” 
- Herbert Butterfield
1 
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General Scott – The Aroostook Crisis, 1839 
 
“It is by timely and instant measures of  
prevention…that the mutual calamities,  
now imminent, may be averted.” 
- Henry S. Fox, British ambassador
1
 
 
We now emerge from metaphysics, and surface on the fields of history. This is the first of six case 
studies in this dissertation. The purpose of these case studies is to provide data against which to test 
the above philosophy. For now, we leave the armchair and venture out to the north-eastern 
boundary between the United States and Canada, in the year 1838. The fertile Aroostook Valley, 
bordering Maine and New Brunswick, almost became a major battlefield of the 19
th
 Century. 
Border incidents escalated from a local competition over timber to the brink of Anglo-American 
war. After briefly explaining the context, I will recount General Winfield Scott’s successful 
mediation of this dangerous crisis. Finally, I analyse the mystery of Governor John Fairfield’s 
change of mind after almost committing to war, for which – I argue – Scott’s mission provides the 
most compelling explanation. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
In 1837, rebellions broke out in several provinces of Canada. This sparked a diplomatic crisis 
between the British, who ruled Canada at the time, and the United States (U.S.). The crisis escalated 
sharply when the British ambassador to Washington, Henry S. Fox, accused the U.S. of supporting 
the Canadian rebels.
2
 Fox warned of a possible war between both powers, and appealed to the U.S. 
to avoid it.
3
 Despite a string of incidents, the U.S. cooperated with Canada to arrest conspirators in 
its jurisdiction.
4
 Secretary of State Forsyth reassured the British ambassador that the U.S. would 
help suppress the rebellion to prevent a major war.
5
 Although the border crisis continued to inflame 
diplomatic relations throughout 1838, cool heads prevailed to prevent escalation for now.  
The U.S. sent General Scott to the region to prevent American citizens from getting involved in 
the Canadian rebellion.
6
 “In the first winter,” Scott wrote in his autobiography, “one of those 
incidents occurred which make history dramatic, and which illustrate how much depends on 
individual men and single events.” In January 1838, Scott confiscated a ship – the Barcelona – 
which American partisans intended to sell to Canadian rebels. However, British ships patrolling the 
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same waters intended to sink the Barcelona for good measure. Scott recounts the incident in the 
third-person: 
The cannon on either shore were pointed, the matches lighted, and thousands stood in suspense...On Scott's note 
and his personal assurances alone depended the question of peace or war. Happily, these assurances had their just 
effect. The Barcelona passed along. The British did not fire. The matches were extinguished, and the two nations, 
guided by wise counsels, resumed their usual way.
7
 
 
The assurances Scott refers to were those which the general had written on his lap earlier, and sent 
to the British officer on the incoming ship. Scott had warned the British against attacking, and gave 
personal assurances that he would restrain his own side in exchange. A British attack on the 
Barcelona, he warned, meant certain war. The British officer complied.
8
 Although Scott’s 
biography engages in blatant self-glorification,
9
 this incident reveals the causal sway which Scott 
exercised in 1837, and foreshadows that which he would exercise in the Aroostook Valley.  
A more dangerous Anglo-American crisis threatened to explode in early 1838. This time, the 
danger lay along the disputed border between Maine and New Brunswick. Both sides claimed the 
Aroostook Valley. The dispute had its origins in the imprecise wording of the Treaty of Paris, which 
had formally ended the U.S. war of independence. The text of the treaty did not correlate with the 
commonly-accepted names of geographical features.
10
 The territorial dispute was worsened by other 
irritants, including lingering animosities from the war of 1812, British strategic interests, and rivalry 
between local lumberjacks for the wood in the fertile Aroostook and Madawaska Valleys.
11
 These 
irritants, according to Howard Jones, “sharpened concern over the unsettled north-eastern boundary 
and had the potential of forcing Great Britain and the United States into war.”12  
Britain’s key strategic interest was to maintain unimpeded access to the St. John River. This was 
the only route via which troops from Britain could reach Canada when the St. Lawrence froze over 
each winter.
13
 British generals also “wanted to keep the United States away from the hills 
overlooking the St Lawrence River, especially near Quebec.”14 These heights, which the Americans 
claimed, would give the U.S. military a stranglehold on the supply of British troops to Canada. The 
precise historical claims and legal arguments of each side, and the details of previous initiatives to 
resolve this dispute, are unimportant for our purposes. The main point is that each side claimed the 
entirety of the Aroostook Valley as its rightful territory.  
Maine sent a U.S. surveyor to distribute taxes from the federal surplus to this valley in 1838. He 
was swiftly arrested by the Canadian authorities for this act of sovereignty. The diplomatic 
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managers of the incident dealt with this incident tactfully. Forsyth’s conciliatory approach to 
foreign policy earned him the scorn of some of his contemporaries. A Maine politician was “utterly 
disgusted” by Forsyth’s attempts to negotiate a compromise boundary line with the British.15 For 
his part, Forsyth’s main correspondent, British ambassador Fox, has gone down in history as “an 
inveterate gambler and often in debt,” as well as being “indolent and lazy”. 16  Indeed “hardly 
anyone,” according to one historian, “ever had a good word to say of him.”17 Whatever their faults, 
Forsyth and Fox at least had the merit of being moderates. 
 
THIS GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY 
 
By 1839, Britain and the U.S. were losing control of the situation on the ground. The Democrat 
John Fairfield, Governor of Maine since 1838, warned the state legislature that Canadian 
lumberjacks had stolen hundreds of thousands of trees in the Aroostook Valley. The local 
legislature appropriated $10,000 to raise an armed posse to defend the territory.
18
 Next, the leader of 
the Maine posse, Rufus McIntire, arrested “trespassers”, including New Brunswick’s warden of the 
disputed territory. In retaliation, a band of Canadians seized McIntyre at night and jailed him in 
Canada.
19
 Sir John Harvey, Lieutenant-General of New Brunswick, issued a proclamation 
denouncing the Maine posse’s “invasion” of Canada, and called for military enlistments.20  
Newspapers in Maine bayed for revenge.
21
 The press was pushing for war in both countries, 
magnifying local tensions into international incidents.
22
 One reporter recounted the mood in Maine 
on February 25: “a great stir and bustle. The foundries are still at work casting balls…men are busy 
in manufacturing cartridges...stores and munitions of war, load after load, are passing every hour for 
the scene of operations.”23 One patriotic song intoned: 
 
We’ll feed them well with ball and shot, 
We’ll cut these Red-coats down, 
Before we yield to them an inch 
Or title of our ground… [and] 
With justice, and with glory fight, 
For these Aroostook lands.
24
 
 
Another report from Maine noted that “swords that have been quietly rusting in their scabbards 
since the time of the Revolution, and muskets that have never known gun-powder…are called into 
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requisition… The general sentiment is to resist even unto blood.”25 Governor Fairfield gave fiery, 
patriotic speeches to the troops in Augusta. “The time has come,” he told them, “when we must 
make a vigorous and manly defense of our soil...”26 The few dissenting voices were crushed by a 
swelling, national war fever.
27
  
To favour peace was utterly ignominious and worthy of shame for generations to come.  “God 
grant,” prayed one newspaper, “that no pacific may retard us [for war].”28 The New York Gazette 
warned that any association with the ‘peace party’ would “ruin a man unto his third or fourth 
generation.”29 One Boston newspaper reported men growing their moustaches, because “those who 
are deficient in these hairy appendages cannot with a good grace shout war! WAR! WAR!”30 The 
New York Herald reported from that city: 
 
The excitement which prevails in this city is of the most extraordinary character. It seems to be a unanimous 
throb of determination, among all parties and all classes, to support the claims of the United States… at every and 
all hazards. The opposition seems more determined to resist the pretensions of Great Britain than even the 
Administration… This topic now absorbs every other subject… at the soirees in the hotels, along the avenues, in 
the lobbies, nothing is heard but questions and conversation on Maine. Even among the pretty women there is a 
strong warlike disposition.
31 
 
Finally, in one of the most hyperbolic pieces of mouth-frothing, jingoistic journalism, one paper 
wrote that “governor Fairfield has it in his power to become second only to Moses and 
Washington.” The newspaper advised that the Governor of Maine should invade all of Canada, set 
up a Republican Government, appoint himself President, and annex Canada for the Union. “All this 
he can do in twelve or twenty-four months at the furthest, if he is the man we take him to be...”32 
The Illinois militia was ready to fight for Maine, and Governor Fairfield was told by a New Yorker 
that “every State in the Union will pour forth her troops to sustain your just war…”33 In the press 
and in popular opinion, the warrior spirit prevailed.  
As a sign that the situation was still manageable in the actual disputed area, British and 
American troops drank together at the local pub in Houlton. The odd drunken bar fight was the 
extent of any violence.
34
 But politicians on both sides were increasingly constrained by the popular 
calls for war, fanned by the belligerent press, and were inching closer to war. In a speech to the 
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Augusta legislature, Governor Fairfield advised sending 300 reinforcements to the Aroostook, and 
asked for an extra 10,000 militiamen.
35
 The legislature unanimously appropriated $800,000 to raise 
that army. Fairfield immediately sent 4,000 of them to the Aroostook. Justifying his decision to his 
son, he wrote that “although it is wicked to fight under most circumstances, it is not wicked, in my 
opinion, to fight for the defence of our country.”36 The difficulty was not to recruit volunteers, 
Fairfield wrote to his wife, but to hold back a flood of recruits.
37
 Fairfield appealed to the president 
for federal troops to support the war effort. He then warned Governor Harvey against intervening in 
Maine’s territory.38 
A war scare seized New Brunswick when newspapers warned of an impending American 
invasion. Governor Harvey, who hoped to avoid war, still felt compelled to deliver fiery speeches to 
his own troops. He was no doubt buoyed by the pledges of military aid from the lieutenant 
governors of Lower Canada and Nova Scotia.
39
 Attempting a good-faith measure, Harvey released 
McIntyre, leader of the Maine posse, on parole, and sent a letter to Fairfield. But direct 
communication did not help. Fairfield, upon receiving the letter from McIntyre’s hand on 21 
February, concluded that “it would appear that collision is inevitable.”40 Three days later, Fairfield 
wrote again to his wife that he was resolved to solve this dispute once and for all. “Now is the time 
to strike a blow for our rights,” he concluded. If he let “this golden opportunity pass,” he wrote, “we 
shall deserve to lose our territory and win the contempt of the world.”41 Fairfield was about to start 
the largest war in living memory. 
 
THE GREAT PACIFICATOR 
 
Decision-makers in Washington and London were the last barrier to certain war. President Van 
Buren, who had clung to the hopes of peace, now appeared more anxious. The president 
“entertain[ed] much less hope of avoiding a serious collision between the two countries.”42 The 
pressure was acute. In Maine towns supportive of his own party, mobs burned effigies of President 
Van Buren, who found himself in a political dilemma.
43
 “If he throws cold water upon us, and treats 
the subject coolly, and in his non-committal style,” a critic pointed out, “he may bid farewell to the 
votes of Maine forever.”44  While supporting Maine’s territorial claims, he criticised Governor 
                                                          
35
 Jones (1975: 524). 
36
 Staples (1922: 267). 
37
 Ibid. 266. 
38
 Jones (1975: 525). 
39
 Ibid. 526. 
40
 Staples (1922: 266). 
41
 Ibid. 268. 
42
 Ibid. 254. 
43
 Ibid. 329. 
44
 Ibid. 327. 
Chapter 2   
 
57 
Fairfield for his call to arms. As Jones writes, Van Buren’s balanced apportioning of blame 
“succeeded only in gaining the enmity of almost everyone.”45 In the end, Van Buren buckled to the 
hawks. On 28 February, both houses of Congress authorised the president to resist British 
aggression in the Aroostook Valley. Van Buren signed the bill in March, appropriating ten million 
dollars for arms and authorising him to call out 500,000 volunteers.
46
 This turned a border dispute 
into a diplomatic crisis. 
Despite complaining of Maine’s aggressiveness, Britain was not an innocent bystander. Lord 
Palmerston “considered the border events merely a nuisance and seemed willing to accept almost 
any compromise settlement,” according to one scholar.47 When relations deteriorated, Palmerston 
asserted Britain’s right to exercise de facto sovereignty over the disputed territory pending its final 
resolution.
48
 He further warned that Maine’s actions “if persevered in, must lead to hostile collisions 
between that State and the Government of New Brunswick.”49 This swing from negligence to a hard 
line defence of British sovereignty worsened the situation.
50
 Another common American grievance 
was the fact that Palmerston did not deal with the dispute punctually, leaving his ambassador in 
Washington, Henry S. Fox, frequently without instructions.
51
 On one occasion, the U.S. ambassador 
in London complained that he had pressed Palmerston for one month to respond on a particular 
topic.
52
 All of the above anecdotes tend to confirm Thomas Le Duc’s accusation that Palmerston 
demonstrated an “inability to formulate a rational policy toward the United States.”53 At least, 
Britain’s indecision sent mixed signals to Washington. 
On 27 February, the British ambassador Fox and Secretary of State Forsyth signed a 
memorandum designed to prevent hostilities. This document was the circuit-breaker for which both 
central governments had grasped. The Fox-Forsyth memorandum set out the fact that Great Britain 
and the United States agreed to disagree for now, and affirmed the principle that the boundary 
dispute should be settled amicably via negotiation. The memorandum contained the following 
short-term commitments on behalf of New Brunswick and Maine: 
 
1. Her Majesty's officers will not seek to expel, by military force, the armed party which has been sent by 
Maine into the district bordering on the Aroostook River;  
 
2. But the Government of Maine will, voluntarily, and without needless delay, withdraw beyond the bounds of 
the disputed territory any armed force now within them;  
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3. And if future necessity should arise for dispersing notorious trespassers, or protecting public property from 
depredation by armed force, the operation shall be conducted by concert, jointly or separately, according to 
agreements between the Governments of Maine and New Brunswick. 
 
4. The civil officers in the service respectively of New Brunswick and Maine, who have been taken into 
custody by the opposite parties, shall be released. 
 
5. Nothing in this memorandum shall be construed to fortify or to weaken, in any respect whatever, the claim 
of either party to the ultimate possession of the disputed territory.
54
 
 
Fox was acting without instruction from his capital, London. He had made a conscious 
compromise in recognising the de facto territorial dispute, but believed it to be necessary to prevent 
war.
55
 President Van Buren and Lord Palmerston quickly endorsed the memorandum. But neither 
capital had the power to impose those terms upon New Brunswick or Maine. It was far from clear 
that the parties could still be persuaded to avoid war. General Scott was the man sent for that job. 
The Great Pacificator, as he would be called, consulted with Washington on his mission. “Every 
branch of the Government felt alarmed at the imminent hazard of a formidable war,” he recounts of 
his meeting with the Secretary of War. Scott, who had not slept in days, said to President Van 
Buren: “Mr. President, if you want war, I need only look on in silence. The Maine people will make 
it for you fast and hot enough. I know them; but if peace be your wish, I can give no assurance of 
success. The difficulties in its way will be formidable.” “Peace with honor,” Van Buren replied. 
Scott left on his mission “with a hearty good will.” 56 He knew that he had carte blanche to prevent 
war; he also knew that, if he failed, the grisly business of war would also fall to him.
57
 
Upon his arrival in the Aroostook, the situation was so tense that the population of Maine hoped 
that he had come to conquer the Aroostook militarily. The crowds “had become tired of diplomacy, 
parleys, and delays”. He could only pronounce the word peace “in the gentlest and most persuasive 
accents to the hostile ears of the Governor and his council at Augusta, the capital of Maine.” 58 
Judging that the parties were fast approaching actual hostilities, Scott quickly understood that 
Maine politics was the driver of war. Since the masses were calling for it, the ruling Democrats 
were bellicose, with the Whigs threatening to regain control of the state with their competing war 
talk. Fairfield could not appear weak. Scott worked on implementing the Fox-Forsyth 
memorandum.  
Setting up an office in the Governor’s house in Augusta, Scott sat with Fairfield and his advisers 
three times a day to persuade him to accept the terms of the memorandum. “By degrees he won 
their confidence,” helped no doubt by his connection to the president.59 Fairfield sympathised with 
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Scott, writing to his wife on 6 March that the general “is now the lion of the day. He is often at my 
rooms and I find him to be very agreeable.” 60  But Fairfield was also influenced by political 
supporters who decried the Fox-Forsyth memorandum as “a foul blot upon our nation”.61 Scott was 
of the opinion that President Van Buren had made a tactical mistake in releasing the Memorandum 
to Congress, as it inflamed passions.
62
 As he made slow progress in Maine, Scott worked 
simultaneously on persuading Sir Harvey, Governor of New Brunswick, to exercise restraint. 
Scott struggled “to find a solvent for such knarled perplexities, foreign and domestic.” By a 
stroke of sheer luck, “accidental circumstances in his history” provided an opening.63 It happened 
that Scott knew Harvey personally, having spared him from certain death on the battlefield. When 
one of Scott’s men took aim and fired at Harvey – who had a reputation for kindness towards 
American prisoners – Scott bumped his rifleman’s weapon, shouting “Don’t kill our prisoner!” This 
gave Harvey the time to escape unscathed. Serendipitously, Harvey – now Governor of New 
Brunswick – had since written a letter to Scott, which allowed them to maintain a crucial exchange 
throughout the crisis.
64
 They had developed a personal bond of friendship and mutual respect. When 
Scott finally mediated a political agreement between Maine Whigs and Democrats, which reassured 
Fairfield that his opponents would not gain politically by tarring his peace gesture, the deal was 
done.
65
 Sir Harvey agreed immediately to the outlines of Scott’s deal, which was basically a 
repetition of the Fox-Forsyth memorandum, without the political poison for Fairfield.  
Trusting Scott, Harvey did not object on grounds of the unresolved details.
66
 On March 12, 
Fairfield, no longer fearing a political threat from the Whigs, made a conciliatory speech. On 20 
March, the Augusta Legislature passed an act echoing this statement.
67
 Scott’s mission was bearing 
fruit, as both sides worked to find a way to dismantle the cycle of escalation. The next day, Scott 
sent a letter to Harvey in the format of ‘if you declare this, we’ll declare that.’ He asked Harvey to 
declare that, while awaiting instructions from London, he would not seek to expel Maine’s posse by 
military force. In exchange, Scott offered a reciprocal statement from Governor Fairfield that he 
would not seize the disputed territory militarily, leaving only a small posse to protect the timber.
68
 
A few days later, Harvey gave his full consent to Scott’s face-saving proposal, and Fairfield 
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followed suit.
69
 Harvey was extremely pleased with Scott’s effort, and thanked him for restoring 
relations to allow the peaceful resolution of the boundary dispute.
70
 The immediate crisis was over.  
 
ANALYSIS 
 
The Aroostook War is one of the most extraordinary non-events in history. In the end, only two 
people died. One Maine soldier died of measles, and a farmer named Nathan Johnston was killed by 
a bullet ricocheting during a peace celebration.
71
 The great powers narrowly averted a head-on 
collision which, as one contemporary source estimated, would have cost the U.S. vastly more than 
the land was worth. The war could have cost $5,000 a day, or millions of dollars a day in modern 
terms.
72
 Despite such enormous political pressure in favour of a military confrontation, none 
occurred. As one author wrote, “it can only be looked upon as a mystery, that under such 
circumstances, actual hostilities did not lead to bloodshed along the entire border.”73 Hindsight has 
made it evident that, far from a mystery, the purposive actions of decision-makers prevented war. 
The question we must ask is how, despite such pressure, the parties were able to prevent a war 
which, as Fairfield wrote to his wife, he considered inevitable? To answer this question, we must 
begin with Fairfield himself.  
Evidently, the dynamics of escalation in this crisis were driven by all the major players. 
However, historians of the Aroostook War appear to concur that the state of Maine – or, more 
precisely, Governor Fairfield – was in the driver’s seat of the push for war. Although Harvey 
immediately supported it, Fairfield initially refused to negotiate a compromise on the basis of the 
Fox-Forsyth memorandum.
74
 On 27 February, at the height of the crisis, Fairfield was not only 
furious at the lack of instructions from Washington and ready to take matters into his own hands; he 
had also, dangerously, convinced himself that events were beyond his control.
75
 By 9 March, 
however, Fairfield had changed his tune. He now expressed the hope that, using the Fox-Forsyth 
memorandum, “I shall be able to take a course which shall preserve our honor and yet not 
unnecessarily provoke hostilities.”76 Over those ten days, Fairfield changed his mind, paving the 
way for the dispute’s peaceful de-escalation. His change of mind is one of the enduring elements of 
this crisis. 
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There are two theories of Fairfield’s character and role in the crisis. The first is the critique, from 
several Whig opponents, that Fairfield was simply “a hot-headed fanatic who was rushing the 
country into war.”77 This was a superficial and politically-motivated argument. In truth, even the 
Whigs pushed for war, with one partisan paper writing: “There is no good reason why we should 
avoid a collision. We have avoided it too much and too long already.”78 Lowenthal proposes the 
alternative theory that President Van Buren’s even-handed public statement worsened the crisis, by 
painting Fairfield into a corner, and making bellicosity his only hope of preventing war. Lowenthal 
argues that John Fairfield “was not a warlike man, and knew how ridiculous it was to suppose that 
Maine could fight England single-handed.”79 Lowenthal continues: 
 
it was only by the most consummate skill that he was able to prevent [war]. Had he shown the slightest 
disposition to back out, the Legislature would have taken the matter out of his hands and precipitated an 
immediate conflict. Fairfield had to pretend to be belligerent, yet do nothing rash, and wait until the dispute 
should die down of its own accord. Had he followed any other course, he would have been committing political 
suicide.
80
 
 
Rather than Fairfield the fanatic, we have an image of Fairfield as the skilled peace-maker.
81
 
This is an intriguing argument. But the entire theory rests on one letter Fairfield wrote to his wife, in 
which he hoped “soon to be able to beat the sword into the ploughshare and to go to work upon our 
humble farm.”82 But a third possibility, which Jones mentions but underplays, is that General Scott 
truly saved the day. Indeed, Fairfield wrote his sword-to-ploughshare letter to his wife six days after 
his previous letter signalling his change of mind. Something occurred between 27 February, when 
Fairfield was ready to start a war, and 9 March, when he hoped for a face-saving way out. That 
something was General Scott’s mission.  
Scott’s presence on the ground is the only explanation for why Fairfield changed his attitude, 
almost literally overnight, once “the lion of the day” had arrived in Maine. As Jones argues, both 
Whigs and Democrats had probably “finally understood where their policies had led the state and 
gladly took advantage of an opportunity to escape war.”83 It is probably not true that Fairfield was 
more concerned with preventing war than with surviving politically – or else he would not have 
escalated the crisis to the brink. General Scott is likely right in his view that, had he arrived in 
March a few days late, “the troops of the two countries would have arrived, and crossed bayonets 
on the disputed territory…”84  
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In his memoirs, Scott’s occasional self-importance is balanced by his realistic assessment that his 
prestige as the general of 1812 was the real source of his power to mediate the dispute so 
effectively.
85
 It was perhaps not what he said which moved Fairfield, but what he represented: a 
general who had fought the last war, and who would lead young Mainers to their deaths if another 
one broke out. In the end, the decision not to go to war belongs squarely to Fairfield. He deserves 
the credit of accepting a mediated solution. Without Scott to help both sides save face, Fairfield’s 
policy of putting Maine on a collision path with New Brunswick would likely have ended in war. 
The final border treaty was signed in 1842. But it was due to the collective efforts of Fox, Forsyth, 
Van Buren, Harvey, Fairfield and, finally, Scott, that history has not added the Anglo-American 
War of 1839 to the list of ‘inevitable’ wars. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The above case revealed important insights into agency, contingency and individualism, which we 
will return to in later chapters. In the first instance, I argued that Scott’s mission helped to explain 
why no war occurred during this crisis. His agency was at the heart of the successful prevention of 
war in the Aroostook crisis. However, it is unclear how much causal power we can attribute to 
Scott’s mediation, rather than to Fairfield’s own change of mind. Secondly, the contingency of 
history was revealed, in this case, in the fact that Scott was able to rely on Governor Harvey’s 
goodwill since he had saved his life during the British-American war of 1813. This element of pure 
chance appears to have been crucial in explaining the success of Scott’s initiative to prevent war. 
Finally, the framework of methodological individualism provides a persuasive lens through which 
to study these micro-historical interactions. If we effaced all of these personalities, and zoomed up 
to the level of nation-states, we would lose sight of the local actors on the ground who were beyond 
the control of central governments – especially lumberjacks on both sides. A structuralist 
explanation of this crisis would not capture the irreducible role of individual people. We will return 
to some of these discussion points in the theory-building stage of this dissertation. For now, we 
remain in the U.S., where decades later General Scott is still playing a major role, this time in 
support of another leader trying to prevent a looming civil war.  
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William H. Seward – The Secession Crisis, 1860-1861 
 
“Cheerful where everyone else was in despair…grand in resource  
where every resource seemed exhausted… between his friends  
who were ready to denounce him, and his enemies who were  
eager to destroy him … [he] fought… a fight which might go  
down to history as one of the wonders of statesmanship.”  
- Henry Adams
1
 
 
In the previous chapter, we followed General Scott’s efforts to prevent armed conflict between two 
great powers over a sliver of arable land. As I argued above, without the key actions of several 
leaders, especially Harvey and Fairfield, war would likely have occurred. In this chapter, we remain 
in North America, but now turn to events which led to the cataclysmic U.S. Civil War. I argue that 
the causes of this war are revealed fully at the individual level of analysis, where we can see some 
agents advocating for the use of force, and others acting strategically, and often desperately, to 
prevent it. One such agent was William Henry Seward. During the 1861 secession crisis, Seward 
mounted what Henry Adams called a wonder of statesmanship. “All the hyperbole and hero-
worship aside,” Mark Stegmaier writes, “Henry Adams was probably not that inaccurate in his 
portrayal of the pivotal role” that Seward played. 2  The civil war, I will argue, did not occur 
necessarily, but due to the confluence of chance events, one leader’s stubborn will, and the actions 
of many individuals.  
This case study focuses on the dramatic events of the winter of 1860-1861, which saw promising 
initiatives to prevent secession from dismembering the United States. Claiming over half a million 
lives, the U.S. Civil War presaged the industrial-scale destruction of twentieth century warfare.
3
 As 
this case study seeks to demonstrate, the civil war was anything but inevitable. In this section, I 
briefly survey the key events and actors in the secession crisis. Secondly, I examine William Henry 
Seward’s campaign to avert the collapse of the Union during the winter of 1860-1861. Thirdly, I 
turn to the pivotal Fort Sumter incident, which saw Seward’s conciliatory campaign lose out to the 
belligerent elements in his own party. Finally, I engage in the scholarly debate on responsibility for 
the outbreak of war. Following revisionist historians, I argue that William Henry Seward very 
nearly prevented the cataclysmic American civil war. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Adams (1958: 23). 
2
 Cited in Adams (2012: 219). 
3
 See Neely (1991: 5-28). 
  Preventive Diplomacy 
64 
BACKGROUND 
 
Tensions between the slave-owning South and the North reached their apex in 1860.
4
 The Missouri 
Compromise (1820) attempted to resolve the impasse by legalising slavery in the southern states. 
The status quo broke down following the Kansas-Nebraska Act (1854), which effectively repealed 
the 1820 compromise. In a sign of growing tensions, pro- and anti-slavery activists clashed 
violently in Kansas. The crisis split political parties into two blocs, Republicans and Democrats, 
which roughly held sway in the free North and the slave-holding South respectively.  
Two particular incidents raised the stakes in this national schism. Firstly, in 1857, the U.S. 
Supreme Court, in one of the most controversial cases in its history, declared the Missouri 
Compromise unconstitutional.
5
 In 1859, a radical abolitionist, John Brown, attempted to launch a 
slave rebellion in the South. He was captured and executed; the North treated him as a martyr, the 
South as a criminal.
6
 By early 1860, the stage was set for a violent confrontation. But not all actors 
were resigned to accepting their parts in the macabre theatre to come. This chapter documents one 
particularly bold and almost fruitful attempt to prevent the conflict that became the American Civil 
War. 
Until they reached the precipice, few observers at the time foresaw that disunion might lead to 
civil war. Those who did foresee it seemed unaware of how costly civil war would be.
7
 One such 
observer was Jefferson Davis, the future President of the Confederate States of America.
8
 Another 
was William Henry Seward, a neighbour and close friend of Davis in Washington, and Lincoln’s 
secretary of state-designate.
9
 Lincoln himself appeared to be blind to the risk of war until late in the 
secession crisis.
10
 Other prominent actors who foresaw and attempted to prevent civil war included 
Douglas Adams, the Democratic presidential candidate whom Lincoln defeated in the November 
1860 election, and senator John Crittenden. However, Seward became the de facto leader of those 
seeking compromise during the secession crisis. This case study therefore focuses on Seward’s 
efforts to avoid civil war. 
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An elder and widely respected statesman across party lines, Seward was by far the favourite 
Republican tipped to run for President in 1860. The former New York governor was a political 
leviathan, backed by immense popular support and money from financial elites. Seward was a 
notable and early opponent of slavery.
11
 He was a captivating orator, if at times slightly academic.
12
 
Karl Marx noted that Seward was “unquestionably” the Republicans’ “leading orator,” which he did 
not mean as a compliment.
13
 Seward was as adept as any 19
th
 Century politician at vote-buying, a 
cruder version of modern lobbying.
14
 And he was self-important. If the Republicans did not 
nominate him for president, he told a reporter, he would quit public life in protest.
15
 With Seward’s 
great fame came great enmities.  
His most eminent detractor was Horace Greeley, who claimed that Seward had abandoned him 
when he sought support for political office in 1855. Now editor of the New York Tribune, the most 
influential newspaper in the country, Greeley sought revenge.
16
 At the Republican convention in 
May 1860, he spread rumours about Seward’s radicalism.17 Greeley allied with Lincoln’s team on a 
“stop Seward” campaign and was elated when, against all odds, Lincoln clinched the nomination.18 
It is important to stress Greeley’s role in undermining Seward’s ambitions, as he appears again at a 
most inauspicious moment in history.
19
 
Despite his shattering and unexpected loss, Seward campaigned vigorously to the point of 
physical exhaustion for the Republicans in the November elections. At the start of the secession 
crisis, Seward was seen, and saw himself, as first among equals in any future Lincoln cabinet. When 
two South Carolina senators resigned their seats and threatened secession at the start of winter, 
Seward immediately saw the urgency of going to Washington.
20
 From there, he would put into 
motion what one historian called “a coherent plan for ultimate peaceful reconstruction of the 
Union.”21 But for a few contingent events, Seward’s plan might have prevented imminent war, and 
ended slavery via non-violent means. As this case demonstrates, Lincoln obstructed these 
compromise proposals of Seward and numerous other conciliatory leaders. Seward, whose soiled 
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reputation has only recently been rehabilitated, very nearly saved the Union. The following section 
recounts the ebbs and flows in Seward’s efforts from December 1860 to April 1861. 
 
THE LONGEST WINTER 
 
With the threat of southern secession growing, the New York stock market crashed. “Washington 
was in a state of near panic,” Denton emphasises, “and no one knew the president-elect, or more 
important, what he intended to do.”22 Lincoln was an obscure and inexperienced politician from 
Illinois. He later freely admitted that he had expected to be Seward’s right-hand man, not the other 
way around.
23
 The President-Elect remained in Illinois for now. Seward was quietly active in 
Washington, manoeuvring quietly to gauge the views of southern leaders.
24
 In a December 2 letter 
to his manager, Seward predicted the secession of many southern states.
25
 As the secession winter 
commenced, two main factions pushed for a compromise: Northern moderates who condemned 
rigid abolitionists, and Southern moderates who sought reconciliation.
26
 Seward’s strategy aimed to 
weld together this cross-party movement, to empower moderates and isolate radicals both North and 
South. 
In conducting his plan to find a political compromise, Seward employed his manager, Thurlow 
Weed, as a proxy. Weed wrote op-eds in his Albany Evening Journal floating various proposals, 
which would help Seward gauge political reactions to them.
27
 On 20 December, South Carolina 
finally seceded. Lincoln still resisted the need to for any compromise. Following the first secession, 
the Washington rumour mill warned of a secessionist plot to seize the capital city in late December. 
Seward clung to the hope that suggesting “a convention two years hence” may buy time for peace.28 
By this stage, Seward’s observations in Washington had evolved into a “three-pronged approach” to 
prevent disunion and, worse, civil war. Firstly, he would seek to push for a compromise acceptable 
to pro-Union activists in upper southern states, to split those key states from the more hard-line 
secessionists in the deep South.
29
 Secondly, he would seek to fuel support for a compromise in the 
North. Finally, his pivotal third objective was to gain time to restore southern trust in the Union.
30
 
Time was not on his side. By late December, moderate Republicans could foresee that a lack of 
compromise might spell war.
31
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The majority of public opinion, North and South, was overwhelmingly in favour of peace. 
Hundreds of moderate politicians, elites and ordinary citizens from across the country sent letters 
supporting the peace efforts of Seward, Crittenden and Douglas. Seward redirected these pro-
compromise petitions to Lincoln, to try to influence his views.
32
 Lincoln not only resisted but 
actively ordered his allies to resist any compromise proposals. An incident on 9 January 1861 
presaged things to come. Buchanan had ordered a ship, The Star of the West, to resupply the federal 
Fort Sumter in South Carolina.
33
 The mission was a major failure; the ship withdrew after South 
Carolinians fired upon it. Mississippi seceded on that day, as did Florida the next, and Alabama 
soon thereafter. Senator Crittenden attempted to bypass opponents of compromise by appealing 
directly to the people in a referendum on his proposal, but Lincoln vetoed the idea.
34
 Speaking 
before a packed senate on 12 January, Seward preached peace, conciliation and devotion to the 
Union before all else. Lincoln privately endorsed Seward’s speech as “doing good all over the 
country.”35 As long as the conciliators prevailed, nothing seemed inevitable about further secession, 
let alone war. 
In February, the last month of the secession winter, Virginia invited all states to attend a ‘Peace 
Conference’ to attempt to negotiate a compromise solution. Although historians are still debating 
whether Seward was behind this initiative, his influence was clearly not far away.
36
 Weed, Seward’s 
manager, convinced Lincoln that Republicans should attend.
37
 Lincoln claimed that he “would 
rather be hung by the neck til he was dead on the steps of the Capitol, rather than begging for 
peace,” but finally relented to moderate Republicans. 38  Greeley attempted to undermine the 
conference with his Tribune mouthpiece, urging “NO MORE COMPROMISES!” He equated 
attempts to broker peace with treason.
39
 The Peace Conference recommended any “constitutional 
method” to “permanently settle the question of slavery.”40 But a powerful coalition of Northern and 
Southern radicals hoped that the conference would collapse.
41
 They successfully joined forces in 
both houses of Congress to defeat a motion even to discuss these propositions.
42
 The hawks had 
won. Despite the swelling tide of popular excitement at the prospects of compromise, the Peace 
Conference would be a sad footnote to history. Horace Greeley continued to use his powerful voice 
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in the press to practically advocate war: “NO NEGOTIATIONS WITH TRAITORS” his headlines 
shrieked. “Let this suspense and uncertainty cease! If we are to fight, so be it.”43 
A contemporary’s account of the peace conference is particularly telling in revealing the causes, 
or rather the personal vendettas, behind the conference’s failure: 
 
The difficulty is certain men of [New York] are more interested in killing Seward, than in saving the Union – 
Indeed there is too general a feeling that party is paramount to Union – I fear that this feeling or rather the 
apprehension of injuring the party will lead to a policy which will destroy both it & the country...
44
 
 
In another letter to his brother, he wrote: “Confidentially, I would say a party is manifestly being 
formed here to head off Gov. Seward, not to drive him out of the Cabinet, but to forestall him for 
the future…” 45  This is intriguing. Some of Seward’s enemies from New York attended the 
conference not only to scuttle a peaceful compromise, but to scuttle his career and, perhaps, his 
chance of running for the presidency in 1864. This episode reveals that Seward’s name had become 
virtually synonymous with ‘compromise’ by February 1861. In destroying his compromise efforts, 
his enemies sought to destroy him personally.
46
 It is unclear of whom exactly this “strong Anti-
Seward party” consisted. 47  But Greeley, a fellow New Yorker, is a likely member. Seward 
increasingly saw Greeley and radical Republicans as enemies of peace. But Seward himself made a 
move which appears, in hindsight, to have been a major mistake. When faced with an intransigent 
Lincoln and Republicans united in their rejection of the Peace Conference, Seward toed the line 
rather than risk his position. Many moderate Southerners, who were depending on Seward to keep 
the doors of compromise open, saw this as a betrayal.
48
 
In Lincoln’s absence, “[General] Scott and [Seward] rule the country and Scott’s share in the 
rule is but small.” 49  Another historian characterised Seward as “the most powerful person in 
Washington” from December 1860-January 1961.50 With Lincoln’s arrival in February, however, 
Seward’s influence waned overnight. When Lincoln was inaugurated on 13 February, Seward 
worked with Scott and numerous agents to ensure that soldiers guarded every potential vantage 
point to protect Lincoln from credible assassination plots.
51
 On 24 February, Seward wrote a letter 
to the president warning him to revise his inauguration speech, which virtually guaranteed the 
secession of wavering southern states.
52
 The original text featured provocative fighting talk, putting 
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the onus on the South to avoid civil war.
53
 Seward succeeded in persuading Lincoln to remove this 
tacit declaration of war.
54
 Aside from this tactical victory, Lincoln’s inauguration was a “pitiable 
failure,” according to one guest, with rumours swirling of an impending attack by southern 
secessionists on the city.
55
 In a sign of Seward’s declining fortune, Lincoln appeased the hawks by 
promoting known hardliners to his cabinet.
56
 Seward’s strategy was losing ground by late February.  
The following section focusses narrowly on Lincoln’s decision to resupply Fort Sumter, and 
Seward’s attempts to influence and undermine that decision by any means necessary. “The ordinary 
eye could not quite follow all that Secretary Seward was doing” in these last days of peace, one 
historian noted. What is clear is that he used “downright subterranean” methods.57 In these final 
weeks of the crisis, human agency comes to the fore. The Fort Sumter crisis is, to paraphrase 
General Scott, one of those historical incidents which dramatically illustrate how much depends on 
individual people. General Scott himself, Seward and the German ambassador all attempted, in 
those final weeks, to prevent war. Their efforts were all blocked and rendered ineffective by the 
interventions of Lincoln himself. But even after Lincoln’s decision brought the North and South to 
the brink of war, military officers still deliberated on a matter which determined the outcome of the 
crisis. An act of insubordination – a James Blunt moment – might have changed U.S. history. 
 
THE FORT SUMTER INCIDENT 
 
By March, Seward resorted to all available tactics to prevent impending civil war. For one, he 
attempted to negotiate directly with the Confederacy. He threatened Lincoln with resignation, in 
order to gain concessions to help southern Unionists fend off secessionism. Seward even gave 
orders to military officers which were perfectly unconstitutional.
58
 General Scott was Seward’s 
close collaborator in pushing for peaceful reconciliation. Scott warned Seward, before warning the 
President, that it was too dangerous to resupply Fort Sumter.
59
 Major Anderson, the commanding 
officer in the fort, had written a report to Lincoln warning him that he could only last six more 
weeks. The same day, Greeley called on the White House to press Lincoln not to compromise. 
Many southern secessionists were praying for a clash with the U.S. army, which would almost 
certainly galvanise secessionism, and would puncture all moderate support for the Union.
60
  
In a cabinet meeting, Seward argued that the fort should be abandoned rather than resupplied. 
“The dispatch of an expedition to supply or reinforce Sumter,” he predicted, would “provoke a civil 
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war”.61 Lincoln appeared to agree, but deferred his decision. General Scott had drafted an order to 
abandon Fort Sumter, awaiting Lincoln’s signature. Meanwhile, Greeley kept up the pressure on the 
president. When the hawks began swaying Lincoln to resupply the fort, Major Anderson himself 
(the officer in the fort) advised against it.
62
 The see-swaying deliberations in Lincoln’s cabinet came 
to a head when General Scott (acting in concert with Seward
63
) wrote a report advocating the 
abandonment of Fort Sumter. The political nature of the general’s frank recommendation incensed 
Lincoln. Scott justified a withdrawal in order to “soothe and give confidence to the eight remaining 
slave-holding States, and render their cordial adherence to this Union perpetual.”64  As Denton 
recounts: 
 
Lincoln, truly worn out with his nerves near the breaking point, exploded in rage at reading the message, lashing 
out at the [80 year] old general and shouting that he would find someone else to lead the military if Scott would 
not follow orders. Scott, truly shaken by Lincoln’s violent reaction, asked to be excused from the dinner party 
and left.
65
 
 
With his cabinet split, ignoring the advice of military officers, and conceding to the hawks in his 
party, Lincoln finally ordered the expedition to Fort Sumter. Greeley played a crucial role in 
influencing this fateful decision through his meetings with Lincoln, in his widely-read Tribune 
articles, and his defamation of Seward and fellow compromisers. While we should not exaggerate 
his role, it is worth recalling that Greeley’s “diabolical hatred of Seward” drove his personal 
vendetta against Seward’s peace efforts. 66  Greeley had achieved his goal of dashing Seward’s 
ambitions, come hell or high water. And both would soon come. 
The scene was set for a clash. But even now, events did not inexorably lead to war. Many other 
plausible courses of actions were still open. A large flotilla, including warships, left New York 
harbour headed for Fort Sumter, and was scheduled to arrive on April 15. Seward had successfully 
worked with his New York friends to delay the departure of the ships, going so far as to trick 
Lincoln into signing secret orders to poach one of the flagships for another mission.
67
 As the naval 
officers deciphered their conflicting orders, Seward bought time to arrange last-ditch meetings 
between the president and Virginian pro-Union leaders. In one such meeting, the Virginian 
delegation proposed a three-part deal: 
  
1. The federal government would promise not to use force against the South;  
2. The South would promise not to seek foreign recognition; and 
3. Both sides would organise a national convention to devise terms for the peaceful reunion of North and South.
68
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Lincoln refused to promise the first point: not to attack the Confederacy. Seward negotiated 
indirectly with the unrecognised diplomatic representatives of the South, hoping to stall for time. He 
desperately gave assurances, behind Lincoln’s back, that Fort Sumter would not be reinforced.69 But 
in the end, Seward’s efforts could not overcome Lincoln’s steel will not to compromise. Seward 
flatly told the Virginian envoy, after his failed meeting with Lincoln, that “the days of philosophic 
statesmanship [were] about to give way to the mailed glove of the warrior.”70 Up to this point, 
Henry Seward “almost single-handedly, had kept the nation from war”.71 Even after fighting had 
begun, Seward attempted to broker a cease-fire deal by encouraging the German ambassador to the 
U.S., Rudolf Schleiden, to negotiate a ceasefire. But this mission, too, finally failed when Lincoln 
suspended it.
72
  
One final anecdote reveals the innate contingency of history. Even with Lincoln’s warships on 
the way to Fort Sumter, the Confederate troops preparing to level the fort to the ground, and 
Seward’s numerous peace efforts having failed, war was still not inevitable.  Between lit matches 
and incoming ships, as General Scott observed in 1837, were individuals. And events hinged upon 
their actions alone. Around 1am on 11 April, Confederate representatives, hearing of the impending 
resupply mission, presented federal soldiers with an ultimatum to surrender.
73
 The resupply mission 
was due to arrive in a couple of days. Major Anderson, who had advised Lincoln against the ill-
fated mission, refused to surrender. But, Anderson suggested, he and his men would likely be 
“starved out” within a few days anyway. When the Confederate officer, Colonel Chesnut, asked 
when this was likely to be, Anderson gathered his men and deliberated for two long hours in a gun 
chamber. There is no record of what they said during their meeting. When he emerged, Anderson 
told Chesnut that he would be “starved out” at noon on April 15. All sides knew the resupply 
mission would have arrived by then. Anderson had bluffed, and lost. It is entirely feasible, and 
historically possible, that he could have responded “tomorrow at noon”. There is no telling how 
history would have changed. However, Anderson did not say those three words. Chesnut gave the 
order to fire on Fort Sumter one hour later – the first volley of the civil war. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
As the above case study has demonstrated, Henry Seward’s plan to save the Union represented a 
resourceful, popular and powerful initiative to prevent civil war. The above narrative, necessarily 
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abridged, captures an array of junctures at which decision-makers could have changed history by 
signing a piece of paper, or simply remaining silent. The above case, I argue, dramatically reveals 
the contingency of history and the crucial role of human agency in determining the outbreak of war 
– and the failure of efforts to prevent it. In this section, I argue that the individual level of analysis 
provides the most coherent account of the causes of the U.S. Civil War. To begin, I will review two 
foreseeable critiques – one philosophical and one moral. 
The first critique proceeds from a structural-deterministic reading of history. The actors seemed 
“to sleepwalk through the plot of a melodrama,” to use Emory Thomas’ analogy. 74  They all 
“stepped up to their marks and delivered their lines as they were supposed to do.”75 This account 
runs in direct opposition to an agent-centric view of history, pinning responsibility for the war on 
individuals who chose force over compromise.
76
 Structuralist theorists argue that the actors were 
enslaved by their conflicting principles, beliefs, economic systems and worldviews.
77
 Implicit in 
this approach is the determinist idea that these factors made war inevitable.
78
 This theory absolves 
the decision-makers of responsibility, shifting the blame for war to impersonal factors. Another 
historian agrees that leaders’ errors were fundamentally “structured by the social, political and 
economic conditions from which they sprang.”79  
The explanation does not pass the counter-factual test of answering why the war broke out in 
April 1861. If it was inevitable, why did it not occur following the Bloody Kansas incidents of the 
1850s? A deterministic account can provide no satisfactory answer beyond blaming Republican 
ideology, or Slave Power, or racialism, or any other abstraction. An early historian of the civil war 
refuted this structural-deterministic theory. “One of the most colossal of misconceptions,” J. G. 
Randall concluded, “is the theory that fundamental motives produce war.” 80  As Thomas 
convincingly retorts, if the “conflicting visions of the world lay at the base of the conflict that 
produced the war,” those visions did not ultimately cause the war: 
 
the world has always been full of peoples who profess ideological conflict with other peoples. Sometimes they go 
to war with each other; most times they choose to live in peace, albeit often an uneasy one. The important 
question about Northern and Southern Americans in 1861, therefore, is why they elected to fight. What drove 
them past posing, posturing, and politics into armed conflict?
81
 
 
The structuralist approach spares historians the divisive task of apportioning blame and credit. But a 
structural perspective can also bring an all-important nuance to Thomas’ argument above. One 
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historian brings a dose of methodological humility to any argument that contemporary leaders, such 
as Lincoln, consciously chose war in a straightforward sense. David Potter warned that participants 
in historical events “tend to see the alternatives in that situation as less clear, less sharply focused” 
than scholars. Hindsight allows us to impose analytical clarity and simplicity on the chaos of events, 
and “to see the alternatives as more clear, more evident, more sharply focused than they really 
were.”82 Potter concludes on a striking note: 
 
When men choose a course of action which had a given result, historians will tend to attribute to them not only 
the choice of the course, but even the choice of the result… Whatever choice anyone exercised in 1860-1861, no 
one chose the American Civil War, because it lay behind the veil of the future; it did not exist as a choice.
83
 
 
This conclusion provides a strong counter to an agent-centric explanation of the U.S. Civil War. It 
nuances the above argument that American leaders simply chose war in 1861. Potter argues that 
hindsight allows us “to define the alternatives in the deceptively clear terms of later events,” and 
holds up agents’ actions in light of that hindsight.84 I will return to this insight in a future theoretical 
discussion,
85
 since it introduces a useful nuance to any agent-centric theory of preventive 
diplomacy. This argument leads us to an important concession to structuralist theories of war, 
namely that agents may determine their own choices, but not the consequences of those choices. 
There is a third objection to the argument that the U.S. Civil War was preventable. Even if it 
could have been prevented with some sort of North-South compromise, some might retort on moral 
grounds, Lincoln was right not to compromise on slavery. Although Seward sought peace as a 
greater good, Lincoln was at least faithful to his abolitionist principles. To modern eyes, the 
Crittenden Compromise is a morally reprehensible text, effectively granting slavery constitutional 
recognition, and extending the practice territorially. From this viewpoint, those who advocated a 
compromise on slavery – sacrificing moral principles to avoid war – were no better than twentieth 
century appeasers. Slavery was an absolute evil, and ending this evil justified as much blood as was 
necessary to achieve that noble end. If half a million graves were necessary, so be it.
86
 In other 
words, it was a just war.  
There are logical problems with this argument. Firstly, this critique fallaciously assumes that 
armed conflict is necessary to end slavery, which is simply not the case, as the experience of Britain 
demonstrated. Secondly, this argument assumes that the secession crisis represented a black-and-
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white choice between good and evil. Reality was much greyer.
87
 One of Lincoln’s biographers 
observed that he “always regarded the perpetuation of the Union as more important than the 
abolition of slavery.”88 This moralistic critique assumes that Lincoln risked war to free the slaves, 
rather than to suppress a rebellion. Although he evidently abhorred slavery,
89
 his emancipation of 
the slaves was a by-product of war, not its root cause. 
Finally, this critique tars Seward for compromising on slavery. In actual fact, Seward was an 
early and radical abolitionist.
90
 He later drifted to a more centrist position, seeing the preservation 
of the Union as the first priority. Seward, the pragmatist, was willing to be flexible to prevent war. 
Lincoln, the principled president, was unwilling to budge for any compromise. Seward did not 
intend to bury slavery under the carpet. In exchange for a short-term compromise, his intention was 
to seek the peaceful abolition of slavery, rather than by force of arms.
91
 However, Seward also 
made critical errors during his efforts to prevent war. To avoid painting a hagiographic portrait of 
Seward, we must explore these in more depth. 
Firstly, numerous sources have corroborated that, during this crisis, Seward attempted to be all 
things to all men.
92
 This led him “down a path of double talk that increasingly painted him into a 
corner,” as Michael Robinson notes.93 At times he “told some Republicans he disdained the notion 
of compromise while he assured others that he would do anything to conciliate the South.”94 His 
mixed signals were sharpened by his indiscretion; he spoke too much after a few drinks.
95
 These 
tactical missteps complicated Seward’s mission.96 It is no wonder that contemporaries thought that 
“Mr. Seward is one of the most perplexing men alive,”97 and had “more faces than Janus.”98 One 
historian called him “an infatuated power seeker” who deceived himself as much as others about the 
prospects of peace.
99
 Tellingly, the only time Seward lost his temper during the crisis was when 
people sought to pin him down on a specific proposal.
100
 Seward’s contrived optimism also made it 
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increasingly difficult to discern Seward’s real views. 101  This tactic of public ambiguity only 
alienated his supporters. 
By denying that he sought compromise, Seward appeared to betray the cause he served.
102
 His 
December vote against the Crittenden proposal in the Senate is a case in point.
103
 To any northern or 
southern observer, he was toeing the party line of ‘no compromises’. Similarly, his January speech 
appears to have been another lost opportunity. Although he preached in favour of the Union and 
peace, Seward failed to make any concrete compromises to avoid splitting his party. One reporter 
judged that Seward, despite hoping for compromise, “cannot arrive at the magnanimity of 
proposing it himself, lest he offend his party. He fails in the quality of the statesman, while he 
indulges in the vanity of the rhetorician.” 104  Compromise advocate Crittenden was bitterly 
disappointed that Seward failed to propose anything novel.
105
  To those who knew of his peace 
efforts, he appeared weak-willed and submissive to his party.
106
 Yet others, like his own wife, saw 
his speech as too conciliatory.
107
 Finally, in publicly rejecting the proposals of the Peace 
Conference – for no other reason, it seems, than to save his career – Seward missed a chance to 
change the course of the crisis.
108
 
  The guardians of posterity, in general, have been unfair to Seward.
109
 Many historians have 
argued that Seward was intent solely on surviving politically.
110
 His conduct sometimes hints at 
self-serving motives.
111
 However, this critique overlooks the fact, which Seward himself knew, that 
his political fate was tied up with that of the nation.
112
 In 1861, Seward was objectively the most 
influential serving official pushing for peace. He understood that to publicise his plan risked 
crucifying his opportunity to influence events.
113
 Instead, he pushed for peace at immense political 
cost. The unflattering portraits of Seward originated in the bitter memoirs of his political enemies, 
who made him appear bellicose and power-hungry.
114
 Numerous historians uncritically repeated 
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these political character assassinations, which left “Seward’s historical reputation in shambles.”115 
Whatever his failures as a politician, William Henry Seward had the merit of attempting to prevent 
war, at immense cost to his political fortunes. Had Seward been opportunistic and unprincipled, he 
would simply have called for military action from the start of the crisis.
116
  
In another convincing critique, Taylor points to three weaknesses in Seward’s judgment: “his 
apparent belief that if peace were preserved over the short term, the seven states of the lower South 
would see the error of their ways and somehow drift back” and his “overvaluation of Unionist 
sentiment in the border states”. His southern allies proved to be “weak reeds” in the end.117 These 
are sound counter-arguments, but they come with the benefit of hindsight. As Taylor concedes, 
Seward was improvising, responding to a fast-paced crisis, not knowing how it would end.
118
 To 
weigh these critiques, we must ask whether Seward and Lincoln could have feasibly prevented the 
recourse to war by adopting a different course of action. A fair counter-factual test must choose an 
antecedent as close to the outbreak of war (early 1861) as possible. It would be too simple to argue 
that, had Seward won the Republican nomination (as he almost did), and carried the presidency (as 
he almost surely would have), he would have made a decisive difference in Lincoln’s role. That 
much is clear. Instead, I make the counter-factual argument, below, that Lincoln could still have 
avoided war in March 1861 by heeding Seward’s advice. 
During Lincoln’s 4 March 1861 inauguration, soldiers were posted everywhere, on Seward’s and 
Scott’s orders, to guard every conceivable vantage point for would-be assassins. The Seward-Scott 
tandem had warned of Lincoln of credible assassination plots. Some plotters allegedly intended to 
blow up the platform on which Lincoln was due to speak. In response, soldiers were stationed 
underneath the platform to shoot any intruders. Since at least January, a worried Scott had told a 
military officer: “We are now in such a state that a dog-fight might cause the gutters of the capital 
to run with blood.”119 That same officer later recounted that he “firmly believe[d] that without 
[troops at the ready] Mr. Lincoln would never have been inaugurated. I believe that…he would 
have been killed, and that we should have found ourselves engaged in a struggle, without 
preparation, and without a recognized head of the capital.”120 Other officers also speculated that 
Lincoln would be killed before being taking the oath of office. 
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A deafening thunder punctuates Lincoln’s speech. In the din and confusion, the screaming crowd 
scatters, and Lincoln falls and is carried away by soldiers. He is not wounded. A nervous soldier, 
below the platform may have accidentally fired his musket; no suspected assassins are found. But 
several audience members were killed during the mass panic, trampled to death. This panic 
amplifies posturing in the North and South, but ultimately catalyses no immediate bloodshed. 
Lincoln, now steeped in melancholy,
121
 may have had his certainties shaken. A superstitious 
Lincoln may have even attributed oracular meaning to this event, as he did to dreams.
122
 Seward – 
whose “shrewd diplomatic quality” his critics recognised123 – would have exploited the moment. He 
could have used the analogy of the stampede to impress upon Lincoln that military posturing 
against the South could bring about the war it was intended to deter. “To err is human,” Seward 
could have said, quoting Alexander Pope. “We must avoid fatal errors at Fort Sumter.”  
In this scenario, let us assume that Lincoln was moved by the shock of the stampede and the 
force of Seward’s arguments to do as Seward subsequently suggested in Cabinet, and as he 
promised to Confederate representatives: withdrawal from Fort Sumter, and a reinforcement of Fort 
Pickens, which was in a much stronger position off Florida. This good faith measure would have 
certainly angered northern Unionists and abolitionists, who would have called it appeasement. 
Southern hardliners would not have been impressed. But this concession may have sufficiently 
bolstered pro-Union allies in bordering southern states, such as Virginia, to resist the hardliners’ 
push for war. In exchange, Lincoln could have requested – or suggested, to avoid recognising the 
sovereignty of the Confederacy – a conference in Virginia, inviting moderate statesmen, such as 
Jefferson Davis, and attendees of the earlier peace conference. Heated debates could have focussed 
on Virginian envoys’ April 1861 proposal. In exchange for not seeking foreign recognition and both 
sides agreeing to freeze any military action, excluding mobilisation, for three months, the Virginia 
conference could have prepared proposals for future reunification based on constitutional 
amendments.  
There can be no guarantee that this conference would have prevented war. Popular emotions, 
North and South, may simply have been too powerful and antagonistic to compromise.
124
 The 
inauguration stampede could just as feasibly have tilted the capital into violent skirmishes, as 
Confederate partisans had not yet left en masse. In sum, this incident could have become the first 
battle in the war, rather than the Fort Sumter incident. More plausibly yet, the Virginia conference 
may simply have broken down into acrimonious and self-righteous posturing, simply prolonging the 
                                                          
121
 Shenk (2006). 
122
 Barton (2005: 233-236). 
123
 Welles (1874: 185). 
124
 Geyl (1955: 296-300). 
  Preventive Diplomacy 
78 
unstable peace by several weeks or months. War, a second-order counterfactual argument suggests, 
would have come anyway, triggered by some other incident of history.  
But had Lincoln simply kept the Union in a defensive posture for a few more months, without 
the provocative move at Fort Sumter, events may have taken a very different course. For one, pro-
Union and pacifist actors in the bordering states, though weak, may have been given more oxygen 
to breathe and even thrive, which was sucked away by the war frenzy following Fort Sumter. 
Moderate Southerners would have provided a strong, attractive alternative view of southern 
interests at the Virginia conference, and a less bellicose southern face. Their productive proposals 
would have been reported by every newspaper in the nation. Lincoln’s own abolitionist political 
base may have shrunk in anger at his compromise, but the influential northern base in favour of 
reconciliation (Seward’s allies) would have rallied to his support. In short, the Virginia conference, 
had it simply existed, may have irrevocably split and weakened hardline factions both South and 
North.  
While we can never know the practical result of such a trend, let alone whether war would have 
been avoided, there is no doubt that this dynamic would have shifted the direction of the crisis. Any 
armed clash, on these terms, would have been by a minority of extremists against a sizeable, nation-
wide pro-peace coalition. Hardline abolitionists and hardline secessionists would almost certainly 
have attempted to catalyse a clash by means of a symbolic attack somewhere in their borderlands, 
perhaps in Kansas or even on the Virginia conference itself. Such an attack, even if successful, 
would have been one against peace itself, rather than against a monolithic North or South. And this 
may have made all the difference in history. Perhaps Virginia, North Carolina and other border 
states may not have immediately seceded, as violent secessionists fought against moderate 
Southerners. Conceding, as we may, that some form of violent conflict was still likely to occur, its 
dynamics would have fundamentally changed. A secessionist insurgency in Virginia, backed by the 
South, may have turned this conflict into a drawn-out proxy war for the borderlands. This would 
have changed American history. Whatever may have occurred, the American civil war, as we know 
it, was not inevitably bound to occur as and when it did.  
As one of the most prominent voices in favour of compromise, Seward understood more than 
most the above political dynamics. “Mad men North, and mad men South, are working together to 
produce dissolution of the Union, by civil war,” as he saw it.125 Upon accepting Lincoln’s offer to 
join his cabinet, Seward wrote to his wife: “It is inevitable. I will try to save freedom and my 
country.”126 Although he failed, Seward does not deserve the litany of attacks he has since attracted 
for seeking a compromise to save the Union. As he himself wrote in February 1861: 
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Twelve years ago freedom was in danger and the Union was not. I spake then so singly for freedom that short-
sighted men inferred that I was disloyal to the Union... Today, practically, freedom is not in danger, and [the] 
Union is... I speak singly for the Union... [and] am now suspected of infidelity to freedom. In this case, as in the 
other, I refer myself not to the men of my time, but to the judgment of history.
127
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has explored William Henry Seward’s efforts to save the Union during the secession 
crisis of 1860-1861 and, by doing so, to avert a fratricidal civil war. I argued firstly that Seward 
pursued a coherent and often desperate campaign to prevent war during the crisis. Secondly, I put 
forward a counter-factual argument that, despite the pull of events, Lincoln could have prevented 
war at numerous points. The American civil war was not necessary; neither a deterministic account 
of history, nor a moral absolutist case for the abolition of slavery through war stand up to scrutiny. 
Finally, I have argued that Seward does not merit the scorn of his political enemies, which has been 
echoed uncritically by numerous historians.  
This case study has revealed fascinating evidence that individuals play a central role in the 
success or failure of efforts to prevent war. For one, this case demonstrated that personality politics 
and careerism can impede the most promising efforts to prevent war. Horace Greeley’s role stands 
out as a great influence in undermining Seward’s peace efforts at crucial turns. But Seward’s own 
refusal to make a specific compromise proposal also partly reflected his careerist concerns. This, I 
suggest, means that the causes of the civil war cannot be adequately explained by accounts which 
omit the role of individuals. The civil war was ultimately not inevitable, as neither ideology nor 
other structural forces rendered it inevitable. The secession crisis culminated in war due to the 
purposive actions of individuals: including, most dramatically, the deliberation of a handful of 
soldiers at Fort Sumter.  
A final sobering conclusion from this case is that those pushing for compromise over force are 
likely to endure the hatred not only of their contemporary enemies, but of posterity. Proponents of 
war, in contrast, are often absolved by impersonal accounts of history which take the responsibility 
for war out of their hands. We now turn to another case in history which confirms this insight. The 
July 1914 crisis is famous for the numerous deterministic accounts which many scholars and 
statesmen alike have encouraged. I aim to demonstrate that the First World War was causally 
determined not by any structural drivers of war, but by the complex web of actions and reactions of 
individual agents and contingent events. The two agents we will focus on are the two most 
prominent leaders – both largely forgotten – who attempted to delay or prevent the use of force in 
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July 1914. I will argue that, had either of these agents acted differently, the war would likely not 
have occurred. 
 
 81 
Count Tisza and Sir Edward Grey – The July Crisis, 1914 
 
“Should he have persisted in his opposition, the World War, 
even if not avoided in the long run, might have been delayed.”1 
- On Count Tisza 
 
“It is a mistaken view of history to assume that its episodes were  
entirely due to fundamental causes which could not be averted,  
and that they were not precipitated by the intervention of personality.”2 
- On Sir Edward Grey 
 
Ink on paper cannot convey the full horrors of the First World War. Statistics are weak substitutes, 
but they at least give a hint of its scale. 65 million men mobilised for the war of 1914-1918. If each 
soldier were to lie down contiguously across planet Earth, this human chain would stretch almost 
three times around the world.
3
 Eight million people perished in the war. That is equal to 500,000 
tons in human weight, the average weight of one former tower of the World Trade Centre. Eight 
more million people presumably died.
4
 Another 21 million people were wounded during the war. 
These numbers boggle the mind.  
There is a striking paradox at the heart of scholarship on the war. The July 1914 crisis which 
preceded the war is one of the most well documented events in history. Paradoxically, however, 
scholars are no closer to agreeing on the causes of that war. Francis Gavin concludes that scholars 
ought to accept that it is “unlikely we will ever achieve a consensus of the causes of the First World 
War.”5 This case study cannot possibly do justice to the complex debates relating to the outbreak of 
the war. Nevertheless, it contributes to the debate by explicitly arguing what some (not all) 
historians tacitly conclude: identifiable individuals caused the war, and they could have prevented 
it. I make the argument that the causes of the First World War are fully explained by the causal 
power of individuals.  
Countless monographs chronicle the month of July 1914 in great detail.
6
 A case study this brief 
cannot hope to rival any of them in analytical depth. Thus, the most I can hope to achieve in the 
following chapter is a specialised analysis, focussing on the question of the role of human agency in 
efforts to prevent the war.
7
  In order to add value to the existing literature, I will focus on the actions 
of two agents who almost prevented war. Firstly, I explore the forgotten role of Count István Tisza, 
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the Hungarian Prime Minister. Secondly, I will focus on the mediation proposal of British foreign 
secretary Sir Edward Grey, which appeared to be the most credible chance to prevent war.  
In contrast to structural deterministic accounts of the war,
8
 this chapter is agent-centric. 
According to this approach, European leaders faced a narrowing funnel of choices in the lead-up to 
the First World War.
9
 That being said, like a funnel, the end never really closed. The actors may 
have been increasingly constrained by the dynamics of the arms race, mobilisation plans, train 
timetables and their beliefs, but “war was not inevitable; the leaders of Europe still had options.”10 
To substantiate this point, I argue that the causal power of individual agents was the main driving 
force behind the crisis. Among those drivers, Count Tisza appeared to forestall the crisis single-
handedly. Secondly, contingent events – forks in the road – demonstrated that agents knew they had 
options. In the analytical section of this chapter, I argue that an individualist framework of analysis 
is more compelling than structural deterministic accounts of the July crisis. 
  
COUNT TISZA’S LAST STAND  
 
Almost forgotten by history, Count Tisza was the most powerful Austro-Hungarian official to 
oppose war in July 1914. As the minister-president of Hungary, he consistently opposed pressure 
for an Austrian attack on Serbia. “Stern and colorless” and “somewhat dour,” as McMeekin 
describes him, “Tisza was a man of few words, but he meant what he said.”11 A strong admirer of 
Bismarck, Tisza was a forceful and domineering political figure. Not gifted in speech, he disdained 
oratory and parliamentary politics. As speaker of parliament, he once broke the opposition’s 
resistance by calling in the police to clear the House. A member of parliament pulled out a revolver 
and fired three shots at him. Uninjured, he ruled that the debate continue.
12
 Tisza was also a devoted 
Calvinist, who privately recoiled against the “terrible…misery, anguish, devastation” of all war.13 
However, Tisza’s reluctance to use force against Serbia was not moral but primarily political and 
strategic. He feared that war risked undermining Hungary’s privileged position in the empire, and 
extending democratic rights to minorities within Hungary.
14
 
The only comparably powerful opponent of Austrian military adventures was Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand.
15
 This is ironic, since the Archduke paid with his own life for the policy he opposed. The 
assassin who shot Franz Ferdinand was motivated by nationalist hatred of Austria’s annexation of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Despite their common stance, Count Tisza and Franz Ferdinand had a mutual 
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personal dislike of one another.
16
 In the 1912 Balkan crisis, Franz Ferdinand had sided with foreign 
minister Count Leopold von Berchtold in blocking the war party which hoped to attack Serbia.
17
 
One prominent advocate of war was Chief of Staff Conrad. He had advocated an Austrian invasion 
of Serbia at least twenty-five times in 1913 alone. Now, in 1914, Conrad saw Ferdinand’s 
assassination as a Serbian declaration of war.
18
   
With Ferdinand’s death, the Vienna peace party was significantly weaker. Almost all of the most 
important Austrian foreign policy-makers advocated war. Berchtold, the intelligent but indecisive 
foreign minister, was one of the few prevaricators. He soon buckled under pressure from his pro-
war colleagues to support a punitive Austrian war against Serbia.
19
 In the context of July 1914, the 
most powerful undecided decision-maker was Count Tisza. With Berchtold now falling in line 
behind the Austrian war party, Tisza assumed a pivotal role in history. McMeekin recounts that 
 
Tisza first learned something important was brewing when he stopped by the Ballplatz [the foreign ministry], 
where he was astonished to find the normally harmless Berchtold breathing fire. There is no record of what was 
said, but the conversation made a dramatic impression on the Hungarian, who went so far as to compose a letter 
of protest to Franz Josef I…20 
 
In his 1 January letter, Tisza expressed his shock at learning of Berchtold’s “intention to make the 
horrible deed of Sarajevo the occasion for reckoning with Serbia.”21 The Hungarian objected that 
Austria “would be considered by all the world as the disturbers of peace.”22 Tisza clothed his case 
against war in pragmatic terms. Tisza perceived a greater threat along Hungary’s eastern borders 
than from Serbia. He told the Emperor that he would “refuse to share the responsibility” for war.23 
The implication of Tisza’s stand was clear to all who had read the Austro-Hungarian constitution. 
As part of the 1867 political compromise, foreign minister Berchtold needed the consent of both 
Austria and Hungary in crafting foreign policy. A Hungarian prime minister had used this 
constitutional veto to keep Austro-Hungary out of the Franco-German war in 1870.
24
 Tisza now 
intended to use his legal veto to prevent another war. 
“War. War. War.” was the refrain Conrad hammered into foreign minister Berchtold.25 On the 
other end, the foreign minister was faced with Tisza’s resolute opposition. Berchtold, between both 
extremes, proposed a compromise. He would recruit German assistance for a new “peace initiative”, 
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which would mire Berlin in the crisis and deter Russian aggression.
26
 What Berchtold did not tell 
the militaristic Conrad is that this initiative had actually been drafted by Tisza’s hand in March. 
This new diplomatic strategy sought to deter Russo-French plans to “foment the world war” against 
Austria.
27
 It bore the fingerprints of “Tisza’s pseudo-pacifist thinking”.28 Berchtold’s compromise 
effectively used Tisza’s initiative as bait to lure German support for the war. By law, Tisza still had 
a veto over foreign policy. The emperor reaffirmed to Berchtold that he must secure Count Tisza’s 
support for any policy.
29
 For now, Tisza effectively checked the war party in Vienna. But Conrad 
and Berchtold had set in motion an insidious plan to use Tisza’s initiative against him, using 
German pressure to break his will to resist. 
In a letter to the German Kaiser, Wilhelm II, Berchtold accused the Serbian government of 
orchestrating the Archduke’s assassination. He called for the “elimination” of Serbia’s power.30 The 
Kaiser was a close friend of Franz Ferdinand’s, and was emotionally distraught by his death.31 
Berchtold made the case for an urgent punitive strike against Serbia. To avoid raising Tisza’s 
suspicions, Berchtold gave oral instructions to an envoy, Count Hoyos, to push for war in Berlin. 
Tisza was intentionally kept in the dark of a major foreign policy decision. When he found out, he 
understood that Berchtold had twisted the meaning of his Balkan peace memorandum.
32
 He 
urgently called the foreign ministry to demand edits – but it was too late. Hoyos was already in 
Berlin. 
The German sovereign, fearing a European war, distrusted the Austrian proposal. However, 
Wilhelm II, an emotional man, was goaded into expressing an opinion in favour of a punitive strike. 
This statement, in Berchtold’s hands, could help to overcome Tisza’s stubborn resistance. The 
German leadership thus gave Austria the infamous ‘blank cheque’ for a war with Serbia. That same 
day, Conrad secured the Austrian king’s consent to attack Serbia if Germany pledged its support. 
The war party was gaining ground. Berchtold put further pressure on Tisza by sending the 
Hungarian an exaggerated account of the Kaiser’s support for an Austrian attack. When he learned 
the contents of the Hoyos mission to Berlin, Tisza was horrified and blocked Austrian war plans.
33
 
At this point, as McMeekin recounts, Tisza was not simply outnumbered. He “stood essentially 
alone.”34 
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In a key ministerial meeting on 7 July, Tisza faced his pro-war colleagues. Criticising the Hoyos 
mission, he predicted that, if Austria struck Serbia, the former would face a three-front war.
35
 
Instead, he proposed imposing terms which would ensure Serbia’s diplomatic defeat. If Serbia 
rejected reasonable terms, then he might consider military action. His voice shaking with anger, 
Tisza threatened his resignation.
36
 All of Tisza’s colleagues hoped to use an unacceptable ultimatum 
as a pretext for war; Tisza alone hoped that it might prevent war.
37
 Where his colleagues attempted 
to impress upon him the urgency of attacking Serbia, Tisza alone conjured up “the terrible calamity 
of a European war under present circumstances.”38  
Tisza grew justifiably suspicious of the scheming Berchtold. He now demanded that Berchtold 
hand-deliver “a lengthy memoir” to the emperor.39 In this letter, Tisza warned that attacking Serbia 
“would—if human foresight does not deceive—cause the intervention of Russia and conjure up the 
world’s war.”40 Strategically, such a war disfavoured Austria-Hungary. Economically, it would 
devastate the already fragile empire. On moral grounds, Tisza refused “to share the responsibility of 
military aggression as it is proposed against Servia.”41 In a renewed push, Berchtold wrote to Tisza 
from the royal castle. Berchtold begged Tisza to change his mind. When he failed, Berchtold 
extracted the Emperor’s consent to draw up an ultimatum to make a Serbian rejection inevitable.42 
Berchtold was perhaps a “blunderer, unequal to his task, an elite dandy,” as historians noted, but he 
“clearly outmanoeuvred Tisza, for good or ill” in July 1914.43 
Six days later, Tisza returned to Vienna from a trip home. He now supported the war. “His 
resistance worn down by the constant pressure coming at him from all sides,” Tisza had almost 
completely folded to the war party.
44
 At a war council on 19 July, he at least managed to insert 
caveats into the ultimatum to Serbia.
45
 He succeeded in blocking the annexation of Serbian territory, 
which Tisza feared would make a Russian attack inevitable. But Tisza’s defeat was near-total. 
Neither he, nor the king, nor the Germans were allowed to vet the extreme terms of the ultimatum, 
which gave Serbia two options: submission or war. Once again – as with his June peace initiative – 
Berchtold took Tisza’s diplomatic ploy, and transformed it into a tool of war. Tisza’s idea of 
                                                          
35
 Austrian Red Book (1920: 22-33). 
36
 Vermes (1975: 75). 
37
 Williamson and Van Wyk (2003: 63-64). 
38
 Austrian Red Book (1920: 29). 
39
 Ibid. 33-34. 
40
 Ibid. 36. 
41
 Ibid. 37. 
42
 McMeekin (2013: 121). 
43
 Williamson and Van Wyk (2003: 71). 
44
 McMeekin (2013: 122). 
45
 Austrian Red Book (1920: 53-58). 
  Preventive Diplomacy 
86 
offering Serbia a “diplomatic defeat”46 as an alternative to war backfired. The notorious ultimatum 
became the trigger of the war Tisza had, very much alone, attempted to avert as long as he could. 
Even after falling in line, Tisza clung to the irrational hope that Serbia may still agree to all terms 
of the ultimatum, thus avoiding a major European war. Tisza happened to be the first Austrian 
official to receive news from the Austrian ambassador to Serbia that he had severed relations. A 
dejected Tisza asked him: “Did it have to be?” Musste es denn sein?47  The German verb Tisza 
employed conveys the meaning of necessity.
48
  He was asking whether war inevitable. The Austrian 
ambassador flatly responded: “Yes”.49 As we will see in an analytical section below, it did not have 
to be this way. Tisza himself, and numerous other key individuals, could have effectively prevented 
the First World War till the very last hour of peace. 
 
SIR EDWARD GREY’S PROPOSAL 
 
Like the efforts of Tisza in 1914 and Seward in 1861, those of British foreign secretary Sir Edward 
Grey have inspired either “eulogies or indictments.”50 Grey’s polarised place in history represents 
the bitter recriminations which followed the war. To his defenders, Grey was an impartial arbiter in 
the crisis, who did everything humanly possible to prevent war by offering to mediate on many 
occasions, only to be rebuffed each time.
51
 In contrast, to his many critics Grey was “the central 
enemy of the human race”.52 David Lloyd George was one such critic, who argued that Grey’s weak 
personality “was distinctly one of the elements that contributed to the great catastrophe.”53 I will 
return, in the analysis below, to weighing the sharply polarised accounts of Grey’s role in the July 
crisis. For now, it is useful to paint a portrait of Grey’s physical and intellectual appearance: 
 
His striking physiognomy with the thin lips, the firmly closed mouth, and the chiselled features gave the 
impression of cold hammered steel. Add to this exterior the reticence of speech and the calm level utterance on 
the rare occasions when he spoke...and that serene flow of unexceptionable diction…54 
 
Grey was a calm and reserved man, who made it to the top foreign policy position in Britain by 
remaining aloof of internal party political disputes. He was well aware, he later wrote, that he had 
“no natural gift for speaking. I never had a peroration,” he noted sadly.55 A “lover of the country,” 
Grey assumed public office “without any elation; indeed with depression.”56 While in London, Grey 
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survived by looking forward to his favourite sports, tennis and fly-fishing.
57
 But by 1914, Grey had 
serious eye problems, which undermined his ability to see tennis balls.
58
 During the Sarajevo crisis, 
we find Grey fly-fishing at his country cottage, which he hoped to enjoy as long as his eyesight 
allowed it. Grey was not disturbed enough by the Archduke’s assassination to cut short his 
holidays.
59
 
The dilemma in Grey’s foreign policy was his attempt to balance two contradictory policies. On 
the one hand, Grey, partnering with Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, attempted to work with 
Germany to reduce naval tensions. On the other hand, Grey personally negotiated a strategic 
arrangement with France. In war-time, the French navy would cover the Mediterranean, while 
Britain defended France’s north coast. Joint war planning for a potential mission to defend Belgium 
was detailed to the level of “the places where [the soldiers] were to drink their coffee.”60 Grey was 
under pressure by the Foreign Office to support France militarily.
61
 The French government was 
also pressuring Grey to begin military planning with Russia.
62
 Grey agreed to naval talks, on the 
understanding that they not imply alliance commitments.
63
 When pressed, Grey downplayed the 
concerns of German officials. An historian called this a “deeply misleading” and “suspiciously 
vague assurance”. 64  Some called it a bare-faced lie. 65  German leaders had no trust in Grey’s 
assurances about the British-Russian naval talks.
66
 This incident cost Grey his impartiality, at least 
in German eyes, during his mediation efforts in the July crisis.  
Sir Edward Grey is relatively mute in his memoirs on Britain’s reaction to the Sarajevo crisis. He 
only mentions, in passing, that he consulted Harold Nicolson at the Foreign Office. They both 
“agreed that, if things became more anxious and the prospects grew darker, I should propose a 
Conference.”67 However, a detailed discussion of the period from 28 June to 25 July is virtually 
missing from his memoir. This is significant, in that it obscures what Grey knew about Austrian 
intentions – endorsed by Tisza – to send Serbia a harsh ultimatum. Grey was well informed. On 16 
July, Britain’s ambassador to Vienna had warned him of Berchtold’s plans for a harsh ultimatum, 
which Serbia could only reject.
68
 Grey did not follow up on the matter.
69
 If we are to believe his 
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memoirs, Grey waited because he agonised over an “opportune moment” to suggest mediation.70 
The opportune moment came one week later.  
During a state visit by French leaders in St. Petersburg, war was openly discussed.
71
 Russia’s 
foreign minister Sazonov, like Grey, was widely seen as “cowardly and weak”.72 But Sazonov was 
now threatening a “European war” against Vienna in case of an Austrian ultimatum to Serbia.73 
Grey learned about these crucial developments from his ambassador. Sazonov attempted to goad the 
British ambassador into declaring Britain’s support for Russia and France. The next day, Sazonov 
again tried to solicit a British declaration of support, which the ambassador again rejected. George 
Buchanan, British ambassador to Russia, instead suggested that Britain could “play the role of 
mediator at Berlin or Vienna,” a proposal which angered Sazonov.74 Grey would have been aware 
of the belligerent language of French and Russian diplomats. 
Grey offered to mediate the crisis on 25 July. That same day, Russia began secret mobilisation 
plans of its 1.1 million-man war machine adjacent Austria. Russian mobilisation was intended to be 
“masked by clever diplomatic negotiations, in order to lull to sleep as much as possible the enemy’s 
fear.”75 Sazonov, who considered war unavoidable,76 immediately rejected Grey’s proposal. Serbian 
leaders, emboldened by Russian support, rejected all but one point in the Austrian ultimatum. Grey 
credulously believed that Sazonov “urged a conciliatory reply at Belgrade,” rather than heightening 
tensions.
77
 The same day, Austria’s ambassador severed diplomatic relations with Serbia and fled 
within 25 minutes.
78
 Serbia began mobilising at 3pm; Austria-Hungary at 9:23pm.
79
 The point of 
painting this complex picture is to give an accurate representation of the moment in which Sir 
Edward Grey chose to act. After one month of prevarication, it was clearly anything but opportune. 
For weeks, Grey had hesitated on whether and when to propose a mediation.
80
 On Saturday 25 
July, he finally began to act. His idea was basically that Britain, France, Germany and Italy would 
mediate the crisis between Russia and Austria.
81
 The French ambassador disliked the proposal and, 
remarkably, did not even relay it to his foreign ministry.
82
 The Russian ambassador flatly rejected 
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Grey’s idea. Only the German ambassador agreed to Grey’s mediation proposal. Curiously, Grey 
continued to believe, wrongly, that Germany was mobilising first.
83
 This reveals a questionable 
assumption in Grey’s mediation. It appears never to have occurred to Grey that his proposal was 
biased against Germany, which had not yet mobilised. Such a conference might simply give France 
and Russia more time to mobilise against Germany. He was dismayed when the Russians rejected 
his proposal. The official silence from Paris also unnerved him.
84
 But he judged that the “things 
were not yet so critical that it was unsafe to be out of town” over the weekend.85  
On 26 July, Grey left on his fly-fishing trip, leaving Nicolson in charge.
86
 Inexplicably, Nicolson 
and Grey (from his cottage) changed the mediation proposal overnight. Prince Lichnowsky, the 
German ambassador, met Nicolson to warn that, if Russia mobilised on the German border, 
Germany would follow, and a European war would break out.
87
 He asked for Britain’s help to stop 
Russian mobilisation from sparking a war. Nicolson politely dismissed the German complaint. His 
answer consisted of three points:  
 
1) Britain had no such information from Russia (which was untrue);
88
  
2) Russia had not yet officially mobilised (an academic point); and 
3) It would be too “difficult and delicate” for Britain to restrain Russia (which was disastrous).89  
 
Nicolson then relayed a new mediation proposal. He proposed that the same four powers now 
mediate between Russia, Austria and Serbia. These states would no longer be expected to cease 
military mobilisation, only active military operations. “Nicolson had unceremoniously scuttled 
Grey’s proposal,” as McMeekin argues, “and replaced it with a new initiative inherently biased 
against the Central Powers.”90 This new proposal superseded the one which Germany had accepted 
the day before. The German ambassador was so worried about war that he accepted Grey’s new 
proposal, without awaiting confirmation from Berlin.  
On Monday 27 July, German foreign minister Gottlieb von Jagow politely rejected Grey’s new 
mediation proposal. He suggested that Grey’s proposal “would practically amount to a court of 
arbitration… [and] was not practicable.”91 The German government preferred to await the outcome 
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of direct Russian-Austrian talks, which it suggested were fruitful. Germany’s ambassador to Russia 
believed that Sazonov had “lost his nerves somewhat and is now looking for a way out.”92 Germany 
also wished to avoid war, von Jagow insisted, but preferred bilateral negotiation.
93
 The German 
chancellor conclusively rejected Grey’s second mediation proposal. 94  Grey was angered by 
Germany’s “depressing” rebuttal.95 He considered writing an angry reply placing the entire blame 
on Germany for vetoing “the only certain means of peaceful settlement”.96 However, he resisted 
doing so, lest his accusations make war a certainty.
97
 Grey went to see the German ambassador 
while still visibly angry. He placed the onus squarely on Germany to mediate the crisis in Vienna, 
and warned that he would hold Berlin responsible for any war.  
This was the crucial turning point. The German chancellor understood that Germany could not 
reject every one of Grey’s proposals. In doing so, “we should be held responsible for the 
conflagration by the whole world and be represented as the real warmongers.”98 Cynically, the 
German leadership formally passed Grey’s note to Vienna, accompanied by an oral message that 
Berlin was “decidedly against” it. 99  Bethman, whom Grey trusted, 100  was undermining his 
mediation efforts. The Germans tried to retain plausible deniability, to avoid Britain siding with 
France and Russia.
101
 This suited Vienna perfectly. Upon reading Grey’s latest proposal, Berchtold 
decided “to send [an] official declaration of war tomorrow, at the latest the day after, in order to cut 
away the ground from any attempt at mediation.”102 On 28 July, the German Kaiser finally became 
alarmed by his government’s handling of the crisis, and offered “to mediate for peace in Austria.”103 
But by the time the Kaiser sent his message – by courier – it was too late. Astonishingly, as 
McMeekin observes, Berchtold declared war two weeks earlier than the army could fight it “in 
effect not to answer his phone.”104 Austria finally declared war on Serbia.  
Grey’s efforts had failed to prevent an Austro-Hungarian attack on Serbia. But there was still 
time to prevent this conflict from precipitating a European war. On July 29, Chancellor Bethmann-
Hollweg made a now-infamous proposal to Grey. Would Britain remain neutral, he inquired, if 
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Germany bound itself not to annex any French territory (excluding colonies) if it were victorious?
105
 
The exhausted Bethmann gave away an elementary point of Germany’s war strategy in the West: 
the violation of Belgian neutrality.
106
 Grey and his ambassador in Berlin strongly rejected this 
proposal.
107
 Tragically, the German leadership had misinterpreted Grey’s strategic ambiguity as a 
declaration of neutrality. King George V had reinforced this perception by telling the German 
monarch that Britain “shall remain neutral.”108 The same day, Grey finally signalled that Britain 
would most likely not remain neutral in a coming war.
109
 This shock signalled the end of British 
mediation attempts. 
Late July saw more efforts to prevent what leaders finally realised would be a cataclysmic war. The 
German chancellor desperately urged the Austrian foreign minister to accept mediation, but 
Bethmann’s incompetence undercut his own efforts.110 The Russian foreign minister effectively 
killed off Austrian-Russian negotiations.
111
 The U.S. also offered its good offices to mediate during 
the July crisis, but gained no traction.
112
 In one of the most memorable diplomatic efforts, the 
German Kaiser and his cousin, the Russian Tsar, entered into direct negotiations to prevent war. 
This famous exchange encouraged the Tsar to overcome the St. Petersburg war party, and froze 
Russia’s mobilisation for two days.113 When these exchanges ended acrimoniously, the Tsar caved 
in to his hawkish advisers. The Russian military chief smashed his phones so that the Tsar would 
not be able to stop the war again.
114
 On 31 July, we find Grey still attempting to revive his four-
power mediation proposal. Like his interlocutors in the crisis, Grey “gave the impression to those 
who saw him in these days of a man near the end of his nervous resources.”115 It is supposedly 
around this time that Grey famously remarked:  
 
The lamps are going out all over Europe; we shall not see them lit again in our lifetime.
116
  
 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
Grey’s construction obscures the question of who was responsible for the war. No lamp-changers 
appear in his famous utterance, as they did in his day, to turn the lights out. The lights are simply 
                                                          
105
 Grey (1935b: 175). 
106
 McMeekin (2013: 278). 
107
 Grey (1935b: 175, 178-179). 
108
 Ibid. 276. 
109
 Ibid. 279. 
110
 Ibid. 290, 306. 
111
 Ferguson (2011b: 268). 
112
 FRUS (1914). 
113
 See Allison (1914).  
114
 McMeekin (2013: 298). 
115
 Joll (1992: 28). 
116
 It was supposedly while watching the lamps being lit in St. James Park from his office, that he uttered those famous 
words.  McMeekin (2013: 372). 
  Preventive Diplomacy 
92 
going out, not being put out by anyone in particular. As Niall Ferguson has noted, “few events in 
modern history have been subjected to more deterministic interpretations than the outbreak of the 
First World War.”117 Alliances in 1914, the theory goes, made Europe a powder keg in want of a 
spark, and an archduke’s assassination was enough to light the fuse.118 Historical actors’ memoirs 
have often conveyed the sense of being helplessly “carried away by the tide of history”. 119 
Historians and IR scholars often search for the very “historical forces which…explain the decisions 
of individuals as part of a broader and inevitable historical process.”120 This bends the historical 
narrative of the July crisis through a “teleological tunnel”, as William Mulligan argues. 121 
Deterministic accounts of the July 1914 crisis rest on the assumption, spoken or unspoken, that no 
human action would have sufficed to prevent the war. The assumption is that an unbroken chain of 
causation linked Gavrilo Princip’s trigger finger to the deaths of millions of soldiers on the war’s 
battlefields.   
In hindsight, many actors sought to justify their decisions with appeals to deterministic forces. 
The German Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg said, during the July crisis, that he sensed “a force of 
fate stronger than the power of humans, hanging over Europe and our people.”122 Grey also saw 
himself as fundamentally passive. “In a great crisis,” he wrote, “a man who has to act or speak 
stands bare and stripped of choice.”123 Channelling Martin Luther, he cryptically theorised that such 
a person “has to do what it is in him to do…and he can do no other.”124 After the war, however, 
Grey lost sleep on this very question.
125
   
 
I used to torture myself by questioning whether by foresight or wisdom I could have prevented the war… but I 
have come to think that no human individual could have prevented it.
126
  
 
We should not take the “broken, disappointed self-apologist of the memoirs” at his word, Ferguson 
warns.
127
 The image of impersonal forces pushing powerless leaders towards war is misleading. The 
obvious function of these “images of natural catastrophe” is to persuade readers that politicians did 
not cause the war.
128
 But Grey’s incredible remark suggests that there may be a simpler motive than 
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cynically shirking political responsibility for the carnage of the war. Rejecting their ability to 
prevent the war may represent a deeper moral or psychological coping mechanism.
129
 
Many individuals clearly acted purposively to make war break out in July 1914. If Sarajevo was 
the spark, numerous people blew on the fuse, and shielded it from attempts to extinguish the flame. 
A more nuanced understanding of the July crisis no only assumes that the outbreak of war was not 
inevitable in July 1914, but that it was perhaps improbable.
130
 The real tragedy of the First World 
War is that it could have been prevented “at any point during the five weeks of crisis,” as John 
Keegan put it.
131
 From this perspective, it was precisely the decisions of individual statesmen which 
narrowed the “freedom of action of governments and closed actions” in a vicious cycle.132 The July 
1914 crisis provides “ample examples of the role of contingency in human affairs,” as Williamson 
and Van Wyk argue.
133
 It is, therefore, an ideal case study of human agency.  
I will now demonstrate the point that certain agents almost prevented the First World War. I will 
begin by reviewing Tisza’s change of mind. Secondly, I return to Sir Edward Grey’s numerous 
mediation proposals. Contrary to Grey’s self-apologetic remarks, I argue that he could have acted 
much more effectively. Finally, I conclude with a broader point about agency in the July crisis. I 
also argue out that historical contingency often arises from chance events like heart attacks, 
nightmares and other unpredictable events. 
What happened in six days to change Tisza’s mind so radically from immovable obstruction to 
supporting a war which he alone foresaw might end in world war? It was obvious to all proponents 
of war, in July 1914, “that without Tisza’s approval there was nothing they could do.”134 His 
legendary stubbornness makes his change of mind doubly difficult to understand. “Of all the 
problems concerning the outbreak of the war in 1914,” one historian remarked, “none has been 
more obscure than Count Tisza’s sudden abandonment of his position to a declaration of war.”135 
This is one of the great ‘what ifs’ of the July crisis, revealing the decisive role of agency in causing 
the war.
136
 Several factors may explain Tisza’s about-face.  
The first potential factor was an unrelated, chance event. On 10 July, Russia’s anti-Austrian 
ambassador in Belgrade collapsed of a heart attack – on the floor of the Austrian embassy. His 
sudden death fed Serbian chauvinism and rumours of Austrian foul play.
137
 Berchtold capitalised on 
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this show of Serbian aggressiveness to pressure Tisza.
138
 Secondly, as a pan-German, Tisza cited 
Germany’s diplomatic support for Austria-Hungary as having swayed him.139 There is evidence that 
Berchtold exaggerated, and may even have tampered with, the content of German telegrams to force 
Tisza to consent to war.
140
 A fourth and crucial factor is that Tisza’s closest confidantes held pro-
war views.
141
 Whatever the ultimate cause of his change of mind, which we may never know, the 
effect of Tisza’s decision is undisputed.  
After his 14 July conversion to the war party, Tisza was “a changed man.”142 On 31 July, when 
Edward Grey proposed his last mediation, it was Tisza who reportedly strengthened Berchtold’s 
resolve to undercut this peace effort.
143
 It was Tisza “who raised Berchtold’s flagging spirits when 
the peace proposal of Sir Edward Grey seemed to jeopardize the plans of the war party.”144 Hence, 
Tisza’s change of mind twice brought Europe closer to war. Underneath this convert’s zeal, Tisza 
was still deeply loyal to the Dual Monarchy and a staunch supporter of the German alliance. An 
anecdote reveals that Tisza swallowed his opposition to war out of “a perverse sense of duty”.145 
When the war began, throngs chanted Tisza’s name in the streets, but he remained despondent.146 
When a sea of pro-war Hungarians chanted his name, Tisza’s colleagues begged him to address the 
crowds. Tisza refused. 
 
The Minister President was sitting on a low chair in the hall, smoking a cigar and looking as remote and 
introspective as ever.…There the man sat, in a deep armchair, not speaking to anyone, with a dark expression on 
his face, his teeth clenched… motionless, staring ahead of him as if all he could see was the tragic fate of his 
country.
147
 
 
Tisza’s colleagues were angry at his inaction, which they could not understand: 
 
They could not have known that Tisza was opposed to the war… he had accepted responsibility for a war he had 
fought hard to prevent. Out of a perverse sense of duty he accepted a task he loathed, the task of organising a war 
knowing full well what it would mean. He accepted it in silence, a silence that lasted until his death.
148
 
 
During the war, Tisza visited the front, where a disgruntled soldier attempted to kill him. In 1918, 
when a revolution broke out in Hungary, Tisza was blamed as the villain of the war. A group of 
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armed soldiers broke into his home and shot him. Tisza had been forewarned, but chose to stay.
149
 
His last words were: “It had to happen this way.”150  
Count Tisza’s last stand, in July 1914, almost managed to prevent an Austria’s war with Serbia. 
Tisza was no saint. He had fought to prevent war to protect Magyar supremacy in the empire.
151
 
There is much truth to Franz Ferdinand’s critique of Tisza as a pretentious dictator. Vienna 
“trembles” and “everyone grovels before him” when he is in town, Ferdinand complained.152 Some 
have blamed Tisza’s three-week delay for making Austria’s attack on Serbia a premeditated murder, 
rather than a crime of passion.
153
 This is an unfair point. Tisza bore responsibility for converting to 
the war party, and he bore it silently to the end of his life. However, it is misguided to cast the first 
stone at Tisza, the only opponent of war in Vienna. It is terrifying to think that, but for one man’s 
change of mind, the First World War would not have occurred. But it is only terrifying because it 
appears true. 
Historical scholarship, which has practically overlooked Tisza, has been less kind to Grey. Post-
war debates have featured at least three criticisms of Grey’s conduct during the July crisis. Grey 
clearly saw, in July 1914, the “possible blood guilt” which he might inherit, and “was resolved that 
I would have none of it on my head.”154 It is in this spirit that he set out to prevent a European war. 
However, I agree with revisionist accounts of the crisis, which place a much larger share of 
responsibility on Grey’s head than he was prepared to admit. 
A major critique of Grey’s foreign policy is that he consistently misled the British parliament, 
and Germany, about the commitments he had made to France and Russia in the event of war.
155
 The 
implication is that Grey acted in bad faith during the crisis. Ferguson argues that Grey tacitly 
signalled a British continental commitment in the event of war.
156
 In doing so, he may have 
encouraged the Russian foreign minister to assume Britain’s support in a war with Germany.157 The 
hawks at the Foreign Office also had Grey’s ear, including Nicolson, who pushed for a formal 
military alliance with France and Russia.
158
 Grey was an interventionist at heart, and would rather 
have resigned than watch France be crushed in a war.
159
 But he kept his preference hidden until the 
                                                          
149
 Ibid. ix. 
150
 The author of a 1966 doctoral dissertation on Tisza concluded: “If one believes the way a man dies is forecast and 
predestined by the way he lived, then Tisza could not have died in any other manner… a soldier’s death – brutal and 
raw…and alone.” Ibid. 204. 
151
 Ibid. 71. 
152
 Ibid. 66.  
153
 This argument first surfaced in a 1963 biography of Berchtold, and is mimicked by McMeekin’s modern account of 
the July crisis. See Ibid. 80; and McMeekin (2013: 122). 
154
 Grey (1935b: 159). 
155
 Kollerstrom (2011). 
156
 Ferguson (2011b: 247). 
157
 Ibid. 252. 
158
 Ibid. 253. 
159
 Ibid. 177. 
  Preventive Diplomacy 
96 
last few days of the crisis, when he led efforts to bring Britain into the war.
160
 Only Grey and 
Churchill favoured intervention in a war regardless of whether Belgian neutrality was violated.
161
 
All of this helps to justify the critique that Grey was not a disinterested mediator. Even as he offered 
mediation proposals in late July, Grey collaborated with Churchill to use British fleet movements to 
send signals of military deterrence.
162
 
Grey and Nicolson consistently denied Russia’s early and menacing mobilisation. Grey was even 
“impatient” at Germany’s request that Britain seek to restrain Russia.163 He justifies his inaction by 
insisting that he could do nothing but send his “pious hopes” to Russia to cease mobilising.164 This 
is a striking admission that Grey knew about Russia’s mobilisation.165 He claims that Germany’s 
rejection of his mediation “struck out of my hand what might have been a lever to influence Russia 
to suspend military preparations.”166 This self-serving justification is disingenuous or confused. His 
second proposal explicitly rejected the need to pressure Russia. Grey’s memoir therefore accuses 
Germany of undermining a policy he never actually pursued. As a long-standing advocate of strong 
Anglo-Russian relations, some historians have concluded that Grey’s bias led him “to appease 
Russia in the July crisis.”167 What is clear is that he consistently downplayed alarming reports of 
Russian mobilisation, and the fears it caused in Berlin. 
A second critique of Grey’s stance in the crisis adopts the French and Russian perspective. 
George Bernard Shaw argued that Grey’s position that Britain was neither-neutral-nor-allied 
confused the other powers.
168
 Grey’s policy was “not to have a policy”.169 Shaw supports the claim 
that “the one chance of averting war was to convince [Germany] bluntly that if they took on the 
French Republic they would have to take on the British Empire, too.”170 This is a bridge too far. It is 
fair to say that a clearer signal of British policy may have influenced events. However, it is another 
argument altogether to suggest that British support for Russia and France could have prevented war. 
On this point, we must give Grey credit in his argument that, such a belligerent stance would simply 
have precipitated the war sooner.
171
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A similar argument is that Grey could have prevented war by accepting the German bid for 
British neutrality.
172
 This argument falls apart upon closer inspection. It is not fair to critique Grey 
for failing to pledge Britain’s neutrality – which his entire policy was designed to avoid. A fairer 
critique is that Grey seriously mismanaged his communications with Germany. After this first 
neutrality proposal, Grey proposed to the Germans that Britain would “remain neutral so long as 
German troops remain on defensive and do not cross French frontier, and French abstain from 
crossing German frontier”. 173  Grey shocked Paris and Berlin alike. He did not realise the 
implications, which implied that Britain would deter France from attacking. It is little wonder that 
Grey back-pedalled from his own proposal. This leads us to a more pertinent critique: Grey was an 
incompetent communicator.
174
 
The above critiques effectively boil down to the circular argument that had Grey pursued an 
entirely different policy, he would have pursued a policy which might have prevented war. This is 
an easy argument which reveals little.  Grey undeniably had “far greater freedom of action than his 
memoirs subsequently suggested.”175 However, he still did not have unlimited agency, and we 
should be careful not to over-state the constraints on his room for manoeuvre. Grey was an 
imperfect human being, with imperfect information, in an extremely divided cabinet, attempting an 
extraordinary balancing act. A convincing critique of Grey is that he could have made a crucial 
difference by simply being clearer, quicker and more decisive in executing his own policy. Grey 
took action “only when the conflagration was on the point of breaking out and no six or seven days 
earlier,” as one historian concluded. “The pity is that his mind moved too slowly.”176 Had he clearly 
warned the German leadership of Britain’s intentions six days earlier than he did, some suggest, war 
would not have broken out in August 1914.
177
 
Proceeding from his own assumptions, and from the information he knew, we can construct a 
more devastating critique. As I will argue, it was principally Grey’s “tactic of studied ambiguity” 
which backfired. Grey was effectively saying: we are not neutral, but we are not allied. But it 
signalled the opposite of what he intended: to Germany, that Britain would remain neutral; to 
France and Russia, that it would not.
178
 Rather than deter the belligerents, Grey may have 
unwittingly emboldened them.  
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Grey later wrote that “there was no other line open to me” than his ambiguous position.179 I 
argue that Grey did have alternative lines open to him. Had Grey pursued his own initial strategy 
more clearly, the July crisis would likely have taken a radically different turn. Using his own 
assumptions, we can build a more effective mediation strategy which he actually considered. As the 
mediator of the 1912-1913 London conferences, Grey had discovered that a permanent body of 
standing negotiators could help to avoid great power war.
180
 A mild Germanophobe, Grey was 
resentful of Germany’s obstructionism in July 1914.181 A man of limited imagination, he could not 
understand why Berlin was inveterately suspicious of all British actions.
182
 He did not perceive his 
secret military conversations with the French and Russians as having any relation to German fears. 
The key to peace had to lie in Berlin, he simplistically believed.  
Grey was later rightly criticised for ignoring Austria-Hungary’s enormous sway in fomenting the 
Sarajevo crisis.
183
 For much of the crisis, he appeared uninterested in putting pressure on Austria-
Hungary to prevent a war, let alone meeting with relevant ambassadors in London until mid-July.
184
 
Berlin did act duplicitously in vetoing Grey’s mediation behind his back. In this sense, Grey’s bias 
was somewhat right, even if it over-simplified reality.
185
 Four assumptions guided Grey’s 
worldview and policies: 
 
1. A modern war would be catastrophic, and must be prevented. 
2. Germany was the decisive actor in restraining its Austrian ally. 
3. If a war came, Britain could not remain neutral, and must support France. 
4. No pledge must be given to France and Russia, which might embolden them.186 
 
A final assumption is that Grey could not step beyond the constraints of a split cabinet. That is, 
Grey could neither extend firm commitments to France and Russia, nor proclaim British neutrality. 
His strategy was bound to navigating the extremely narrow channel between both. Within those 
constraints, we can decisively rebut Grey’s self-apologia that “there was no other line open to me.” 
He could have acted sooner and more forcefully within the same constraints.   
Firstly, Grey’s mediation was not only undermined by his strategic ambiguity, but his delay in 
acting. Britain’s ambassador to Russia had urged Grey, on 24 July, to clearly warn Berlin and 
Vienna “that if war became general, it would be difficult for England to remain neutral.”187 Had 
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Grey issued this veiled (but, in fact, truthful) warning in both capitals over the next few days, 
Britain may have effectively nipped the crisis in the bud. This policy accords with all four points in 
Grey’s worldview set out above. I propose to build on this point as the basis of a mediation proposal 
which Grey could easily have pursued.  
As we saw, Grey’s initial proposal consisted of Britain, France, Germany and Italy mediating the 
crisis between Russia and Austria-Hungary. Berlin had accepted it; Paris and St. Petersburg had 
rejected it. At this critical juncture, let us suppose that Grey did not concoct a new variant of his 
proposal overnight and leave the hawkish, pro-French Nicolson to ham-fistedly explain this 
initiative to Germany. Instead, let us assume that Grey had thought:  
 
The Germans are open to it; Britain’s friends are not. Since France and Russia want British security guarantees, I 
have more influence with both than with Germany. I must first work on bringing these powers to accept my 
proposal while I have German support, which is the key to restraining Austria. 
 
In this counter-factual universe, Grey, acting on this intuition, would have left his country home in a 
hurry to return to work at the Foreign Ministry. On the way, he would have madly scribbled the 
following points of his mediation strategy on the back of a napkin on the train: 
 
1. Instruct Bertie [ambassador to France] to enquire about grounds for French rejection. If they cite fear of 
signalling British neutrality, instruct him to clearly state that nothing would do more than estrange Britain 
from France than if the latter undermines mediation. 
  
2. Send instructions to Buchanan [ambassador to Russia] with the same message. Ensure that this message 
reaches the Tsar; he is one of the few proponents of peace.  
 
3. Summon Lichnowsky, express gratitude for Germany’s cooperation and agree to urgency of restraining 
Austria and Russia to preserve peace. Stress that Britain stands ready to facilitate mediation, in London or 
elsewhere. Couple this appeal with a clear and forceful statement “that if war became general, it would be 
difficult for England to remain neutral.” Therefore, Britain counts on Germany’s unconditional support.  
 
4. For good measure, send telegram to Goschen [ambassador to Berlin] containing the thrust of the same 
message, to be communicated to Bethmann-Hollweg, Jagow and the Kaiser. Coordinate a royal message 
from British sovereign, the Kaiser’s cousin, to reinforce the importance of a successful British mediation for 
the sake of European peace and Anglo-German relations. 
 
5. If Germany obstructs, offer the concession that Britain pressure Russia to freeze mobilisation. If Russia and 
France obstruct, offer the concession that Serbia might attend the conference. If they continue to obstruct, 
threaten (even if not true) that Britain might consider a neutrality pledge after all. 
 
6. Instruct De Bunsen [ambassador to Vienna] and Buchanan to pressure on Berchtold and Sazonov, 
respectively, to attend the conference. Communicate the message to the Austro-Hungarian sovereign, and to 
known proponents of peace, including Count Tisza, to amplify pressure.  
 
7. Impose a delay of 24 hours for confirmation attendance. Schedule start of conference for 27 July.  
 
In this scenario, Grey would not have betrayed any one of his policy constraints. He may admittedly 
have needed some imaginative capacity in courting German support, and in realising the importance 
of France, Russia and Austria in the crisis. However, short of this, Grey proposed this scheme 
himself. The main difference is that, in real life, Grey did not interrupt his fly fishing trip, subverted 
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his own proposal, and left the Foreign Office in the hands of a hawkish pro-French official at the 
most critical time in modern British history.  
Granted, we can never know whether the above strategy would have prevented war. Even if the 
parties had met in London, a critic might argue, this conference would have likely have broken up 
acrimoniously. War could have been delayed by a week, but not prevented.  Let us briefly consider 
this second-order counter-factual. With the parties in one place, they would have been forced to 
react to allegations, rebut critiques and clarify their intentions on the spot. This conference would 
have no doubt been extremely heated. It may not even have prevented some type of war. But 
granting the critique that this conference may have failed, any war which came may have been a 
different one. Supposing that Grey ably chaired and kept such an extraordinary meeting together for 
a further week or two without a shot being fired, the strategic landscape would have been radically 
different.  
Russia would have come close to completing its large-scale military mobilisation for all the 
world to see. Britain could not credibly have denied this fact at the conference. The Russian 
government would have faced the choice of using the tactical military advantage of mobilisation – 
attacking first – or losing it. If Russia did not attack first, its military juggernaut could not remain 
on high alert for a protracted period of time due to the immense resources this wasted. In the short 
term, with Germany backing this mediation, war would not have broken out in August 1914.  
One of history’s great unknowns is what may have occurred had Edward Grey reached out, via 
his ambassador in Vienna, to Count Tisza. Had such a correspondence simply existed in the crisis, 
these two powerful individuals may have realised their shared interest in preventing war. Tisza, 
whose close friends included international bankers,
188
 could feasibly have interacted with Grey 
through backchannels. With Grey’s powerful support prior to his infamous change of mind, Tisza 
may have resisted the Austrian hawks’ pressure for a further two weeks. During this time, Tisza 
could have made a good faith British mediation of the Serbian crisis the sine qua non of his 
agreement to any future military action. 
Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that the fictitious Grey-Tisza correspondence had 
simply fizzled out. We may further assume that Grey’s mediation conference in London had broken 
up dramatically. If, as is likely, the Russian hawks were still ascendant in St. Petersburg, they may 
have pressured the weak sovereign to attack Austria upon the failure of the conference. In this case, 
Austria would have been at war with Russia and Serbia. France would likely have joined Russia. 
This would have been a major war, but with Britain and Germany still on the sidelines, not yet a 
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European war. Without German involvement, it is extremely unlikely that Britain would get 
involved.
189
 This leads us to an almost incomprehensibly plausible scenario. 
The fate of world peace hung on the actions of the German leaders. Had Chancellor Bethmann-
Hollweg and the Kaiser realised – as they only realised belatedly in the real world – that German 
and Austrian hawks were conspiring to create a major war, they could have thwarted them. 
Germany could still have rescinded its blank cheque. Rather than ordering mobilisation 
prematurely, Berlin could have adopted a policy of passive defence – waiting to be attacked in order 
to gain international support for a war of self-defence. In this counter-factual universe, a Germany 
which faced a two-front war not of its own making, and which did not violate Belgian sovereignty, 
would have been a clear victim of Franco-Russian aggression. It would have had a natural ally in 
Britain, which would either have remained neutral, or could even have threatened France with 
sanctions or worse if it did not come to peace terms. Without the might of the British Empire on the 
Western Front, France would almost certainly have lost a war with Germany in 1914. Without 
Britain, in short, this European conflict would likely not have become a world war.
190
 Hitler may 
never have risen to power. The Second World War may never have occurred. The present would be 
unrecognisable. 
In this way, we see that even if Grey’s mediation conference failed – which it need not have – 
any European war in late 1914, or early 1915, could have taken a radically divergent course. It 
would have been a different war. The above counterfactual reveals the disproportionate extent to 
which the greatest events, such as world wars, hinge upon the smallest, like a leader’s personality. 
In the best case scenario, Grey’s mediation would have succeeded in simply gaining enough time 
for the crisis to gradually deescalate. Granted, this would have left underlying strategic rivalries 
intact. This would still have been a much better outcome than the First World War. What is certain 
is that Grey’s argument that he had no alternative lines beyond those he said, and that he stood 
stripped of choice in July 1914, is false. This conclusion, even if valid, does not challenge one 
historian’s assessment that Grey’s conduct was “honourable and rational” in the crisis.191 This is an 
altogether different question. Grey appears to be one of the few leaders genuinely, even desperately, 
committed to preventing a major war during the crisis. The blood guilt for the war was not his. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This case study raised three important points on agency in diplomatic efforts to prevent war. The 
first point is banal but important: personality matters. As David Lloyd George wrote of Edward 
Grey, his personality was inextricably linked to his actions during the crisis.
192
 It is obvious that a 
stronger or weaker personality may have played Grey’s role differently.193The personality traits of 
key agents can have an enormous influence on the course of an international crisis. What is less 
obvious is that the causal link between an actor’s personality and choices is not deterministic. As 
we saw in the case of Count Tisza’s efforts, this individual was strong-minded enough to endure the 
pressure of a powerful pro-war lobby in Vienna and Berlin. Yet even Tisza ultimately relented 
under pressure. In 1861, an equally strong-minded leader, Abraham Lincoln, did not budge an inch 
under heavy psychological pressure. We will return to this comparison in CHAPTER 8, as it contains 
insights which are particularly relevant to preventive diplomacy.  
Secondly, this case revealed the pivotal role of contingent events, if not sheer luck, which 
resembled, at a few important points, the indeterministic roll of a die. The fact that Russia’s 
ambassador died in the Austrian embassy, and the Serbian hatred it provoked, was an entirely 
fortuitous event which Berchtold manipulated to wear down Tisza’s resolve. Other contingent 
events, such as the Kaiser being asleep on one crucial evening, opened up causal paths which, in 
their absence, would not have been possible. Finally, the individualist framework of this thesis gave 
the reader a view of a crisis “saturated with agency.”194 Christopher Clark argues that this approach 
is superior to the structural view of history, which “has a distorting effect, because it creates the 
illusion of a steadily building causal pressure,” leading to an inevitable explosion.195 In this view, 
“political actors become mere executors of forces long established and beyond their control.”196 It 
was the conscious and self-reflexive decisions of actors alone which determined the outbreak of the 
war. Far from an unavoidable catastrophe, it was a war of choice. Further proof of this argument 
can be found in another great power crisis which ended peacefully. A potential Sino-American war, 
I will argue, pivoted upon the wills of a few individuals. 
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Dag Hammarskjöld – The Taiwan Strait Crisis, 1954-1955 
 
“This case is one of those which history  
suddenly lifts up to key significance...”  
- Dag Hammarskjöld
1
 
 
Between 1839 and 1861, Scott’s and Seward’s efforts to prevent war were carried out in face-to-
face encounters, and slow and gruelling written exchanges. Official letters took weeks to cross the 
Atlantic during the Aroostook crisis. The press played a growing role. In 1914, the crisis played out 
at an alarming rapidity, over days not months. Diplomatic exchanges were dense, instantaneous and 
pervasive, even confusingly so. Only the old-fashioned Kaiser sent his last desperate peace effort by 
courier to Vienna, rather than via telegram or telephone.
2
 History has not recorded how far this 
courier travelled before Austria declared war. Forty years and two world wars later, preventive 
diplomacy had entered the modern age. In 1954, the U.S. and China almost went to war over the 
future of Taiwan. While communication technology had not altered radically since the First World 
War, those labouring to prevent war now worked under the shadow of nuclear weapons and 
journalists. The key architect of preventive diplomacy, in 1954, was Dag Hammarskjöld, who also 
coined the term. 
The son of Sweden’s prime minister during the First World War, Dag Hammarskjöld was the 
second head of the United Nations. Between 1954 and 1955, he was instrumental in facilitating a 
peaceful de-escalation of the first Taiwan Strait crisis. Subsequent scholarship has framed his 
initiative as a minor diplomatic mission on the periphery of the crisis.
3
 Drawing on under-studied 
archival sources, this case study provides a richer picture of the immense challenges and tactical 
successes of Dag Hammarskjöld’s mission to prevent a great-power war over Taiwan. I will first 
reconstruct the context of U.S.-China tensions in the early Cold War. Secondly, I trace 
Hammarskjöld’s mission to China to release captured U.S. pilots. Thirdly, I recount how the U.S. 
and China almost went to war, before Zhou Enlai and Chiang Kai-Shek chose to deescalate the 
crisis. Finally, I explain how Hammarskjöld linked his mission to the broader task of preventing 
U.S.-China war in the Taiwan Strait. This case demonstrates a powerful agent acting within 
extremely narrow institutional constraints, yet making a tangible difference to a great power crisis 
in the face of these structural limits. 
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BACKGROUND 
 
During the Chinese Civil War (1927-1950), the U.S. provided military aid to the nationalist forces 
of the Republic of China (ROC) against those of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). By 1950, 
ROC forces had retreated to the island of Formosa (Taiwan), and a few islands hugging the Chinese 
mainland. In January 1950, the Truman administration excluded Taiwan from the U.S. defence 
perimeter, spelling the end of the ROC.
4
 The PRC scheduled a military campaign to ‘liberate’ 
Taiwan by summer 1951.
5
 But the beginning of the Korean War prompted the U.S. to interpose the 
Seventh Fleet across the Taiwan Strait. Beijing delayed the Taiwan operation, redirecting its armed 
forces to the Korean border. Mao Zedong planned a new campaign against Taiwan when the 
Korean War ended.
6
 
The first Taiwan Strait crisis began at dawn on 3 September 1954. The People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) launched a sustained artillery attack on Quemoy, one of the ROC-held islands closest 
to the mainland. The shelling killed two U.S. military advisors among Taiwanese victims.
7
 
Competing explanations of Chinese intentions abound. One prominent argument is that Mao tried to 
deter the U.S. from concluding an alliance with the ROC.
8
 Mao himself appeared to convey this 
intention to Zhou Enlai.9 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had recently announced that the U.S. 
was considering the creation of a Northeast Asian NATO. A second explanation is that Mao 
considered China vulnerable to a U.S. attack on three fronts. He may therefore have been 
attempting to pre-empt a U.S.-backed invasion.
10
 A third theory is that Mao erratically micro-
managed this operation “without a long-term strategy nor a short-term plan.”11 Whatever Mao’s 
intentions, the U.S. did not perceive them as limited. 
Early accounts of the crisis stressed that President Dwight D. Eisenhower steered a successful 
“policy of restraint and avoidance of conflict in the Taiwan Strait.” 12  However, new evidence 
suggests that Eisenhower dangerously escalated the crisis. The mentality of preventive war had 
gained ground among senior American officials.
13
 Truman was so frustrated by the protracted 
Korean War that he considered blockading China’s entire coast, and threatening its cities with 
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nuclear annihilation.
14
 Eisenhower also considered using nuclear strikes to force China to make 
peace.
15
 Had he implemented this decision, the U.S. may also have had to launch a sustained 
nuclear attack on the USSR. Additionally, the U.S. had covertly supported the ROC’s intention of 
reconquering the Chinese mainland.
16
 Admiral Arthur Radford, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, presented Chiang Kai-Shek with a detailed plan for a major “counter-invasion” of the 
mainland.
17
   
With escalating tensions in the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. was divided. Hawks were pushing for a 
U.S. defence of the islands, and a nuclear attack on China if it responded.
18
 Dulles and Eisenhower 
agreed on what appears to be a three-pronged response to the crisis. The first part of their approach 
involved “keeping the enemy guessing” about U.S. intentions.19 The second leg of the U.S. strategy 
was to ask the UN to mediate. This was largely a propaganda move to divide the Soviet bloc and 
paint China as the aggressor. Dulles foresaw that the initiative would be rejected by Chiang. He 
therefore “sought to keep the American hand in this UN initiative hidden,” as Brands recounts, 
working through the proxy of New Zealand.
 20
 The secret plan was called Oracle. U.S. leaders 
delayed this mediation until after mid-term elections, to avoid facing accusations of appeasement.
21
 
The third leg of the U.S. response served to reassure Chiang, who doubted that Eisenhower would 
fight China over Taiwan. To secure his endorsement of the UN ceasefire, the U.S. offered Chiang a 
formal defence treaty. As a compromise, the treaty was ambiguous on whether it covered the 
offshore islands.
22
 The U.S. extracted a secret guarantee that the ROC would consult Washington 
before launching a military attack against China.
23
 
On 23 November, the PRC imprisoned 13 American pilots on espionage charges, claiming that 
they had spied on China during the Korean War. With mounting war talk in Washington, the U.S. 
once again postponed Oracle.
24
 Although the administration did not admit it, Chinese allegations 
were true concerning several of the pilots, who were actually CIA agents.
25
 On 3 December, 
President Eisenhower broached the possibility of war with China in the press.
26
 The next day, the 
U.S. representative to the UN, Henry Cabot Lodge, requested that Hammarskjöld put the issue of 
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the captured U.S. airmen on the agenda of the General Assembly.
27
 The President conveyed to 
Hammarskjöld that “this was a great responsibility of his.”28 This seemed to convince the Swede 
that he should go to Beijing.
29
 After a heated debate between Cold War blocs, the General 
Assembly finally empowered Hammarskjöld to use “the means most appropriate in his judgment” 
to release the pilots.
30
  
 
HAMMARSKJÖLD GOES TO CHINA 
 
Hammarskjöld stepped into the breach, his path strewn with diplomatic mines. We should bear in 
mind that Hammarskjöld’s mission had three major structural constraints. Firstly, the PRC had 
recently been at war with the UN, of which it was not yet a member-state. Secondly, Hammarskjöld 
was mediating a crisis between two great powers with no diplomatic relations. Most crucially, his 
mandate was vulnerable to Cold War pressures.  
In this section, drawing on overlooked declassified documents, I argue that we should see 
Hammarskjöld’s mission as important to the peaceful outcome of this crisis. Without ever saying so 
explicitly, Hammarskjöld was trying to prevent a U.S.-China war. In the overall dissertation, this 
case study picks up where the last one left off. Sir Edward Grey, as we saw, argued that he stood 
stripped of choice in 1914.  
This case study further demonstrates that, even within the narrowest constraints, leaders always 
have choices. Mao, Zhou, Chiang, Eisenhower and Dulles all set the region on the path to war in 
1954. Two of those actors pulled back in time to avert it. They were helped by a largely forgotten 
actor. Without Hammarskjöld, those leaders might later have written memoirs, like Grey, riddled 
with fatalistic self-justifications based on their alleged lack of choice to prevent war. 
The UN resolution endorsing Hammarskjöld’s diplomatic mission was a poisoned chalice, since 
it condemned China in one paragraph while also calling for negotiations. A Chinese rejection would 
damage the UN’s credibility and bolster hawks in the U.S. who were advocating military strikes 
against China, “despite all the risks of general war these would entail.”31 Hammarskjöld decided 
that he would act on the basis of the UN Charter, which the PRC recognised, rather than the harsh 
resolution.32 He cabled a blunt message to the PRC’s foreign minister, Zhou Enlai, practically 
inviting himself to Beijing.
33
 A reply came seven days later: “In the interest of peace and relaxation 
of international tension, I am prepared to receive you in our capital, Peking, to discuss with you 
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pertinent questions.”34 Hammarskjöld felt he had to “crash the gate”, according to one cable, and 
“try to find [a] method divorced from limelight…in such form as not to commit either [Beijing] or 
Washington.”35 He saw himself as the “only emissary acceptable” to both China and the U.S. He 
thus couched his invitation in a form that “[made] it impossible” for China to refuse.36 To cultivate 
U.S. support, Hammarskjöld had warned U.S. Ambassador Lodge of his intentions two days before 
sending his cable to Zhou.
37
 Hammarskjöld was pleased by Zhou’s tone, which he considered “very 
courteous” and “not contentious”.38 Lodge expressed confidence in Hammarskjöld’s “ability to play 
his hand in his own way.”39 For good measure, Hammarskjöld also informed the Soviet ambassador 
of his mission.  
Fully aware of the U.S.-China propaganda war at play, Hammarskjöld boldly told the American 
government not to “tell him lies.”40 The Cold War created immense protocol issues at the UN, 
putting tight constraints on the Secretary-General’s room for manoeuvre.41  One false step and 
Hammarskjöld would forfeit his impartiality, if not that of the UN. For symbolic effect, 
Hammarskjöld took his American bodyguard with him, to avoid the Chinese leaders thinking that 
he was “kowtowing”. To reinforce the point, he also asked for a U.S. Government airplane to start 
his journey.
42
 For now, Hammarskjöld enjoyed full American support; behind the scenes, the U.S. 
went to great lengths to avoid any actions likely to embarrass or endanger his mission.
43
 
Having established contact with Zhou, and shored up American support, Hammarskjöld’s third 
step was to manage the media. On 18 December, he answered the press with evasive double-speak. 
When asked whether he had “any real suggestion how to ease the tension in the Far East,” 
Hammarskjöld stressed that bringing preconceived ideas to a negotiation would risk sacrificing his 
own flexibility.
44
 Although opaque, his answer did not deny that his mission was linked to the 
Taiwan Strait crisis. During his last press conference before his trip, he said that his mission was 
“not negotiation, and it is not a goodwill mission.”45 Defining his mission in the vaguest possible 
terms may have helped him to retain his flexibility. One journalist asked him whether it was not 
humiliating, as the head of the UN, recently at war with China, to now “kneel” before Zhou Enlai to 
beg for the release of American pilots. “I am not going anywhere to beg anyone for anything,” he 
                                                          
34
 Cited in Ibid. 423. 
35
 FRUS (1954: 454). 
36
 Ibid.  
37
 FRUS (1954: 437).  
38
 FRUS (1954: 449). 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 FRUS (1954: 433). 
41
 FRUS (1954: 561), FRUS (1954: 562), FRUS (1954: 487), FRUS (1953: 213). 
42
 Ibid. 
43
 For example, FRUS (1954: 976) and FRUS (1955: 5). 
44
 Ibid. 427. 
45
 Ibid. 431. 
Preventive Diplomacy 
108 
replied firmly.
46
 Asked whether he might be willing to discuss other matters while on his trip, 
Hammarskjöld evasively questioned the semantics of the word “discuss”.47 Clearly, he was leaving 
his options open. 
Arriving in Beijing on 5 January, Hammarskjöld dined with Zhou and watched an opera. The 
next day, he began his marathon series of meetings: the pair spoke for over fourteen hours in four 
days, with an average of three hours per meeting.
48
 They focussed on the captured American pilots, 
their conviction on spying charges, and the possibility of their release. They also dealt with Sino-
American bilateral issues. From the outset, Hammarskjöld positioned himself not as the mouthpiece 
of the UN or the U.S., “which would have made me a party to the conflict.”49 Instead, the Secretary-
General claimed to speak on behalf of all the weight of world opinion which his office carried. 
Hammarskjöld stressed to Zhou “the vital importance of [the pilots’] fate to the cause of peace.”50 
Here is a concrete expression of Hammarskjöld’s recognition, largely tacit but fairly evident in the 
transcript of their talks, that his action was aimed at more than the release of the prisoners. Having 
made this explicit linkage, the Secretary-General strengthened the connection: 
 
You may feel that I exaggerate: how can the fate of these men be of such significance? However, I know that I 
am not exaggerating. This case is one of those which history suddenly lifts up to key significance...it has brought 
me around the world in order to put before you, in great frankness and trusting that we see eye to eye on the 
desperate need to avoid adding to existing frictions, my deep concern both as Secretary-General and as a man.
51
 
 
Hammarskjöld revealed two important points. Firstly, he was subtly tying the fate of the 
prisoners to the fate of peace in the Taiwan Strait. Secondly, Hammarskjöld made a fine yet 
powerful distinction between his office and his person in the resounding phrase “as Secretary-
General and as a man”. This distinction, as we will see, was crucial in allowing Zhou Enlai to save 
face in the de-escalation of this crisis. 
It soon became clear that Zhou and Hammarskjöld agreed on none of the details. The Chinese 
premier noted that they “were not even using the same language.”52 This led Zhou to conclude that 
they would be unable to find a solution “without approaching the matter from the angle of general 
political questions.”53 The next day, Zhou repeated his desire to discuss the broader Taiwan crisis. 
Peaceful coexistence was only possible if the U.S. withdrew from Taiwan.
54
 On the third day, the 
Secretary-General finally broached the Taiwan crisis. Zhou feared that the UN was dominated by 
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the U.S.
55
 He complained of the U.S.-ROC mutual defence treaty, seeing in it evidence that the 
United States was strengthening Chiang’s army so that it could attack the mainland.” 56 
Hammarskjöld used this opening to hold up the mirror to Zhou Enlai.  
“Many of the words you used with such deep conviction in describing your fear of aggression I 
have heard used in other countries concerning you,” Hammarskjöld replied. “You may seem to have 
substantial reasons for your fear, but so have others for theirs.”57 He used the analogy of the opera 
they had watched earlier as an example of the current crisis. In the opera, he said “two men were 
fighting each other in the dark, each of them believing that he had been threatened by the other 
man.” For this “tragedy of errors” to be broken, he argued, “somebody must begin, somewhere.” In 
effect, Hammarskjöld was inviting Zhou to release the pilots as a token of good faith. He 
emphasised that he was in favour of the PRC joining the UN.
58
 
The final sessions ended with no firm promise from the Chinese leadership. However, they had 
reached a basic understanding. Hammarskjöld agreed to represent China’s views on the broader 
Taiwan crisis to American leaders. In return, Zhou would consider granting more lenient sentences 
to the pilots, and hinted at a potential future release. The main condition would be that the U.S. 
refrain from bellicose threats against China. Despite their lack of agreement on the case, the 
Secretary-General was confident that their mutual respect paved the way for China’s unilateral 
release of the pilots.
59
 Zhou reciprocated with an expression of China’s admiration for 
Hammarskjöld’s commitment to peace.60 
The result of Hammarskjold’s ‘Peking formula’ strategy was still up in the air. Before his trip, he 
had called his trip to Beijing “one of the most extraordinary experiments in modern diplomacy.”61 
On his return, he was even more elated. He described it as “a miracle that everything went well, 
because the risks we were taking were extraordinary; but it did— in every detail.”62 Hammarskjöld 
was not speaking about the release of the prisoners, which of course he had not yet secured. He 
alluded instead to his meeting of the minds with Zhou. His conversations with the latter had 
 
made an enormous impression on me, and I would wish that other policy-makers had got it. What is so appalling 
is the basic lack of realism as to assumptions on which very much of Western policy is built. And now I am 
thinking not only of the situation in China, but of China’s role in Asia and of the position of the present regime in 
Peking. It is a little bit humiliating when I have to say that Zhou Enlai to me appears as the most superior brain I 
have so far met in the field of foreign politics.
63
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Overlooking Zhou’s role and personal qualities, he thought, “is likely to lead to disaster.”64 
Hammarskjöld had brought back not so much a deal, as a more nuanced understanding of China. 
President Eisenhower was well known for his stereotypical view of all Asians as wily Orientals.
65
 
Having exposed Zhou to the American view in Beijing, Hammarskjöld now hoped to achieve a 
comparable result in the U.S.  
 
WAR SCARE 
 
Stepping off the plane, the Secretary-General felt that his “feet hardly touched the ground. I had a 
good story to tell, but couldn’t tell it!”66 In order not to harm his fragile understanding with Zhou, 
he avoided the media.
67
 Hammarskjöld had kept Dulles in the loop over the phone during his talks 
in China, including the linkage between the pilots and the Taiwan Strait crisis.
68
 But the winds were 
blowing against Hammarskjöld.  
On his second day in Beijing, Dulles had already assembled a team of advisers to discuss options 
if Hammarskjöld failed. Some of the actions U.S. officials debated included “overflights, mining of 
harbors, and bombing of railroads.”69  Each of these could easily be construed as acts of war. When 
discussants brought up this point, Dulles simply remarked that he did “not think that the Chinese 
Communists want war.”70 This was a dangerous assumption. Dulles ultimately favoured the UN 
route (Oracle), but kept the other options on the table. President Eisenhower did not think the 
American public was ready to go to war yet.
71
 I will now explore the origins of a major war scare in 
March 1955. I will argue that Washington’s negative assessment of Hammarskjöld’s mission helps 
to explain this sudden escalation. 
Back in the U.S., Hammarskjöld was “moderately optimistic” that Zhou would agree to the 
prisoners’ release, as long as the issue was publicly divorced from the crisis.72 “One of the most 
significant statements Hammarskjöld made,” the American ambassador in Tokyo noted, “was that 
Chou appeared in private conversations to be a very worried man.”73 Over time, Zhou had stopped 
invoking Communist propaganda clichés, and became “more human”.74 Hammarskjöld had brought 
back photos of the captured pilots, who were safe. He had secured a promise that the families of the 
pilots would be given visas to visit them in China. Of the two pilots the PRC knew were CIA 
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agents, Zhou noted that, although they deserved the death sentence, they would come home one 
day. The Chinese foreign minister had said that “he definitely wanted the possibility of releasing the 
prisoners but it must be in such a way as not to make him lose face in Asia”. Hammarskjöld was 
convinced of Zhou’s good faith, and advised the U.S. to “lie low” and avoid inflaming tensions. 
Zhou’s main grievance related to concerns about details of the U.S.-Taiwan alliance, which he 
feared might include territorial designs on mainland China.
75
 Hammarskjöld was now holding up 
the mirror to U.S. leaders.  
On his way home from China, Hammarskjöld had requested a meeting in order to brief the U.S. 
president.
76
 President Eisenhower turned down Hammarskjöld’s request; he would meet Dulles 
instead.
77
 When they met, Dulles “didn’t feel very happy” about what he heard.78 His impression 
was that “Hammarskjöld had made no progress at all.”79 Dulles now openly considered giving the 
ROC a secret guarantee to defend the contested offshore islands. He was also working on 
persuading Chiang to withdraw ROC forces from those islands under U.S naval escort. When a 
British colleague asked him if such an escort risked war with the PRC, Dulles said that “if we were 
shot at we would obviously shoot back.”80 Diminishing faith in Hammarskjöld’s mission inclined 
the U.S. toward more muscular action. 
A few days later, Dulles predicted the failure of Hammarskjöld’s mission.81 He announced the 
president’s intention to request congressional authorisation to use the armed forces in the Taiwan 
Strait. “In my mind,” he announced, “the risk of war is greater if we don’t take this action.”82 
Lastly, Dulles informed the ROC Foreign Minister that the president had agreed, that very morning, 
that the United States would defend Quemoy and Matsu islands.
83
 This secret guarantee included a 
“preparedness to act against the mainland” if conflict escalated.84 This demonstrates that Zhou’s 
fears, which Hammarskjöld had reported, were well founded. 
From Taipei, the hawkish Ambassador Karl Rankin consistently undermined U.S. support for 
Hammarskjöld. Rankin spread the rumour that Hammarskjöld had sold out Taiwan by bartering the 
evacuation of the Dachen islands in return for the pilots’ release.85 This was pure conjecture, but it 
confirmed Dulles’ unfounded opinion that Hammarskjöld had failed. The ROC ambassador to the 
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UN also spread this rumour on the day Hammarskjöld left for China.
86
 The Secretary-General 
noticed the hardening mood in Washington. The U.S. had publicly rebuffed Zhou’s offer to allow 
the pilots’ families to visit China, deeming it a propaganda move.87 In an extraordinarily blunt move 
on 27 January, Hammarskjöld wrote Dulles a letter virtually accusing him of burning “a possible 
bridge to solutions”. Hammarskjöld further cast doubt on the success of any UN action through the 
Security Council, accusing the U.S. of using Oracle as a propaganda exercise, which it was.
88
 He 
continued: 
 
In view of the vital importance of this whole issue to peace, and more specifically to the United Nations efforts to 
achieve peace, I would, under all the circumstances, have regarded it as natural if some contact had been 
established with the Secretary-General. As matters now stand, when the Secretary-General has a more direct 
impression of the Chinese aspect of the problem than anybody else in the West….89 
 
Hammarskjöld was stressing the direct linkage of the release of the pilots to peace in the Taiwan 
Strait, accusing Washington of endangering peace. Dulles replied in a brief statement essentially 
referring Hammarskjöld to lower-level officials.
90
 Curtly, Dulles told Hammarskjöld that the 
General Assembly had not mandated him to tie “other issues” into his mission to China.91 The 
message was clear. The broader Taiwan crisis was not his business. The U.S. government did not 
appreciate Hammarskjöld conveying the fact that Zhou had linked the pilots’ release to the issue of 
peace in the current crisis.
92
 As Pang Yang Huei noted, “the US found Hammarskjöld to have taken 
his job too seriously.”93 His initiative, and China’s positive reaction to it, now made the U.S. appear 
obstructionist. Dulles felt that the Secretary-General’s mission had left Washington “in a mess”, and 
he was so “mad” that he did “not know what to say to H.”94 Dulles was irritated that Hammarskjöld 
was broadcasting his “belief that Chou is a reasonable human being.”95 Ambassador Lodge stoked 
Dulles’ anger by claiming that Hammarskjöld was “way over his head” and suffered from 
“delusions of grandeur.”96 Lodge tried to deter Hammarskjöld from going on any more “personal 
excursions” with Zhou.97 The qualified faith American officials had in Hammarskjöld’s mission 
evaporated. The U.S. was gearing up for war. 
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Early 1955 was a turning point in the crisis. On 18 January, the PLA staged an amphibious 
assault on the ROC-held islands. Yijiangshan Island fell two days later, with half of the 1,000 ROC 
troops killed, the other half taken prisoner. In late January, the U.S. Congress granted the president 
the right to use force to defend Taiwan.
98
 Although the resolution did not explicitly mention the 
offshore islands, Zhou saw this as “a war message.”99 China was not afraid and would fight for 
Taiwan, Zhou warned the U.S.
100
 President Eisenhower authorised the use of force against mainland 
Chinese bases in the event of war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered the air force to begin urgent 
target selection for an “enlarged atomic offensive” against the PRC.101 By February, Dulles was 
convinced that war was “a question of time rather than a question of fact,” and believed that it 
would quickly go nuclear.
102
 He hoped that there would be enough time for the administration to 
help “to create a better public climate for the use of atomic weapons.”103  Towards that end, the 
Eisenhower administration appears to have deliberately attempted to prepare the public for nuclear 
war by fomenting a full-blown war-scare in March.
104
 The war talk reached a crescendo in the 
American media when a senior military official was quoted, in front-page news, warning of a 
military showdown over Quemoy and Matsu islands on April 15.
105
 Against this backdrop, the U.S. 
supported policies which provided two plausible triggers of immediate war. 
Firstly, the U.S. administration’s war scare, which its own officials encouraged, led Eisenhower 
and Dulles to concoct a secret plan to defend Taiwan. President Eisenhower endorsed an immediate 
naval blockade five hundred miles in length along China’s coast. He also agreed to the stationing of 
nuclear weapons on Taiwan to deter a PRC invasion.
106
 In mid-April, Eisenhower dispatched 
Radford and Robertson – two well-known hawks – to Taipei carrying the president’s plan. Radford 
understood that the plan he was proposing to Chiang “meant war” with China.107 In a dramatic 
twist, Chiang rejected the plan out of hand. 
He no longer trusted the U.S.
108
 The irony is that the U.S. was, just as Eisenhower had joked of 
Chiang a few months earlier, in the hands of “a fellow who hasn’t anything to lose.”109 But when 
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Eisenhower gave Chiang a blank cheque to provoke a U.S.-China war – and with U.S. military 
backing for his planned invasion of mainland China. But Chiang refused to fill it out and cash it in. 
I will return to this anecdote in the analysis below, as it is a pivotal moment revealing the immense 
influence which one individual can exert over historical events. 
A second U.S.-sponsored event could feasibly have involved the country in a direct war with 
mainland China. On April 11, an Indian airplane carrying diplomatic delegates and journalists to a 
conference in Bandung, Indonesia, crashed into the sea, killing most of the people on board. Zhou 
Enlai was meant to be on the plane, but changed his flight plans citing an emergency 
appendectomy. This was an assassination attempt on the Chinese premier, carried out by Taiwan’s 
secret service using CIA technology.
110
 This incident is all the more extraordinary when it becomes 
clear what Zhou was about to announce at the diplomatic conference. His death might have 
inflamed tensions to the point of war. This point, which I also return to below, demonstrates the 
inherent contingency of history. 
 
THE UNRAVELLING 
 
Around the same time as Radford and Robertson arrived on their mission in Taiwan, Premier Zhou 
spoke at the Bandung conference in Indonesia, having arrived safely by another route. He supported 
“the settlement of disputes between the United States and China by peaceful means,” and hoped 
thereby to ensure “the postponement and prevention of a world war.” 111  These words almost 
instantly deflated the danger of war in the Taiwan Strait. Some have suggested that Zhou’s remarks 
appear to have been largely improvised, and they originated in a private luncheon with Asian 
delegates, at which they asked him about the current crisis.
112
 Dulles later took the credit for 
exerting influence, via diplomatic proxies, to pressure Zhou to make a peaceful gesture to decrease 
tensions over Taiwan.
113
 However, the credit belongs to Zhou himself, and second of all to 
Hammarskjöld, whose influence was at work. While Dulles did exert influence, the original idea 
and effort appear to have been Hammarskjöld’s.  
Dulles ordered the covert U.S. diplomatic campaign on 8 April.
114
 Hammarskjöld had begun 
much earlier. In February, despite Dulles’ attempt to tie his hands, Hammarskjöld had secured a 
proposal from Zhou to negotiate directly with the U.S.
115
 Dulles turned down the offer.
116
 Despite 
growing U.S. impatience, Hammarskjöld persevered. In a meeting on 24 March with U.S. 
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Ambassador Lodge, Hammarskjöld hinted that he was working behind the scenes to influence the 
outcome of the conference. As Lodge summed up, Hammarskjöld “feels Chou is clever enough to 
realize that he will be queried in private discussions there by friends of US and UN about his 
attitude on the prisoners.”117 Indeed, he had already been working to pressure Indian diplomats and 
leaders to convey this to Zhou. Hammarskjöld simultaneously pressured the U.S. to abstain from 
provocative statements.
118
 Dulles agreed to support Hammarskjöld’s campaign of “quiet 
diplomacy” until the end of April.119 Although he never acknowledged it, Dulles’ own behind-the-
scenes efforts to influence the Bandung conference took their lead from the UN Secretary General. 
Following Bandung, Hammarskjöld continued his demarche despite U.S. impatience.
120
 To 
Dulles’ credit, he had already sent several signals of good faith to the PRC.121 Dulles remained 
scathing, telling foreign diplomats that Hammarskjöld had “not done a good job.”122 In an indirect 
compliment, however, Dulles noted that although numerous states had extended their good offices 
to resolve the crisis peacefully, none could match the disinterestedness of the UN.
123
 Despite his 
dislike of Hammarskjöld, Dulles secretly helped him by confronting the Indian ambassador, 
Krishna Menon, who maintained a competing channel of negotiation with Zhou.
124
 Hammarskjöld 
probably never learned of this exchange, but he would have been pleased. Menon opportunistically 
took credit publicly for the release of the first U.S. pilots in May 1955; Hammarskjöld had quietly 
avoided public criticism of this impostor.
125
 In hindsight, Dulles regained confidence in 
Hammarskjöld’s work.126  
The news of the final release of all captured U.S. pilots came on 29 July 1955, Hammarskjöld’s 
birthday, while he was holidaying with his family in Sweden. This was no coincidence. The 
Chinese embassy had apparently enquired what he would like for his birthday.
127
 Zhou’s message 
stressed that “this release takes place in order to maintain friendship with Hammarskjöld and has no 
connection with the UN resolution. Zhou Enlai expresses the hope that Hammarskjöld will take 
note of this point.”128 The New York Times and other newspapers framed the release as a symptom 
of the warming U.S.-China relationship, omitting Hammarskjöld’s role entirely.129 This did not 
bother him, but he nevertheless received congratulations privately, and Dulles apparently respected 
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him thereafter.
130
 What the newspapers, and modern accounts of the crisis, missed is that 
Hammarskjöld’s mission was not merely a sideshow, but a major contribution to the prevention of a 
U.S.-China war. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
We now return to the philosophical purpose of this dissertation: to examine the role individual 
agents play in preventing war. This section discusses three key points. Firstly, I return to the three 
agents whose actions contributed to the prevention of war: Hammarskjöld, Zhou and Chiang. 
Secondly, I return to the failed attempt on Zhou’s life which, I argue, was a potential Sarajevo 
moment. I make this case by arguing that Zhou’s premature death might have escalated U.S.-China 
tensions to the point of war. Finally, I argue that methodological individualism is the most 
persuasive level of analysis at which to understand the causes of war and its prevention. I also deal 
with two structural critiques which might downplay the role that agents played in preventing war. 
Dulles later claimed that the U.S. administration had prevented war by threatening it.
131
 
Historians were initially sympathetic to this view; but more recent evidence belies this claim. 
Today, the scholarly consensus is that Eisenhower and Dulles brought the U.S. close to war with 
China by unnecessarily escalating the crisis.
132
 Moreover, their use of nuclear threats in 1955 
apparently convinced Mao of the need to develop China’s own nuclear weapons programme, to 
effectively guard against such threats in the future.
133
 This crisis was an important example of great 
powers pulling back from the brink of war. However, scholars have not challenged the U.S.-centric 
focus of accounts of this crisis. This is an understandable bias in the Cold-War-era literature. 
Newly-declassified evidence, I have argued, reveals the important roles of a plethora of other 
actors, including UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, Premier Zhou Enlai and the Taiwanese 
leader Chiang Kai-shek, among others. I will now argue that all three played major roles in 
preventing the use of force. 
If judged in absolute terms, Hammarskjöld’s effort to prevent war failed. Armed clashes 
occurred between PRC and ROC forces, as we saw. Moreover, crises again erupted in the Taiwan 
Strait in 1958 and 1993. The underlying conflict remains unresolved in 2014. Granted, 
Hammarskjöld was no superman. However, this black-or-white framework is ill-suited to weighing 
the causal efficacy of agents in a world which is mostly grey. Preventive diplomacy, as we defined 
it, only aims to tackle specific crises as they arise. It is unfair to judge Hammarskjöld’s efforts 
against the benchmark of resolving a conflict for all time, were that even possible. We are more 
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interested in weighing the effect of his efforts in preventing the escalation of this crisis to a U.S.-
China war in 1955, which was a clear and ominous danger. Judged according to that criterion, 
Hammarskjöld’s mission proved immensely successful. 
It is impossible to prove categorically that Secretary-General Hammarskjöld’s efforts in the 
crisis tilted the balance from potential war to peace. What is certain is that his quiet, behind-the-
scenes diplomatic efforts had a much more important effect than most accounts suggest. This bias 
may be partly due to the Eisenhower administration’s self-congratulation, Dulles’ dislike of 
Hammarskjöld, and the subsequent U.S.-centric accounts of the crisis. Hammarskjöld never 
published an account of the incident, or claimed any credit for the de-escalation of the crisis. 
However, tellingly, and probably sincerely, Dulles later came close to acknowledging 
Hammarskjöld’s important role during the Taiwan Strait Crisis.134 Hammarskjöld contributed to 
preventing war in at least two important ways. In the first instance, although he was not the only 
potential mediator in the crisis, he was the most impartial. For the worst days of the crisis, the 
Secretary-General was the only indirect channel of communication between the U.S. and China, and 
helped both understand the other’s fears.  Secondly, Hammarskjöld’s most effective move was also 
his simplest: humanising Zhou, and assessing that he was searching for a way to deescalate. 
Hammarskjöld’s psychological assessment that Zhou appeared to be a worried man was prescient, 
since the crisis partly reflected internal Chinese political tensions, as we will now see. 
Hammarskjöld’s actions did not suffice to prevent war. In 1839, General Scott had held open the 
door to a peaceful compromise, but Harvey and Fairfield had to walk through it. Similarly, 
Hammarskjöld only held the door open to compromise. Like any go-between, he was not the most 
decisive actor. Ironically, the belligerents – the leaders of the ROC and PRC – appear to have 
decided against further escalation, seemingly independently of one another. Zhou and Chiang 
arguably prevented a major war in 1955. It was largely Zhou’s actions which ended the Taiwan 
Strait crisis peacefully.
135
 Domestically, it was also Zhou who cemented political support for peace 
by radically advocating for the peaceful reintegration of Taiwan in July 1955. Peace was only 
restored when Zhou gained Mao’s consent and the support of political elites.136 This suggests the 
potential tragedy of Zhou’s assassination, which I explore below. Therefore, ultimate credit for the 
prevention of war must go to the Chinese premier, Zhou Enlai, as well as to his enemy, Chiang Kai-
shek. 
The moment in which two U.S. envoys presented Chiang with a blank cheque to provoke a war 
is one of those which history throws up to significance. Nothing in Chiang’s character or policy 
preference predisposed him to reject the plan. Indeed, the U.S. president was outsourcing to Chiang 
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the decision to launch an aggressive war to reconquer mainland China, backed by U.S. guarantees 
and nuclear weapons. That Chiang refused, due to his distrust of the U.S., was either wise or lucky. 
The case of July 1914 offers a stark parallel which demonstrates the decisive importance of agency. 
In 1914, as we saw, Berchtold sought and received an infamous blank cheque from the German 
leadership to attack Serbia. In 1955, Chiang Kai-Shek received a similar commitment from the 
U.S., and every incentive imaginable to cash it in. Unlike Berchtold, however, Chiang decided not 
to. This was lucky, but it was not due to luck that the U.S. and China avoided war in 1955. It was 
due to one individual’s decision. 
This case study demonstrated at least one major contingent event upon which history hinged. 
The failed Taiwanese assassination attempt provides the premise for a counter-factual scenario 
which, arguably, suggests how close the U.S. and China came to war. Let us imagine that, instead 
of having an emergency appendectomy – or being tipped off – Zhou had boarded the plane he had 
initially booked for his upcoming trip to Bandung. Almost as soon as his plane crashed, rumours of 
foul play would have swirled around the world. Even if his intelligence services failed to unveil the 
Taiwanese plot, Mao, distrustful as he was, may have laid the blame squarely on Washington for 
the actions of its client state. This, feasibly, would have added a major stressor in the crisis, with 
unpredictable consequences. Presumably, Washington would have denied any culpability, and may 
even have alleged that Mao had orchestrated this ‘false flag’ attack to justify an invasion of Taiwan. 
In this new crisis, Chiang might have accepted the secret U.S. security guarantees after all. Or Mao, 
his fears sharpened by the death of Zhou Enlai, might finally have ordered the invasion of Taiwan.  
The above counter-factual argument reveals the causal role which specific individuals played in 
preventing the resort to the use of force in 1955. This case study, like the previous ones, has once 
again substantiated the broader argument of this dissertation: that individuals, not structural forces 
beyond their control, cause and prevent wars. This specific case study may inspire counter-
arguments. One such argument is that the U.S. and China were not really close to war in 1955. The 
implication is that, whatever individual agents did – and no matter how much they exerted 
themselves – it did not causally determine the outcome of the crisis. Most accounts stress that the 
outbreak of a U.S.-China war was a looming possibility. However, Pang Yang Huei provides a 
dissenting view. He argues that the U.S. war scare was primarily for domestic consumption, and did 
not increase the risk of war.
137
 From this perspective, both the PRC and the U.S. “demonstrated 
flexibility as they inched towards [de-escalation] with the intention to tacitly resolve the Taiwan 
Strait Crisis.”138 This argument is original, but downplays the fact that numerous U.S. officials 
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advocated war with China in internal discussions.
139
 Moreover, this argument also assumes that 
China and the U.S. exerted a level of control over the crisis, which they did not.
140
 A series of 
events in early 1955 appeared to make war imminent.  
Firstly, Operation Oracle failed before it ever began, as Hammarskjöld had expected.
141
 Anthony 
Eden’s efforts to find a peaceful settlement with Zhou behind the scenes also failed.142 Moreover, 
Mao had concluded (erroneously) that the U.S. would not go to war over the offshore islands.
143
 He 
thought that further agitating against the U.S. and Taiwan would not provoke war. As we saw 
above, the U.S. had already committed to the defence of the islands. Moreover, U.S. leaders 
similarly assumed (wrongly) that China would not risk a war. When there was a lull in activities in 
the Taiwan Strait in early March, Dulles again miscalculated, assuming that the PRC was engaged 
in “a large-scale build up” to attack.144 “It was this misassessment that led the United States to 
escalate tensions in mid-March,” as Chang and Di note, “and the crisis lurched towards open 
hostilities.”145  Therefore, the diplomatic context in early 1955, as in 1839, appeared perfectly 
propitious for a major war. That no such war erupted was not due to a lack of structural causes, but 
to the actions of a handful of people.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter traced the arc of the first Taiwan Strait Crisis, focussing on Dag Hammarskjöld’s 
efforts to release captured U.S. pilots. By inserting himself into the middle of a U.S.-China crisis, 
the UN Secretary General took a gamble to try to prevent a major war. Zhou Enlai explicitly 
recognised Hammarskjöld’s contribution to peace, while American scholars and policy-makers 
have generally overlooked it. Whatever the exact effect of his actions in the first Taiwan Strait 
crisis, this case study gives fascinating insights into agency and contingency in diplomatic efforts to 
prevent war. It also demonstrates how, despite severe structural constraints, Hammarskjöld could 
still play an important role. Similarly, Chiang, despite every structural incentive conspiring in 
favour of a ‘yes’, said ‘no’ to a U.S. proposal almost guaranteed to provoke a U.S.-China war. 
Finally, I made the case that the failed assassination of Zhou was a contingent event upon which 
peace depended. 
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This case study provided a useful contrast to the previous chapter on the July crisis. I have 
already noted one superficial comparison with July 1914: the U.S. blank cheque to Taiwan. This 
comparison allowed me to tease out the crucial role of agency in determining the outcome of each 
respective crisis. There is a second and deeper point of comparison regarding what agency and 
contingency reveal about crises themselves. Had Zhou been successfully assassinated, the parallels 
with Sarajevo would have been startling. Zhou, like Franz Ferdinand, was a force for moderation in 
his own government. With that voice gone, one of the strongest brakes on war would have 
disappeared. However, as I argued in the last chapter, Franz Ferdinand’s assassination did not cause 
WWI. Rather, it caused a crisis; the subsequent actions of statesmen, as I argued, caused the war. 
Similarly, had Zhou died, as I hypothesised, a Sino-American war would still not have been 
inevitable. It would perhaps have become immeasurably more likely, but not over-determined.  
The previous cases suggest an important nuance in how we think about crises in relation to war. 
This relation is neither linear nor deterministic, since it is mediated by human beings. Crises are 
perceptual states triggered by an unforeseen event, with an element of risk or uncertainty, and in 
which people feel an urgency to act.
146
 A crisis therefore “resides in the person as well as in the 
situation.”147 It may appear grossly reductionist to suggest that the 1914 and 1955 crises were partly 
products of the mind. But they arguably were so, in certain key respects. An analogy helps to clarify 
this point. Some might see the Sarajevo incident in mechanistic terms, like an explosion unleashing 
“a power no work of man can oppose.” The imagery is of an uncontrollable stream of events 
pouring forth, against which resistance would be futile. But this type of imagery only makes sense if 
we understand that the pressures which leaders perceive are entirely psychological. And, as we saw, 
some leaders (such as Zhou and Chiang) have resisted such pressures where others (such as Tisza) 
have not. In CHAPTER 8, I discuss why leaders might respond differently under comparable 
pressures. 
Thic case study undermines the idea that a crisis itself can cause war. A crisis is nothing but a 
perceptual state shared by many individuals and, even then, not shared equally. The inequality of 
perceptions and the unknowability of another agent’s intentions make crises dangerous. But these 
factors all reside in individuals’ minds. For this reason, I suggest that a more fitting analogy for 
crises is that of a modified Mexican stand-off. Five armed individuals all raise their weapons at the 
same time. The danger accentuates each individual’s perceived pressure to act, yet the intentions of 
all the others remain unknown. It is precisely in such a situation that perceptions, and dialogue, 
matter. In July 1914, crudely put, the Russians, fearing Austrian intentions, cocked their weapons 
first; the Germans, fearing French and Russian intentions, acted second. Soon, everyone lay 
                                                          
146
 Billings, Milburn and Schaalman (1980: 306). 
147
 Ibid. 
Chapter 5   
121 
bleeding on the floor. This logic also applies to 1955. Zhou Enlai did not perceive war as inevitable, 
so he did not escalate. American leaders did, but held off temporarily. Had Zhou been assassinated, 
and Mao taken his place in the crisis, it is likely that he – corroded as he was by fear of American 
aggression – would have fired first. Hence, the idea that a crisis itself causes war is inaccurate. We 
can explain the outcome of international crises with sole reference to individuals, their relations to 
each other and their mental states.
148
 
The next chapter leaves the arena of high statecraft and international crises, and enters the 
domestic politics of Kenya and its post-electoral violence in 2007-2008. We delve deeper into the 
question of crises and mental pressures by focussing on a single individual, whose decision – he 
well knew – would have a major impact on the possibility of ethnic violence. This individual, 
various primary sources have corroborated, may actually have been threatened to act in a certain 
way. The follow case therefore tests the limits of agency. 
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Samuel Kivuitu – The Kenyan Electoral Crisis, 2007 
 
“My very personal view is that if Samuel Kivuitu  
had been willing to stand up and publicly resign 
 and say: ‘this isn’t credible and somebody needs  
to come in and clean this up’...maybe the  
violence could have been prevented.”
1
 
 
Kenya’s 2007-2008 post-election crisis is a closely studied case of preventive diplomacy.2 The 
brutal inter-ethnic violence which engulfed Kenya following the 2007 presidential elections claimed 
the lives of over 1,500 people. Over 600,000 people were forced to flee their homes. Law and order 
broke down completely in parts of the country, as mobs of young men used machetes and stones to 
kill ethnic rivals. Some UN observers saw in the organised violence in Kenya the shadow of the 
Rwandan genocide.
3
 At the height of the crisis, Rwanda’s president publicly mused that he would 
welcome a military coup to prevent genocide in neighbouring Kenya.
4
 Another group of observers 
warned that the crisis could “result in a protracted war.”5 Kofi Annan’s 2008 mediation therefore 
helped to prevent escalation of this crisis into full-blown war. Annan’s mission ended widespread 
violence after a marathon 41 days of mediation, turning Kenyan enemies into “co-conspirators for 
peace”.6 In this sense, Kenya was a major success of preventive diplomacy.  But seen from another 
perspective, it can equally be studied as a failure. Few scholars have asked whether the electoral 
violence itself could have been prevented. This chapter aims to answer this question. 
Since Kofi Annan’s mediation of the Kenyan crisis is well-documented,7 this chapter does not 
seek to make an original contribution to this literature. Instead, it focusses narrowly on the actions 
of one senior bureaucrat by the name of Samuel Kivuitu. Kivuitu usually figures as a secondary 
character in accounts of this drama; not quite an extra, but not a key protagonist either. 
Unconventionally, this case puts him at the centre of events, as he actually was in the lead up to the 
2007 elections. I will argue that his actions – and inactions – on 30 December 2007 altered the 
course of the electoral crisis.  
This case begins with a brief summary of Kenyan history prior to the 2007 violence. It then turns 
to Kivuitu’s role. I draw on original interviews with international actors who knew and worked with 
the late Kivuitu. I seek to demonstrate that Kivuitu strove to prevent electoral violence in the 
coming elections. He was the central figure in a Western strategy to prevent violence after the 
elections. In the end, however, he did the opposite of what he promised to do in the event of 
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electoral rigging. I will analyse the effect which his actions had on the course of the crisis, and 
provide a counter-factual scenario of what might have been, had he done what he had sworn to do. 
Through original interviews, I have uncovered that Kivuitu was likely threatened in order to compel 
him to announce fraudulent election results on 30 December. This chapter therefore adds to our 
understanding of this crisis, and enriches our discussion of agency by discussing coercion. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Kenya gained independence from British rule in 1963. For forty years, the country was a one-party 
state ruled by the Kenya African National Union (KANU). This continuity gave outsiders the 
impression of Kenya being a haven of stability and an African “success story”.8 In 2007, the New 
York Times diagnosed the cause of violence in Kenya as “an atavistic vein of tribal tension that 
always lay beneath the surface in Kenya but until now had not produced widespread mayhem.”9 
Political violence in Kenya undeniably has a strong ethnic component. A land of 41 ethnic groups, 
Kenya has seen a ‘normalisation’ of ethnocentric violence.10 The two largest ethnic groups, the 
Kikuyu and the Luo, had long been economically and politically dominant. The Kikuyu, in 
particular, were perceived to have benefited unfairly from post-colonial land transfers in the fertile 
Rift Valley.
11
 Having fought for the British during the Mau Mau uprising, the Kikuyu were 
demonised as a wealthy, parasitic and overly-powerful minority.
12
 “The end result,” Michael Chege 
concludes, “was a reinvented history in which the Kikuyu had set themselves up for resentment and 
retaliation.”13  Ethnic grievances did play a role in electoral violence between 1992 and 1993. 
However, scholars have rebutted the “misguided and inflammatory” theory that Kenya’s 2007 
electoral crisis resulted from atavistic “tribal warfare”.14 Ethnic violence, as Branch and Cheeseman 
argue, stems from attempts by ruling elites to maintain their power, rather than from ethnic 
grievances per se 
Historically, Kenya’s diverse ethnic groups traded with each other, inter-married and co-existed 
peacefully.
15
 Brown convincingly argues that “violence in Kenya is an ethnically defined 
expression of political conflict. Ethnicity is the medium of political violence, not its cause.”16 To 
survive political liberalisation, the KANU regime resorted to a “policy of state informalisation”.17 
Local politicians used armed gangs as political proxies, giving them plausible deniability. Another 
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contributor to the 2007 violence was a proposed constitutional reform known as majimboism, which 
aimed to devolve power from the central government. Many Kenyans understood this proposal as a 
euphemism for ‘ethnic cleansing’.18 For years, government officials had referred to rival ethnic 
groups as “spots” or “blemishes” which “contaminated” Kenya’s ethnic map.19 There is further 
evidence that officials trained and financed ethnic-based militias to hunt rival groups, paying 
between $20 and $40 per head.
20
 Brown warned, in 2003, that the Kenyan government risked 
sparking a “localised genocide”.21 In this scenario, “spontaneous ethnically motivated attacks across 
the country” might end up “potentially escaping the control of those who initiated the violence.”22 
He was largely right.  
At the 2002 elections, a broad-based alliance named the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition 
(NARC) had ended KANU’s monopoly on power.23 For a while NARC, led by President Mwai 
Kibaki, oversaw impressive economic growth, which masked high-level corruption. However, this 
inter-ethnic political alliance collapsed when Kibaki failed to honour a Memorandum of 
Understanding with another constituent party led by Raila Odinga.
24
 Odinga felt betrayed because 
he had supported Kibaki’s leadership. His party, nursing the grievance of having been excised from 
key cabinet posts, soon reformed as the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). The schism 
between Kibaki and Odinga widened further in the lead-up to the 2007 elections. 
Odinga conducted a professional campaign, mobilising Kenya’s enormous youth vote. 25  He 
received a major boost from a first-term U.S. senator named Barack Obama.
26
 Reacting to the ODM 
wave, President Kibaki cobbled together the Party of National Unity (PNU) three months before the 
election.
27
 During the elections, “ODM was appealing to people’s hearts with passionate reminders 
of economic exclusion, while the PNU appealed to their minds with dry statistics depicting a 
promising economic future”.28 Despite the appearance of a normal election, Kenya was no stable 
democracy. Peter Kagwanja has argued that the collapse of a multi-ethnic consensus sparked “a 
fierce surge of populism and ethno-nationalism which sowed the seed for the 2008 violence.”29 The 
ODM’s campaign whipped up existing ethnic grievances.30 A sympathetic national daily, Standard, 
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printed anti-Kikuyu articles.
31
 ODM campaigners preached hatred on themes of ‘Kenya against the 
Kikuyu’. 32  The ODM intentionally blurred the distinction between Kikuyus and the Kibaki 
regime.
33
 The PNU retorted by spreading rumours that, if ODM won the election, it would carry out 
a genocide of Kikuyus.
34
 But the PNU’s campaign also had “a seamy side that preyed on ethnic 
fears.”35 In sum, both the PNU and the ODM shamelessly incited ethnic hatred during the election. 
Two days before the election, President Kibaki named two High Court judges to a court which 
was already seen as partisan.
36
 Public trust in the objectivity of the Electoral Commission of Kenya 
(ECK) was also at an historical low in 2007. The ECK had long been a servile body, staffed with 
political appointees loyal to the incumbent government.
37
 The ECK appeared to be redeeming itself 
by acting more independently in 2002 and 2005. This was largely due to the integrity of a senior 
bureaucrat named Kivuitu. However, the trust it enjoyed evaporated when President Kibaki 
appointed new commissioners to the ECK not long before the 2007 elections. In doing so, the PNU 
violated a decade-old agreement which required consultation with the opposition.
38
 The ECK’s 
credibility suffered again when the President did not renew Chairman Kivuitu’s contract until one 
month before the elections.
39
 Consequently, numerous Kenyan observers had lost faith in the ECK 
at a critical time. The ECK’s commissioners appeared to owe their allegiance to the incumbent 
president.
40
 This was the background behind the man in charge of the December 2007 elections. 
 
KIVUITU’S MOMENT 
 
Throughout 2007, Kivuitu enjoyed the strong support of major diplomatic players in Nairobi, 
including the U.S., Britain, UN and electoral management NGOs. They discussed ways to ensure 
clean elections, and to prevent a repeat of past electoral violence. In March, he met with U.S. 
ambassador Ranneberger, to whom he confessed his concern that Kibaki’s appointment of new 
“pet” commissioners risked undermining the ECK.41 The ECK chairman openly asked Western 
ambassadors for help to prevent violence in coming elections.
42
 When pressed about his relationship 
with new appointees in the ECK, his answer that they were “getting on very well” seemed 
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contrived.
43
 On 25 September, Kivuitu publicly pleaded for peace in the coming elections, 
condemned politicians for inciting violence.
44
 In October, the ECK carried out a national, televised 
campaign against electoral violence in 2007. These shocking advertisements featured a victim of 
such violence saying: “I don’t blame the people who killed my parents; I blame the politician who 
paid them.”45 In a blunt speech, Kivuitu delivered a scathing indictment of enduring corruption.46 
Finally, in a November meeting, Kivuitu thanked diplomatic officials for being “good friends when 
we are under pressure.”47 
While he had hitherto been worried by the risks of violence, Kivuitu was not yet desperate. This 
changed sometime in November. When he again met the American ambassador, Kivuitu felt under 
pressure. “I am followed everywhere I go,” he said. But he remained “feisty, determined and 
upbeat,” despite his worsening cancer.48 He complained of efforts by unnamed people to influence 
him to make unethical decisions. Since he saw himself as protected from government pressure by 
positive public opinion, Kivuitu remained resolute: 
 
If they make it impossible for me to run a fair election, I will not quietly resign and fade away.  No.  I will hold a 
mass meeting in Uhuru Park and explain to all the world why I had to resign.
49
 
 
The American government and other key donor states stood firmly behind Kivuitu, protecting 
him from dismissal by the Kibaki government (which had not yet renewed his contract). The U.S. 
was coordinating international support for his reappointment.
50
 Kivuitu was the centre-piece of a 
U.S. strategy to encourage free and fair elections, and to prevent electoral violence. As the head of 
the ECK, Kivuitu was deeply concerned by the spectre of ethnic violence at the next elections, and 
attempted to prevent it. He spoke of new measures that had been put in place to give the ECK – and 
himself – broad powers to sanction corrupt officers, and to nullify the results of polling stations 
where rigging occurred.
51
 However, Kivuitu’s false optimism may have lulled the U.S. embassy 
into over-estimating how smoothly the elections would unfurl.
52
 In the event that the government 
attempted to manipulate the ECK on election day, the U.S. embassy “strongly expect[ed] that 
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Chairman Kivuitu would keep his word to resign in a publicly spectacular fashion if the 
commission was subverted in this fashion.”53 
Kivuitu’s was an authoritative voice at this point in history. He was generally seen, across the 
country, as a guarantor of the ECK’s independence.54 He was practically a “grandfatherly” figure 
for many Kenyans.
55
 Indeed, Kivuitu was “highly respected and determined to run a clean 
election.”56 His “characteristically frank and critical” style made him one of the rare respected 
sources in Kenyan officialdom.
57
 Ambassador Ranneberger understood that the ECK chairman’s 
statement would carry serious weight among public opinion.
58
 With great foresight, the American 
ambassador predicted what might follow: 
 
The greater danger is if Odinga loses.  He and his supporters will be very tempted – even if the Electoral 
Commission and observers deem the process credible – to declare the election fraudulent and to resort to 
violence.  In that case, there could be significant violence...
59
 
 
Kivuitu’s role was crucial. If he opposed potential rigging, he would invalidate the legitimacy of 
the election in the eyes of many Kenyan and international observers. If he ratified what was seen as 
a fraudulent election, this might entice ODM supporters to resort to violence. The U.S. believed 
Kivuitu’s assurances that he would annul the elections in the case of rigging. Speaking at the 
Kenyatta International Conference Centre (KICC) one week before the elections, Samuel Kivuitu 
put on a brave face. His prognosis was that, this time, elections would run smoothly.
60
 Beneath his 
calm exterior, however, he was clearly worried. 
The 2007 Kenyan elections were watched by hundreds of international observers from the 
European Union, the American embassy and the International Republican Institute. International 
observers were complemented by an army of 16,500 Kenyan observers.
61
 Election day went fairly 
smoothly. The EU concluded that, despite a lack of transparency, the ECK administered the election 
competently – at least prior to the tallying stage.62 The U.S. embassy praised the “Herculean efforts 
by the Electoral Commission” for the peaceful and orderly elections.63 But rising tensions were 
palpable. At several tally centres, the police fired into the air to disperse crowds protesting against 
alleged tampering. In the Nairobi slum of Kibera, one ECK official worried about potential violence 
when 5,000 frustrated people had lined up since midnight to vote. In this case, Chairman Kivuitu 
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intervened and successfully pacified the situation.
64
 However, as the day progressed, Kivuitu began 
losing control. 
The first ill omen came as the ECK refused an EU electoral expert entry into the tallying centre, 
despite Kivuitu’s clear instructions to grant the observer access.65 Next, word spread that some ECK 
officials in the countryside had turned off their phones; Kivuitu was not able to contact his own 
staff.
66
 Even more ominously, Kivuitu’s own office line appeared to be blocked on election day. 
“Even in my office right now I cannot ring out, but I can receive,” he complained at the time.67 At 
such a tense and critical time, Kivuitu made a ground-shaking statement on live television, publicly 
speculating that his officers were probably busy “cooking results”.68 The effect of his words was 
electric. As the Kenyan National Commission on Human Rights later concluded, this statement 
“irreparably damaged any confidence left in those who feared rigging may have taken place.”69 
With mounting evidence of abnormalities, Kivuitu openly confirmed that he himself suspected his 
officials of rigging the election. He had resolved that, in the event of rigging, he would “resign in a 
publicly spectacular fashion” to annul the elections. This course of action was a desperate gamble, 
and it was not assured that it would prevent subsequent violence. However, the contrary course – 
ratifying rigged elections – was a near-certain path to widespread violence. His next move mattered 
immensely.  
As the ECK delayed releasing presidential results, demonstrators thronged the Kenyan 
International Conference Centre. When rumours surfaced of “something afoot” occurring at KICC, 
the British and American ambassadors decided to investigate.
70
 At 1am on Friday night, the 
ambassadors, escorted by a UNDP official, went “to see what sort of shenanigans were going on 
there,” but were not able to discern anything.71 One diplomat thought that this move did “cause 
pause for thought”, but that “in the end, the hawks…gave some backbone to those who began to 
think” about the risks of rigging.72 In private meetings with diplomatic officials, Samuel Kivuitu 
was openly worried, showing diplomats what he thought were electoral documents which had 
clearly been doctored. Kivuitu appeared “very rattled,” and “thought cheating was going on.”73 
When this diplomat understood that Kivuitu was going to announce a Kibaki win regardless, he 
feared large-scale violence, and returned to his embassy to put into gear an emergency response.
74
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The next day, the mood in the tallying centre at KICC was “vocal and threatening”.75 When a 
scuffle broke out, international journalists were expelled from the venue, and the government 
announced an immediate ban on all live television broadcasts.
76
 At 4:30pm, Chairman Kivuitu 
attempted to announce the results of the elections – but was interrupted by agitated ODM activists. 
Kivuitu was rushed out of the conference centre under police escort. In this brief time window, a 
diplomat rang Kivuitu on his mobile, and said to him: 
 
Look, I’ve got an idea what you’re about to do, and have got, maybe, some feel for the pressure you are under. 
But don’t feel that you have to do this…if you’re not happy with this process, the international community will 
support you if you don’t go ahead and announce this result.
77
 
 
Kivuitu replied: “No, I’m sorry. I feel I’ve got to do this.” Twenty minutes later, he declared 
Kibaki the winner of the elections.
78
 Minutes later, the state-owned television channel, known for 
its pro-government bias,
79
 broadcast the swearing in of President Kibaki.
80
 ODM officials 
denounced alleged rigging of the election, and formed a parallel government.
81
 Dramatically for the 
ECK’s credibility, one of its own officers supported Odinga’s rigging charges. The next day, five 
ECK commissioners called for an independent inquiry.
82
 Kibaki’s inauguration at State House was 
so hastily arranged that official guests arrived late, and the national anthem was not even played.
83
 
Violence erupted within minutes of the televised ceremony.  
 
ANALYSIS 
 
The above series of events leads us to three inter-related questions about the role of the ECK and 
Kivuitu personally in the outbreak of electoral violence. Firstly, we must ask whether the ECK – 
and Kivuitu himself – was guilty of incompetence, corruption or both in the lead up to the election. 
Secondly, a puzzling but theoretically-rich question is why exactly Kivuitu changed his mind? 
Finally, what would it have changed had Kivuitu resigned, as he had said he would? I will argue 
that the ECK showed evidence of low-level corruption, as well as gross incompetence. There is 
clear evidence linking Kivuitu to its incompetence, but none to alleged corruption. Finally, I argue 
that Kivuitu’s change of mind can be explained, in part, by the pressures and, allegedly, personal 
threats directed at him to release the results. 
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Interviewees who worked with the ECK, and knew Kivuitu personally, are divided on whether 
the electoral commission was incompetent or politically manipulated in 2007. There are at least 
three sides to this story. Firstly, one interviewee argued that the ECK broadly-speaking was “acting 
on good faith” during the crisis, but was constitutionally “toothless” to prevent electoral violence.84 
While cheating occurred on both the PNU and ODM sides, the ECK itself – and Kivuitu personally 
– were “really professional.”85 This argument is compelling, to an extent. Kivuitu did seek to 
prevent electoral violence, at one point calling both candidates before the election to urge them to 
tone down their rhetoric.
86
 However, Kivuitu was frustrated, saying “I can call them, and tell them 
to stop, but I have no enforcement powers.”87 This is certainly true. The ECK, and Kivuitu himself, 
had very little legal power to impose sanctions on those threatening violence or peddling hate 
speech. They could only announce sanctions. To impose them, the ECK needed to take legal 
action.
88
 This is the sympathetic version, which sees the ECK and Kivuitu as among the few actors 
with professional integrity in the corrupt landscape of Kenyan politics. 
A second position views the first one as “utter rubbish”, contending that the ECK was 
incompetent to run a 21
st
 Century election.
89
 The ECK, according to Margie Cook, was simply 
unwilling to consider the opposition as a serious contender, even when polling showed that it would 
win. The ECK also failed to take seriously a UN media strategy which aimed to prevent hate 
speech. “Even though we had a discussion with the ECK,” Cook recounts, “there wasn’t a single 
allegation that they proceeded to investigate.” Ultimately, this critical argument points to Kivuitu’s 
incompetence. “He had no experience in an election in the sense of being a competition, as opposed 
to a process,” she argued, “he was simply out of his depth.” Cook recalls an incident during which 
she met with Kivuitu, along with the UN country official, and expressed concern that the ECK had 
no results database weeks out from the election. Kivuitu had only recently returned from cancer 
treatment in India, and was surprised to find out that this was the case. Kivuitu had clearly lost 
control of the Commission, Cook argues. One diplomat monitoring the elections had to use a 
flashlight from his own vehicle to read ballot papers, since the polling station in question had no 
electricity.
90
 
A third allegation is that the ECK was not only incompetent but, at some levels, corrupt. 
Eyebrows were raised, for example, when the ECK declined an international contract to develop a 
results database, claiming that it would contract a local business. This never actually took place.
91
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This incident fed rumours of corruption within the ECK.  “The story got about that Kivuitu had 
taken a big backhander for the contract, and that’s why it never worked,” one diplomat recounts.92 
However, this interviewee warned that rumours about corruption were put about in Kenya to 
discredit people.
93
 Even if these rumours were false, there were more persuasive signs of political 
corruption within the ECK. For example, some commissioners later admitted in private 
conversations that they had not actually been given the final results of the election by the time 
Kivuitu announced them, and were merely present for “window dressing”.94 Even Kivuitu himself, 
as we saw earlier, had misgivings about the results he was announcing. However, he went ahead 
and “announced results that had been subject to serious manipulation.”95 In contrast, the head of a 
fact-finding commission found no evidence of corruption at the ECK involving Kivuitu himself. 
Judge Kriegler concluded that “there was ample support for finding cock-up rather than 
conspiracy.”96  
We now have at least three explanations for the ECK’s performance in the electoral crisis: legal 
impotence, sheer incompetence and corruption. International policy-makers who worked with the 
ECK, and who knew Kivuitu personally, remain divided on this question. However, these 
explanations are not mutually-exclusive. The available evidence seems to point to a complex 
interaction of those causes at various levels. With the benefit of hindsight, we now know that the 
ECK mismanaged the tallying of the presidential election. After the election, an international 
investigation critiqued the ECK for its severe bureaucratic weaknesses and for lack of 
professionalism.
97
 The report pinpointed the ECK as one of the principal institutions responsible for 
the contestation of the 2007 elections.
98
 It concluded that “one cannot rely on any figures from the 
ECK.”99 It is now clear that the ECK was both incompetent and, at some levels, corrupt. The 
evidence overwhelmingly suggests electoral malpractice did occur under Kivuitu’s nose at the ECK 
office.
100
 Later in the crisis, the U.S. sanctioned high-level individuals within the ECK with U.S. 
visa restrictions on charges of corruption, election fixing and suspected links to various political 
parties and the mafia.
101
 Kivuitu did not figure on that list. His exact role in the 2007 electoral crisis 
remains one of its mysteries, to which I now turn. 
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As we saw, the U.S. strategy to prevent electoral violence relied on Kivuitu’s good faith. When 
the violence began, Ambassador Ranneberger rationalised that “Kivuitu has only limited authority 
as head of the ECK.” 102   He blamed the ECK’s staff for bungling the election, not Kivuitu 
personally.
103
 As Stephen Brown wrote, donors were no doubt “initially hesitant to disown the body 
in which they had invested so much.”104  The same could be said of Kivuitu personally. The 
American embassy at first seemed convinced by Kivuitu’s statement that, “if it were up to me, I 
would not announce the results.” 105  The U.S. and other ambassadors had interceded to try to 
persuade Kivuitu to delay the announcement. The ODM also requested that Western ambassadors 
pressure Kivuitu to delay the announcement. Kivuitu said he agreed, but only if the government did, 
effectively deferring to President Kibaki.
106
 The U.S. government soon became critical of Kivuitu’s 
“mix of excuses and untruths” in justifying his role in the crisis.107 In particular, his excuse that he 
could not have done anything differently must have profoundly disillusioned Ambassador 
Ranneberger. Kivuitu had promised that, in case of rigging, he would publicly resign to delegitimise 
the election. Why he did not do so remains unexplained.  
In hindsight, Kivuitu justified his actions by producing documents which claimed that he was 
misinformed that the disputes had been settled at an overnight recount on 29 December.
108
 
However, this evidence is self-serving. It is feasible that Kivuitu was intentionally left in the dark in 
official correspondence, due to the politicised nature of the ECK. However, Kivuitu could not have 
failed to learn of the abnormalities of the election results, including turnout rates reaching 115 
percent at certain polling stations.
109
 According to an ECK document, Kivuitu himself changed such 
problematic results to the passable figure of 85 percent.
110
 He also later reported seeing the Chief 
Justice at State House dressed and waiting to swear in Kibaki before the ECK had even announced 
the results.
111
 Moreover, as we saw above, Kivuitu was alarmed enough by apparently doctored 
electoral documents to show them to diplomats. We should ask why Kivuitu acted against his own 
concerns, or perhaps whether he chose to ignore them under duress. 
Kivuitu’s second defence was to argue that, even if he knew of the contentious results, he could 
not have done anything other than read out the electoral results. He absolved himself of 
responsibility by claiming that he “was pressured into announcing the results by people in State 
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House who God should never have allowed to be born.”112 He maintained that he only did his job, 
in accordance with the law.
113
 But this legalistic argument is misleading, since it negates the actual 
plan he had resolved to pursue in case of rigging.  It may appear unfair to focus on one cast member 
of a drama – himself not one of the key protagonists. Moreover, the late Kivuitu, who passed away 
in 2013, cannot defend himself, unlike Kenyan politicians who are still alive, who remain 
deafeningly silent on their roles and their direct responsibility for the violence.  However, we 
cannot allow Kivuitu’s passing to act as an amnesty for his role in history.  
When a Kenyan poet wrote an open letter to Kivuitu asking for an apology, he explained himself 
in a reply. His arguments allow us to wrestle with his (likely) views more fairly. In the first 
instance, Kivuitu claimed to have an absolutely clear conscience, and  not to have any feelings of 
regret or personal responsibility for the electoral crisis.
114
 This is untrue. All interviewees who knew 
him personally confirm the same fact. After the election, Kivuitu “appeared a broken man,” “looked 
pretty washed up,” and “stayed at home and appeared to drink a certain amount.” 115  Two 
interviewees confronted him, one in January and the other in February of 2008, about his decision 
to announce the results. To his first interlocutor, Kivuitu gave information about an alleged attempt 
to pay off the ECK to change the results.
116
 Another person asked Kivuitu what was in his mind 
when he made his decision. Kivuitu replied that he was in a dilemma, and in the end he thought he 
should get it done and go home and sleep. “But I have never rested since that moment,” he 
admitted.
117
 The electoral crisis, one interviewee said, had visibly contributed to his deteriorating 
health.
118
 That Kivuitu was so “personally shattered” only makes sense if we understand why “he 
went along with the show.”119 He had clearly been under serious pressure to announce the election 
results. “Kivuitu was very much a hostage and felt like that,” one interviewee noted.120 But perhaps 
he was only a broken man because he had almost literally been held hostage.  
A simple but compelling explanation for Kivuitu’s change of mind is that he was not only 
pressured, but threatened to release the results.
121
  To some people who knew him, Kivuitu’s 
behaviour appeared to confirm that he “was certainly intimidated”.122 Other interviewees either 
corroborated this threat, or were unsurprised by this information in the context of Kenyan politics. 
Indeed, at least one senior Kenyan government official was “personally involved in the consultation 
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about death threats to people who were vocal in opposition” to the rigging of the elections.123 In the 
context of Kenyan politics, it is possible, if not likely, that Kivuitu was personally threatened to 
release the results dictated by the government. Another interviewee corroborated the rumour that 
Kivuitu “had been threatened, not only himself, but his family, and that he didn’t want to make any 
public statement until his family was safely hidden away.”124 This explanation clarifies why Kivuitu 
reversed course overnight, against his long-standing concerns about the risk of electoral violence. I 
will explore this question in CHAPTER 8, where I discuss whether such cases of coercion undermine 
an agent’s ability to do otherwise.  
Kivuitu’s second argument is that “there was no other candidate or his/her agent seeking me to 
hold on and re tally – no.”125 As we have seen, this is also untrue, since there is evidence that Raila 
Odinga was pushing for such a re-tally, with the backing of key Western powers. Thirdly, Kivuitu 
claimed that “Commissioners do not tally counted results.” Their job is to announce results.126 But 
we know that Kivuitu himself had the intention not only of refusing to announce the results, but of 
resigning publicly. Finally, Kivuitu argued that “the genesis of the tragedy is in our dirty politics 
and negative ethnicity,” rather than in his own personal role. In his most convincing defence, 
Kivuitu wrote: 
 
I do not share the view that people killed others, or destroyed the properties belonging to others, on account of 
my announcement of the winner. I believe that irrespective of whoever of the two top candidates won, there was 
going to be violence. That environment was created by the politicians themselves.
127
 
 
This is a sound argument. Evidently, the fate of Kenya did not rest on Kivuitu’s shoulders alone, 
and the responsibility for the killings should not misattributed to Kivuitu. There is evidence, 
according to diplomatic sources, that PNU supporters were also armed and may likewise have 
reacted violently in the event of an Odinga victory.
128
 Thus, the post-electoral violence could simply 
have played out in reverse.
129
 The bulk of policy-makers interviewed for this case study agree with 
Samuel Kivuitu on this final point. 
One interviewee endorsed Kivuitu’s view that there “was really not that much he could have 
done…I can’t imagine anything that anyone could have done at that point to prevent” the post-
electoral violence.
130
 A second interviewee agreed that Kivuitu’s agency was too constrained by the 
state having “effectively infiltrated the ECK” and by his deteriorating health to affect the crisis.131 A 
third interviewee noted that it was possible that “the socio-political climate was by that stage so 
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toxic that any spark would have ignited the conflagration, but no one will ever know.” 132 
Interestingly, not a single interviewee had heard of Kivuitu’s intention of resigning. One person 
argued that this “would not have changed much” in the crisis, and speculated that Kivuitu “may 
have feared that such a move would plunge the country into a constitutional crisis.”133 Another 
interviewee doubts that it would have changed much, and speculated that it “would almost certainly 
have caused greater violence than happened anyway.” 134  A third remarked that this “sounds 
consistent with the guy who I knew,” but doubted it would have changed much.135 “When push 
came to shove,” another commented, “Kivuitu did not act on any of the intentions that he expressed 
verbally, and those intentions had absolutely no substance in my view.”136 
This discussion reveals an interesting contention regarding Kivuitu’s role in the crisis. Some 
interviewees are saying that there was really not much else he could have done, given the structural 
constraints. Others are arguing that, had he resigned, as he said he intended to do, the crisis would 
not have played out differently. The first argument, I suggest, is mistaken, in that it dismisses 
alternative courses of action which Kivuitu himself actually considered. The second argument, 
however, is up for debate. This question is not about whether Kivuitu could have done otherwise. 
Evidently he could have, not only because he had free will, but because he self-consciously charted 
an alternative course of action. The debate is about the causal influence of his proposed resignation. 
While I agree that this is, in principle, impossible to ever know counter-factually, it is a question 
worth pondering. 
I am not arguing that Kivuitu alone had the power and responsibility to prevent violence. Kibaki, 
Odinga and a thousand tribal leaders had much more influence to do so.
137
 However, I am arguing 
that, as Chairman of the ECK and the central pillar in an international strategy to prevent violence, 
Kivuitu’s words carried tremendous weight on 30 December. In a sense, “Kivuitu dug his own 
grave” with his comment on returning officers cooking the books, and thereby undermined any 
influence he may have had in the crisis.
138
 While Kivuitu’s actions did not cause the violence in a 
deep sense – on that, Kivuitu is correct – they may have done so in an immediate sense. A brief 
scenario can substantiate this point. 
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In one existing counter-factual, Stephen Brown argues that the “main critical juncture where 
donors could have decisively taken another path was on 30 December 2007.”139 In this scenario, 
Brown suggests that, following Kivuitu’s announcement of a Kibaki victory, “donors could have 
insisted on an immediate recount.” 140  Had Western powers been united, it is likely that a 
delegitimised Kibaki government would not have been able to cling to power.
141
 This does not 
mean that violence would not have broken out, but its scale and intensity might have been 
significantly shorter or less deadly.  
I would propose another scenario, also beginning on that crucial date, 30 December. Instead of 
doing as he was pressured to do, Kivuitu could have defied the government ban on live media 
broadcasts (as the U.S. embassy had), and addressed the following words to bipartisan and multi-
ethnic crowds in Uhuru Park or on live radio: 
 
As head of the ECK, it is my professional and moral duty to resign. Today, you showed great patience and 
orderly conduct in waiting for hours and voting in historic numbers. However, I am saddened to say that the 
ECK, which I represented, lost control of returning officers. I stress that there is evidence of gross tampering on 
all sides. Both pro-government and pro-opposition forces appear to have cheated.  I therefore urge the people of 
Kenya to remain calm, and I appeal to the international community to assist Kenya in organising a swift re-tally 
and, failing that, to return to internationally-organised elections in two months. 
 
Of course, these words alone may not have sufficed to prevent the pre-planned violence. The 
Kibaki government may have simply cracked down on dissent, arrested Kivuitu and outlawed the 
ODM. Alternatively, Kibaki, if pressured by the international community,
142
 may have consented to 
a re-tally after an initial stand-off. There is really no telling how such a statement may have altered 
the course of events; it must remain speculative. There are negative or neutral prognostications, as 
above. But some have added that Kivuitu’s actions may also have served as a catalyst for 
international and domestic pressure on the parties to compromise.
143
 Either way, I argue that the 
implications of Kivuitu’s potential resignation – which are unknowable – would not have been 
causally neutral. His actions on 30 December essentially undermined his influence, and practically 
triggered the electoral violence. There is therefore sound reason to believe that if Kivuitu had acted 
as suggested above, he may have altered the course of the crisis, in one way or another. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, I explored in great depth the role that Samuel Kivuitu, head of the Electoral 
Commission of Kenya, played during the 2007-2008 post-electoral crisis. As I demonstrated, 
Kivuitu held a very important role in an internationally-backed strategy to prevent renewed 
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electoral violence in Kenya. As the head of the ECK, he was held in extremely high esteem, both by 
the Kenyan public and the international community. His role was not only to ensure that the 
elections were free and fair but to seek to prevent electoral violence, which he was clearly 
concerned about months before the election. As we saw, he had announced to the U.S. ambassador 
that in the event of rigging he would resign in order to undermine the government’s legitimacy. 
When the moment came, however, Kivuitu backed down.  
This case study has shed new light on a little-known sub-plot to the post-electoral crisis. 
Importantly, it demonstrated that one bureaucrat’s actions may have changed Kenyan history. I 
conceded that it is impossible to prove beyond reasonable doubt whether Kivuitu’s actions alone 
could have prevented any electoral violence. However, there is good reason to believe that, had he 
acted as he said he would, the crisis would likely have taken a different course. This chapter 
revealed the agential power which Kivuitu exercised at the pivotal turning point of 30 December, a 
day which appeared to open up multiple causal paths. His decision to endorse Kibaki’s election at 
such a crucial moment – perhaps influenced by a death threat – was arguably one of the direct 
causes of the 2007 violence. Had Kivuitu acted differently, for example by stepping down, the crisis 
would most likely have taken a radically different turn. That is not to say that such a move would 
certainly have prevented violence; but it would almost certainly have changed the likelihood of 
violence. None of this is to argue that Kivuitu should have acted differently, only that he could 
have. I defer further discussion of the moral quandary of acting under duress until CHAPTER 8. 
Finally, this case study critiqued the argument that profound structural causes, such as atavistic 
tribal hatreds, caused the violence. To be sure, ethnic demonisation played an immensely influential 
part in inciting people to kill fellow Kenyans of different tribes. However, the point is that 
individuals – especially unscrupulous leaders – purposively manipulated ethnic hatreds and fears 
the better to channel violent passions towards political ends. I will also return to this argument 
below, when I address the question of how methodological individualism can explain cases of 
apparently spontaneous mass violence. I conclude this chapter by noting that the above analysis 
would be lost, or useless, at a higher level of abstraction. If tribes, or ethnicities, or even nation-
states were taken as the primary unit of analysis, individuals like Kivuitu would not appear to play a 
decisive role in the events described in this chapter. Yet he demonstrably did.  
The final chapter turns to an international crisis which followed on the heels of that in Kenya. 
The August 2008 Russo-Georgian war was the first inter-state war in Europe in decades and, in 
many respects, a precursor of the 2014 Ukrainian crisis. It is an extremely poignant case since it 
reveals the likely limits of efforts to prevent war. As I will seek to demonstrate, there was no lack of 
such efforts in 2008. In fact, there were various diplomatic actors and institutions working around 
the clock to prevent a war. Many such actors saw it coming, and did everything they could to 
Preventive Diplomacy 
138 
prevent it. But it came nevertheless, not because of structural forces or conflict trends beyond 
human control; rather, it came because powerful individuals manoeuvred intentionally in order to 
bring it about. 
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Matthew Bryza - The Russo-Georgian War, 2008 
 
“The problem is that…as a [mediator] 
 you couldn’t rely on anybody. You couldn’t trust  
Saakashvili, because he was uncontrollable. The  
Abkhaz had their hidden agenda. The Russians  
have their hidden agendas, and the Americans.  
Then, you can do anything you want with  
preventive diplomacy – it will fail.”  
- Senior European diplomat
1
 
 
The August 2008 war is arguably one of the most instructive cases of preventive diplomacy, for 
several reasons. Firstly, it reveals the limitations of many efforts to prevent war. An army of 
mediators converged on the conflict zone in the summer of 2008, carrying various plans to avoid 
war. Their dramatic failure makes this such a rich and relevant case. In the INTRODUCTION to this 
dissertation, I stressed that cases of failed diplomacy are often richer in data than successes. In this 
case, however, many of the diplomatic actors involved remain tight-lipped about their experiences. 
As one interviewee noted, failed mediators are unlikely to be talkative on the Georgian crisis 
“simply because this was all a failure.”2 In short, careers still hang in the balance of history’s 
verdict.
3
 Whereas successes like Kenya have many parents, failures are orphans.
4
 Finally, this case 
comes close to confirming that when one or more parties to a dispute have formed the intention to 
go to war to achieve their aims, preventive diplomacy is virtually bound to fail. 
By drawing on original interviews and U.S. diplomatic cables, I explore the various attempts to 
prevent war in Georgia prior to 7 August 2008. I focus primarily on U.S. Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State Matthew Bryza’s peace initiative in May 2008. I also study peace initiatives that 
preceded and succeeded it, in order to better contextualise Bryza’s efforts. I focus on this particular 
mission because, as I will argue, it was the most promising of all. After detailing Bryza’s mission, I 
analyse why it failed.  I will argue that even the most skilled mediator would likely have failed to 
prevent war, since powerful individuals on both sides simply did not want to prevent it.  Finally, to 
nuance this pessimistic argument, I explore the missed opportunities in attempts to prevent this war. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Like most nations, in its early history Georgia was little more than an “imaginative concept”.5  
Annexed by Russia in 1801, Georgia was only briefly independent between 1917 and 1921. 
                                                          
1
 Unattributable interview.  
2
 Interview with former OSCE official, 12 August 2014. 
3
 The handful of interviewees I spoke to were open to sharing their insights and experiences. However, some key 
figures in this drama have been unreachable for over three years. 
4
 Numerous interviewees I spoke to pinned the blame on specific personalities or organisations. Others claimed to be 
sworn to secrecy on why this mission failed. In this particular case study, my attempts to glean information sometimes 
resembled a Hollywood spy game. 
5
 Goltz (2006: 25). 
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Nationalists revolted against Soviet rule in 1956 and 1978,
6
 and again in 1989.
7
  This narrative 
might suggest a straightforward case of national liberation from imperial oppression. But, within the 
microcosm of Georgian politics, this narrative plays out in reverse. Andrei Sakharov called Georgia 
“the little empire”.8 The 1989 Soviet crackdown was aimed at halting Georgian rallies targeting the 
ethnic Abkhaz minority, which had just declared independence. What Russia had done to Georgia, 
Georgia did to the Abkhaz, making Georgian the sole official language.
9
 Georgian nationalists 
shamelessly incited hatred by vilifying “devil Russia” and “non-Georgians”. Zviad Gamsakhurdia 
advocated that they “should be chopped up…burned out with a red-hot iron from the Georgian 
nation.”10 Georgia was soon ripped apart by inter-ethnic violence. 
Russia played an “ugly and obscure” role in Georgia’s internal wars.11  Russian soldiers fought 
alongside separatists in South Ossetia, and in Abkhazia.
12
 Both sides of the conflict in South Ossetia 
perpetrated atrocities and ethnic cleansing.
13
 The fighting was even crueller in the former 
beachside-resort region of Abkhazia.
14
 Even when a Russian MIG-29 was shot down, and the 
pilot’s body recovered in full uniform, Moscow denied any involvement.15 Still, Russian leaders 
claimed “special powers as a guarantor of peace and security” in the region.16 Russia was obviously 
a party to these wars, rather than a disinterested peace-keeper.
17
 Russian fighters, their weapons and 
ammunition were all chartered to Abkhazia on board official Russian humanitarian relief planes.
18
 
Like Kenya, modern Georgia was a failing and ethnically-polarised state. Unlike Kenya, it had 
Russia as a neighbour. 
The game changed with the rise of Saakashvili, who promised revolutionary change.
19
 
Saakashvili looked up to King David IV, who had repelled the Turks and united Georgia.
20 
This 
gave a hint of his political agenda. Internally, the president sought to fight corruption.
21
 Externally, 
Saakashvili sought to escape Russia’s sphere of influence.22 In practice, this meant joining the EU 
and NATO. Russian leaders reacted with alarm at the prospects of NATO troops based on its 
                                                          
6
 Ibid. 44.  
7
 The catalyst was the slaughter of 19 unarmed protestors by Soviet paratroopers. Ibid. 47. 
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9
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border.
23
 They saw U.S. support for democratic revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine as a direct 
threat.
24
 Saakashvili confirmed these fears by campaigning to close a Russian base on Georgian 
soil.
25
 When Saakashvili succeeded, Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly told him: “Now 
remember, we did not intervene…but you won’t have any gifts from using South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia.”26 Putin further told Saakashvili, in 2006, that trying to join NATO was harmful to 
Russian interests.
27
 A diplomatic crisis erupted in October 2006 when Georgian police arrested 
alleged Russian spies. In response, the Russian government sanctioned Georgian workers in 
Russia,
28
 imports of Georgian goods and gas exports.
29
 Ominously, unidentified helicopters 
attacked Georgian officials in the Kodori Gorge in March 2007. In August 2007, a Russian-made 
anti-radar missile hit Georgian territory.
30
  
In February 2008, the West recognised the independence of Kosovo. This move reinforced 
Moscow’s fears of an “aggressive agenda” in Washington to undermine Russian interests.31 Putin 
called Kosovo a “terrible precedent” that would “come back to hit them in the face.”32 In private, he 
warned European leaders that if the West recognised Kosovo’s independence, he would respond by 
officially recognising Georgia’s separatist regions.33 During Saakashvili’s last official encounter 
with Putin, the Russian leader warned:  
 
As for the disputed territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in this regard we shall respond not to you, but to 
the West—America and NATO, and in connection to Kosovo… What we do will not be directed at you but will 
be our response to them.
34
 
 
Kosovo was highly symbolic for Russia.
35
 Russian leaders experienced the West’s recognition of 
Kosovo as an intense humiliation.
36
 As a result, by February 2008, Putin was openly envisaging 
armed intervention in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  This intention became clearer in April, in the 
aftermath of the NATO summit in Bucharest. One diplomat recalled hearing loud footsteps 
thudding outside the main door; it slammed open. In walked Putin, in a theatrical display of Russian 
power.
37
 By early 2008, Russian opposition to the Georgian and Ukrainian attempts to gain a 
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NATO membership offer was “shrill and threatening”.38 If Ukraine joined NATO, Putin threatened, 
Russia would consider Kiev a legitimate target in a nuclear war.
39
 At the summit, Putin assured 
Western leaders, magnanimously, that Moscow would “wriggle and behave very carefully…without 
provoking military conflicts.” 40  Nevertheless, analysts anticipated that Russia was ready to 
intervene to stop Ukraine or Georgia from joining NATO. Ukraine seemed the most likely target.
41
 
After late-night and divisive negotiations, NATO heads of state announced the compromise that 
“these countries will become members of NATO.”42 The Russian reaction was crystal clear. At the 
summit, Putin had delivered a monologue claiming that Ukraine was not even a nation-state.
43
 Now, 
he made an ambiguous parting statement about NATO’s enlargement being a direct threat to 
Russia.
44
 Twenty minutes later, he released a communiqué announcing, much more clearly, that 
Russia “will provide effective assistance to South Ossetia and Abkhazia in return for NATO’s 
decision.” Putin’s colleagues filled in the details. Foreign Minister Lavrov announced that Russia 
would “do everything possible to prevent the accession of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO.”45 The 
Chief of the General Staff announced that Moscow was preparing “military steps” as well as “steps 
of another nature” to make sure that Georgia and Ukraine did not join NATO.46 
 
BLESSED ARE THE PEACEMAKERS 
 
To make sense of the key diplomatic initiatives in 2008, we must briefly review the twenty-year 
efforts to make peace in the region. This section will separate the peace initiatives in Abkhazia from 
those in South Ossetia, as each conflict is distinct. The above section dealt with the dispute from the 
heights of great power politics; we now descend into the two regions. Although at the previous level 
Russia appears plainly culpable of geopolitical cynicism, at the lower level the picture is very 
different. While Georgia framed the conflict as one with a neo-imperialist Russia, the Abkhaz and 
Ossetians saw it as one with a revanchist Georgia. Georgian military incursions into both regions, in 
2004-2006, destabilised the status quo. Peacemakers in both regions faced a lack of good faith on 
all sides. Efforts to prevent renewed violence in the region followed a clear division of labour. The 
UN took the lead in Abkhazia, and the OSCE in South Ossetia. I will discuss each in turn.  
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The UN Security Council asserted its role in Abkhaz-Georgian peace talks in 1993.
47
 In 1995, 
Abkhaz negotiators almost agreed to a confederal arrangement.
48
 After the collapse of this proposal, 
another almost succeeded in 1997.
49
 It collapsed again in 1999.
50
 Georgia accepted this last 
proposal, but the Abkhaz refused it, as it pre-judged Abkhazia’s status.51 Peace talks were only 
revived when Secretary-General Kofi Annan wrote to the Abkhaz.
52
 A third renaissance of peace 
proposals arose in 2004-2006.
53
 By this time, however, Russia was beginning to link the future 
status of Kosovo with that of Abkhazia. The EU’s foreign policy chief and Saakashvili worried 
about the consequences of this argument. But the Georgians took rash actions in 2006 which killed 
off hopes of a peace deal. Georgia’s military budget quadrupled between 2003 and 2007, stoking 
Abkhaz security fears.
54
 In June 2006, a report warned that Saakashvili’s “high risk strategy” of 
rushing to resolve Georgia’s territorial issues was pushing it towards war with Russia.55 The next 
month, Tbilisi sent armed forces into the Kodori Gorge, installing an Abkhaz government-in-
exile.
56
 This was a clear sovereignty claim, much like the U.S. collecting taxes in the disputed 
Aroostook valley. Victoriously, Saakashvili announced that “we will come back to our homes very 
soon, we will come back from every direction.”57 By undermining the political legitimacy and 
territorial control of their negotiating partners, the Georgians froze all peace talks. 
An even grimmer picture emerges of peace talks in South Ossetia. The 1992 ceasefire in South 
Ossetia established a Joint Control Commission (JCC), facilitated by the OSCE.
58
 In July 2004, 
Tbilisi ordered an operation to close a black market in South Ossetia. This sparked killings which 
nearly degenerated into renewed war.
59
 Saakashvili unveiled a new peace plan in 2004, which 
resembled the formula of his Abkhaz proposals.
60
 As Georgian-Russian relations deteriorated in 
2006, Saakashvili began agitating for a revision to the JCC.
61
 In a dangerous gamble, Georgia 
vetoed its participation in the JCC in 2006, making a change of format a precondition for 
dialogue.
62
 Finally, Tbilisi supported a parallel administration in South Ossetia led by Dmitry 
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Sanakoyev. The majority of South Ossetians saw Sanakoyev as “a Quisling” paid by the 
Georgians.
63
 Like in Abkhazia, Saakashvili increased South Ossetian fears by building up Georgia’s 
military, increasing its police presence and undermining the local regime’s legitimacy.64 Georgia’s 
actions encouraged South Ossetia to assume a war footing. By 2007, the situation had deteriorated, 
with OSCE patrols being held up at gunpoint to prevent them from monitoring Ossetian 
strongholds.
65
 The JCC, the only conflict management mechanism in South Ossetia, was suspended 
when it was most needed. 
In the end, all sides in the escalating crisis showed bad faith. Russia was, for all intents and 
purposes, a party to the dispute. Both separatist states, feasibly as a result of guarantees from 
Russia,
66
 therefore had no incentive to compromise. In any case, the basic negotiating positions 
were antithetical: autonomy vs. full independence.
67
 Tbilisi’s major strategic mistake may have 
been to claim that it had no conflicts with either Abkhazians or South Ossetians. The Abkhaz saw 
this position as a blatant “myth” which distorted history,68 as did the Ossetians.69 Framing the 
conflict as such tended to delegitimise the fears and aspirations of the separatists, and to 
dangerously antagonise Russia. Georgia’s actions, the International Crisis Group (ICG) concluded, 
although non-violent, were “so assertive that they are contributing to a perceptible and dangerous 
rise in tensions.”70 Saakashvili launched another major proposal in March 2008.71 On the face of it, 
it was a generous proposal, creating an Austro-Hungarian style dual government. In substance, 
however, it simply recycled old initiatives which had never gained traction. The separatist 
leaderships saw such olive branches from Tbilisi as aimed primarily at proving Georgia’s peaceful 
intentions to the international community.
72
 Internally, Georgian statements were much more 
bellicose and threatening.
73
 By 2006, peace talks in both regions were moribund.  
 
BRYZA’S PEACE INITIATIVE  
 
One of the most important mediation efforts of the 2008 Georgian crisis was drafted, implemented 
and advocated by Matthew Bryza, the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. Long before the 
crisis, Bryza was working to facilitate direct Abkhaz-Georgian talks, to check Russian moves and to 
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urge the Georgians to refrain from provocative actions.
74
 Bryza regularly discussed Georgian affairs 
with his Russian counterpart, Grigory Karasin, with whom he appeared to enjoy a warm 
relationship.
75
 By late 2007, however, Karasin’s lines were toughening. He warned of an alleged 
Georgian plan to attack the two separatist regions around December, against which Russia was 
prepared to act.
76
 In Tbilisi, the general feeling was that time was not on Georgia’s side. President 
Saakashvili, in particular, was impassioned by the perceived threat of Russia annexing Abkhazia.
77
 
The president’s own family harboured the guilt of not fighting off Russian annexation in 1921.78 In 
the year of the crisis, Bryza also worked extremely closely with major European diplomatic actors 
to coordinate an international response. One of his most important interlocutors was Jean Arnault, 
the UN Secretary General’s special envoy in Georgia. 
When they met in January, Arnault and Bryza worried that the UN’s efforts were failing.79 Both 
sides were losing interest in the peace process.
80
 This was ominous, at a time when the Georgians 
perceived Russia tightening its grip on Abkhazia. The only upside, the diplomats agreed, was that 
Abkhaz de facto president Bagapsh “realizes that joining a confederation with Georgia is likely to 
be their best option.”81 Arnault suspected that Russian pressure aimed to make Georgia renounce its 
NATO aspirations.
82
 Kremlin hardliners also appeared to be gaining the upper hand on recognising 
Abkhazia.
83
 At this critical time, the UN Friends of Georgia group was “focusing solely on 
minutiae,” Bryza lamented, “rather than on the urgent need for a political resolution of the 
Abkhazia conflict.”84 This was the first seed in Bryza’s campaign to shift negotiations to “the bigger 
question” of a political resolution.85 
Over the next months, the situation became positively alarming. By March 2008, Karasin warned 
his American counterparts that “the explosive Kosovo precedent” and the question of NATO 
membership for Georgia and Ukraine were pushing Russia into a corner.
86
 The U.S. should now 
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decide what kind of Russia it wants, and make its “strategic choice”.87 The Abkhaz had their own 
strategic choice to make. In April, de facto Foreign Minister Shamba rejected Saakashvili’s latest 
peace proposal.
88
 In conversation with the U.S. ambassador, he blamed the West for giving 
Abkhazia “no choice” but to ally with Russia. “You’re giving us no alternative,” he insisted. 
Shamba was wary of Russian influence, noting that if they attempted an outright annexation, the 
Abkhaz would take up arms against them. Although Shamba reiterated the Abkhaz precondition for 
talks with Tbilisi – that the Georgians withdraw from the Kodori Gorge – he was still open to 
dialogue.
89
 On his side, Saakashvili remained calm in the face of Russia’s growing military 
footprint in Abkhazia.
90
 But conflict was brewing. Even the anti-war moderates in Saakashvili’s 
administration were becoming increasingly nervous at the prospects of a coming war with Russia 
over Abkhazia.
91
  
The Americans sensed a diplomatic opening. On 8 May, Matthew Bryza unveiled a plan to his 
British, French and German colleagues to revive the Georgian-Abkhaz peace process. The plan he 
had personally designed,
92
 which he would take to Georgia, had three key elements: 
 
1. Encourage Georgia to elaborate its proposal of autonomy for Abkhazia;  
2. Put pressure on Russia to prevent further infringement of Georgia's sovereignty;  
3. Create a new forum to oversee the implementation of measures to create economic, social, and 
information links between Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia, and to foster direct Georgian-Abkhaz 
talks.
93
 
 
The thinking behind this plan, according to Bryza, was that “we recognized back in 
Washington…that the Russian side, and President Putin, had manoeuvred President Saakashvili into 
an impossible decision between either acquiescing to the loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia…or 
go[ing] to war with Russia.” 94  In this way, the U.S. peace initiative was designed “to give 
Saakashvili a way out” by proposing a third option.95 Upon his arrival in Tbilisi, Bryza presented 
the plan to his UN colleague, Jean Arnault, who agreed with Bryza that the current Friends of 
Georgia group was a broken mechanism.
96
 Arnault observed that the Abkhaz “see themselves as 
stuck between a pig (Russia) that wants to gobble up all of Abkhazia and a dog (Georgia), that 
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wants to attack Abkhazia and take it back by force.” To undo that perception, Georgia needed to 
signal its goodwill.
97
  
In Tbilisi, Bryza attempted to dampen warnings of war emanating from the Georgian leadership, 
and called Russia’s actions provocative.98 The Russian foreign ministry immediately cast doubt on 
his role as a mediator.
99
 Moscow’s actions in Abkhazia, according to Russian experts, “were 
designed [to] demonstrate clearly for a German and French audience all the problems NATO would 
inherit if it were to shelter Georgia.”100 Russia was imposing a clear choice on Georgia: territorial 
integrity or NATO membership. This was clearly about NATO, U.S. diplomats opined.
101
 Moscow 
might have believed that it held all of the cards in the escalating crisis, but “providing the Abkhaz 
with a better deal than fealty to Moscow could fundamentally change the Caucasus dynamic over 
time,” the Moscow embassy advised.102  
Bryza first moved to secure broad political support in Georgia for his plan. He promoted it to 
senior Georgian officials, including the Foreign Minister, who was initially sceptical. When his plan 
encountered resistance, Bryza tied Georgia’s prospects of NATO membership to its peaceful 
conduct in Abkhazia. He flatly warned that any attempt to reclaim its separatist provinces by force 
would result in Georgia losing both the provinces and U.S. support.
103
 Bryza reiterated this warning 
to senior Georgian officials who had been contemplating armed action.
104
 He promoted his plan in 
Tbilisi to moderates and rabid populists alike.
105
 The most important of Bryza’s meetings took place 
during his visit to Abkhazia on 10 May. His interlocutor, de facto President Bagapsh, appeared open 
to meeting Georgian officials, but insisted on four pre-conditions. There must first be: 
 
1. An agreement on reducing the number of Georgian troops in the UKV [Kodori valley];  
2. A non-use of force pledge; 
3. The lifting of economic sanctions; and  
4. The establishment of a sea link between Trabzon and Sukhumi.106 
 
Bryza responded positively, noting that “Bagapsh offered a reasonable basis for further 
negotiations, and about the best one could hope for at that point.”107 Bryza proposed that both the 
Georgians and Abkhaz forces could withdraw entirely from the Kodori valley, leaving the local 
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Svan population to ensure their own security, with UN oversight.
108
 When Bagapsh raised the 
presence of Georgian troops in the Kodori valley, Bryza “responded that the U.S. has told the 
Georgians bluntly that if they start a war in Abkhazia, they would lose, they would be alone, and 
their NATO aspirations would be finished.”109 Crucially, Bagapsh did not object to these peace 
proposals, as he had earlier in the year. He even stressed that he did not support Russia’s recently 
increased presence in Abkhazia, and agreed to meet Georgia’s foreign minister, as soon as they 
reached agreement on the Kodori Gorge. The U.S. ambassador emerged from the meeting 
impressed by the fact that the Abkhaz, “even the usually aggressive and inflexible…were clearly 
trying to appear as constructive as possible in their talks with Bryza.” The Abkhaz did not appear to 
want a war. After the meeting, Shamba stated that he felt safe because the Americans were 
mediating the crisis. 
110
 
Back in Tbilisi, Bryza relayed his intuition that the Abkhaz were open to compromise.
111
 He 
“knew we had a shot at an agreement,” and now worked to persuade the Georgians of its merits.112 
The Abkhaz leader had dropped the pre-condition that Georgia withdraw from the Kodori Gorge. 
Instead, they appeared open to negotiating that very point. Relaying the Abkhaz proposal to Interior 
Minister Merabishvili, Bryza stressed that Georgia’s policies alienated Abkhazia and pushed it into 
Russia’s arms.113 In parting, Bryza warned him that “war is a bad option for Georgia, and will 
destroy any chance for the country to enter NATO as well as cost it valuable support in Washington 
and European capitals.”114 He pressed the Georgian minister to remain patient while the U.S. peace 
initiative bore fruit. Bryza continued to promote his peace plan broadly in Tbilisi for the rest of the 
month.
115
 Georgia maintained the official pre-condition that recently-arrived Russian troops 
withdraw from Abkhazia before negotiating a non-use of force pledge.
116
 Russian officials rejected 
this linkage, and expressed a lack of confidence in Bryza’s strategy of discussing the bigger 
political questions.
 117
 Moscow clearly disliked the U.S. peace plan. 
Fascinatingly, Bryza’s initiative came to an abrupt end not in Tbilisi, but in Berlin. The last time 
they had met in May, the Western Friends of Georgia – which excludes Russia – had given Bryza’s 
initiative their qualified support. Germany and France were more sceptical of Georgia’s peaceful 
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intentions than Washington.
118
 Moreover, Berlin wanted to take ownership of the peace initiative, 
which Bryza accepted.
119
 The implication became clear on June 12, at the Friends’ meeting in 
Berlin. The Germans tabled a new peace proposal. It advocated beginning with confidence-building 
measures (CBMs), effectively putting off the question of Abkhazia’s status. Bryza warned that the 
parties risked becoming “bogged down” in CBMs while the situation deteriorated,120 and advised 
that the paper allow the parties to negotiate an agreement, rather than dictating it to them.
121
 Finally, 
he reaffirmed his view that Abkhazia’s final political status was the most urgent priority.122 Bryza 
stressed to his European colleagues the importance of deploying EU police monitors in the Kodori 
Gorge: 
Look, there probably aren’t three people anywhere, on earth – at the risk of an exaggeration – who could do more 
right now to avoid war in Georgia…because you can press the EU to authorise police monitors or trainers in the 
Kodori Gorge. And we are absolutely convinced, in Washington, that is the key step to keep the parties separated, 
and to avoid a war.
123
 
 
Bryza’s peace plan revolved around solving the impasse in the Kodori Gorge. The key to peace, 
in his mind, was to station neutral monitors to oversee local policing. Theoretically, this gesture 
would allow negotiations to resume. However, when Bryza floated the possibility of an EU police 
presence in the Kodori Gorge, the European ambassadors unanimously rejected it as politically 
impossible.
124
 Matthew Bryza recalls feeling “crestfallen after that. I was very frustrated.”125 This is 
how the Bryza initiative ended. It became the German plan dubbed the ‘Steinmeier Plan.’ The next 
day, the Western Friends were meant to meet in the broader format involving Russia. However, 
Moscow withdrew its participation for unclear reasons; German Chancellor Merkel was particularly 
offended.
126
 
 
THE STEINMEIER PLAN 
 
German Foreign Minister Steinmeier’s peace plan became the central Western peace initiative prior 
to the August 2008 war. As we saw, it had grown out of Bryza’s own plan, but had reversed the 
priorities, postponing discussion of Abkhazia’s status. For the Europeans, placing EU monitors in 
the disputed Kodori Gorge was a bridge too far. Behind the scenes, question marks surrounded 
Germany’s role in the crisis. Matthew Bryza and Swedish foreign minister Carl Bildt agreed that 
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Berlin was “complicating the peace process... by requiring that every step…be cleared in advance 
with Moscow.” 127  Germany was so wary of angering Russia that it carefully submitted each 
initiative for Moscow’s approval.128 In fairness, it should be acknowledged that Berlin inherited the 
mantle of peace-making at a most difficult time in the crisis. A track two meeting between Abkhaz 
and Georgian officials in Sweden, organised by an academic, had not borne fruit.
129
 The Georgians 
were so disillusioned with international peace talks that even anti-war Georgian ministers 
contemplated the use of force.
130
  
However, the diplomatic opening Bryza had perceived still existed. President Bagapsh reiterated 
a proposal he had suggested to Bryza: stationing a joint EU police force in the Kodori Valley, to 
create a buffer between both parties.
131
 Moreover, Bagapsh implored the Europeans to act 
“quickly”, alluding to Russia’s increasing presence in Abkhazia.132  Around the same time, the 
Georgian leadership was also open to this compromise, while also imploring the European powers 
to act quickly.
133
 As such, Germany was not responsible for the environment of increasing tensions 
which it inherited in June 2008. However, as Germany assumed the lead in Western efforts to 
prevent war in Georgia, the diplomatic opening Bryza had perceived (even if not his plan) was still 
on the table. 
On 30 June, the Friends met again in Berlin; this time, Russia attended. At the meeting, the 
Germans presented their three-phase strategy for resolving the Georgian-Abkhaz dispute.
134
 The 
German chair asked for a quick turnaround to present the plan to the disputants before the summer 
break. But the Russian representative stated that Moscow would not support such a plan until 
September, after a meeting between Medvedev and Saakashvili. The German ambassador warned 
that the Group of Friends was “down to its last bullet” to resolve the conflict.135 If Russia did not 
help, the German warned, it would be excluded from future peace initiatives.
136
 The same day, 
Georgia’s foreign minister reiterated the urgency of the crisis to the Western Friends, calling for a 
new negotiating format.
137
 The Steinmeier initiative’s success would depend on its ability to allay 
Georgian fears in the face of Russian provocations, while allaying Abkhaz fears about Georgian 
intentions. 
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Steinmeier led the final push for peace in his three day visit to the region on 17-18 July. By all 
accounts, this mission had failed before it began. Russian and Abkhaz officials rebuffed the 
Steinmeier Plan before the minister arrived in Georgia.
138
 On 17 July, the Abkhaz leader announced 
that he would not even “consider the plan”.139 Russian foreign minister Lavrov also cast doubt on 
Steinmeier’s trip before it began. 140  Steinmeier’s meeting with the Abkhaz was particularly 
difficult. The Abkhaz disliked “Steinmeier’s condescending attitude”.141 Conversely, the Germans 
also complained of “a rude Bagapsh reception”.142 What followed was a triple rejection of the 
Steinmeier plan: by Abkhazia, then Georgia and finally Russia. Firstly, the Abkhaz leader reiterated 
his wholesale rejection of Steinmeier’s plan.143 Bagapsh was uncompromising. “We are not going 
to discuss Abkhazia’s status,” he said. “Abkhazia is an independent state.”144 Secondly, Georgia 
also reiterated its own preconditions.
145
 Finally, Russia ended Steinmeier’s initiative by formally 
endorsing Abkhazia’s preconditions.146  
The failure of Steinmeier’s peace initiative was total, as German diplomats recognised. 147 
Steinmeier told Lavrov that he had not expected to meet such resistance on all sides. Lavrov gently 
rejected Steinmeier’s initiative, German diplomats believed, out of fondness for Steinmeier 
personally, rather than for his plan.
148
 Diplomatic subtleties aside, Steinmeier had been 
humiliated.
149
 In late July, the German foreign minister noted grimly that diplomatic efforts were 
“not fully back to square one, but close to it.”150 Steinmeier intended to invite the Georgians and 
Abkhaz to Berlin for negotiations, but this meeting never occurred.
151
 
Meanwhile, American efforts to reach out to the Abkhaz continued. Even after the failure of the 
Steinmeier mission, the U.S. was still advocating that EU observers could stabilise the Kodori 
Gorge.
152
 Although Georgia was not blameless, U.S. officials argued, Russia was the principal 
aggressor; some European officials agreed.
153
 Turkish officials also saw Russia as trying to provoke 
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Georgia into making a fatal mistake on the ground.
154
 Throughout July, Bryza continued to 
campaign quietly on his Kodori Gorge proposal.
155
 On 25 July, Bryza and the German ambassador 
travelled to Abkhazia to attempt to revive his proposal.
156
 He emerged frustrated at the numerous 
preconditions and lack of concessions on both sides.
157
 One week later, a wave of sniper fire, shells 
and improvised explosions swept through South Ossetia and Abkhazia. President Bagapsh refused 
to attend peace talks in Berlin.
158
 Bryza flew to Moscow and met General Buzhinsky, whom he 
pressed to help deescalate tensions in the Kodori Gorge.
159
 Russia’s military build-up in Abkhazia, 
Bryza complained, was strengthening the hands of the Georgian hawks “foolishly” advocating 
war.
160
 The Russian general warned of a direct NATO-Russia military confrontation if Georgia 
joined the alliance.
161
 Around this time, an OSCE official in Ossetia recalls feeling that time was 
running out; her usual interlocutors were manning trenches.
162
 War broke out six days later. OSCE 
officials in Tskhinvali were soon holed up in their basement, with shells exploding in their 
courtyard.
163
 The peacemakers had failed.  
 
ANALYSIS 
 
Despite this failure of diplomacy, we are entitled to ask whether the August 2008 war was bound to 
occur as and when it did. I will argue that, the positions of all antagonists being what they were, a 
war of some description was extremely likely. But this does not make it inevitable by any stretch of 
the imagination. As I will seek to demonstrate, international actorsa attempting to prevent war made 
a series of strategic errors. I will begin by briefly analysing the peace efforts of the UN, the OSCE 
and the EU in May-August 2008, airing critiques of their attempts to prevent war. Secondly, I will 
ask the counter-factual question of whether Bryza’s peace plan, if it had remained the plan, may 
have made a tangible difference to the flow of events. I argue that it would most likely have done 
so, even if it may not have prevented what was ultimately a war of choice.  
The UN was the main actor in charge of conflict prevention in Abkhazia. However, it was 
crippled from the outset by Russia’s participation in the process. A former UN official was 
cognisant of the fact that Russia was actually a party to the dispute, rather than a neutral 
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mediator.
164
 Whenever the UN was close to a breakthrough in negotiations, “the Russians tried to 
intervene” to prevent an agreement.165 Russia simply worked from within to hamper any peace 
initiatives against its interests. At the April summit in Bucharest, Putin basically “made the 
declaration to Western powers that the admission of Georgia [to NATO] was a casus belli.”166 
Moreover, Russian military preparations were obviously in motion in early spring 2008.
167
 Thus, 
the August 2008 war “was like a Greek tragedy: in the end the tragedy had to happen, there is no 
choice.”168 However, this fatalistic account forgets that individuals working at the UN arguably did 
have an impact on the crisis.  
As early as 2007, UN officials in Abkhazia had drawn up a contingency plan to prevent violence. 
But the proposal languished in New York.
169
 One official spoke darkly about careerist, high-level 
officials having done “nothing – exactly nothing to prevent this.”170 When the crisis escalated in 
July 2008, a senior UN official was finally named UN Special Representative. He was too risk 
averse, a critic charged, and “did not even manage to publish a report.”171 The disgruntled critic 
argued that senior officials on the ground, that year, were “a typical product of UN bureaucracy”.172 
When tensions escalated, a key UN official was on sick leave and out of area.
173
 Some suggest that 
Heidi Tagliavini, a former OSCE and UN diplomat in the region, could have made a difference. 
After the war, the chief of the Security Council of Abkhazia supposedly told Tagliavini: “If you 
were here, we probably would not have had the war.”174 The interviewee’s explanation is that “the 
wrong people in the wrong place” failed to prevent the war.175 This certainly tends to confirm the 
overall argument of this dissertation. 
Another key conflict prevention institution was the OSCE, which had overall responsibility for 
South Ossetia. On the ground, Moscow had immense leverage to undermine the OSCE’s efforts by 
militarising the South Ossetian population, restricting OSCE monitors, and undermining the JCC of 
substance.
176
 As a result, the Georgians made a strategic decision to opt out of this negotiating 
format.
177
 Initially, the OSCE was firmly opposed to changing the negotiating format in South 
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Ossetia. On May 30, however, Finnish Foreign Minister Stubb, Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, 
announced a sharp policy U-turn. After speaking with the Georgian foreign minister, he repeated 
the Georgian position that the JCC was dead.
178
 Thomas de Waal credits this statement with having 
“effectively killed off the Joint Control Commission without an alternate format being in place.”179 
Preferring not to be identified, several officials pinpointed this OSCE announcement as a fatal 
mistake.
180
 This move was “a major mistake, especially in the context of daily incidents on the 
ground and serious tension.”181 The Finnish Chairmanship of the OSCE had all but “developed for 
various reasons into being ostensibly pro-Georgian.” 182  This position constrained the OSCE’s 
influence in the crisis, since Tbilisi had no incentive to attend JCC meetings.
183
 The implications of 
this policy became evident on the day the war broke out. An emergency meeting of local co-chairs 
could simply not be held, since the Georgians refused to attend.
184
 
The OSCE chairman’s statement reinforced the perception that the OSCE – whose mission head 
was decorated by the Georgian president
185
 – was too close to Georgia to be neutral.186 This fed the 
allegation that political officers in the mission re-worded military observers’ reports to make them 
sound more innocuous.
187
 After the war, the OSCE submitted highly “filtered texts” to the 
Tagliavini fact-finding mission.
188
 Another theory is that the OSCE was generally caught unawares 
by the war. The Deputy Head of the OSCE mission in Georgia, Ryan Grist, recalls that violence 
was not abnormal prior to the war.
189
 Indeed, when President Saakashvili announced a unilateral 
cease-fire on the eve of the war, Grist went home, assured that the crisis had been contained – until 
he began receiving 2am phone calls.
190
 Internal OSCE recriminations after the war focussed on 
whether the lower-level field mission or higher-level political leadership had failed.
191
 In Grist’s 
view, it is unfair to blame the field mission for the geopolitical machinations of high politics.
192
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This is a sound argument. Grist may have been a convenient scapegoat to avoid questioning the 
actions of higher-level OSCE officials.
193
 
A third important actor in pre-August 2008 conflict prevention efforts was the EU. As an 
institution, the European Union “could not really get its foot into this door” in conflict prevention 
efforts prior to the war.
194
 The EU’s special representative was mandated to juggle the conflict in 
Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh, forcing him to split his focus.
195
 One interviewee suggested that 
the EU special representative, Peter Semneby, lost patience too quickly.
196
 Another high-level 
official characterised the EU’s pre-August 2008 role as “timid”.197 The dominant position in the EU 
was that, even if Russia was intentionally raising tensions, the Georgians should avoid antagonising 
Russia.
198
 There was also tension between the EU and its member-states. Some national diplomats 
in the Group of Friends resisted letting any EU “tentacle” into the process.199 Theoretically, the EU 
could have played a crucial role in preventing conflict escalation, since it was the only organisation 
in which Russia did not have a veto.
200
 This explains why Bryza insisted on deploying EU monitors 
to the Kodori Gorge. The EU had discussed deploying such monitors in 2005,
 201
 and in 2007,
 202
 
but desisted from fear of offending Russia.  
During his June visit to Georgia, Javier Solana, according to one EU diplomat, “smelled an 
opportunity” to play a constructive role in June 2008.203 During that trip, which appeared positive in 
tone,
204
 Solana attempted to carve out a facilitating role for the EU in Abkhaz-Georgian 
negotiations.
205
 However, President Bagapsh – in stark contrast to his meeting with Bryza – now 
rejected any EU role in the Kodori Gorge. Georgia was prepared to sign a ceasefire with Abkhazia, 
if the EU guaranteed the agreement.
206
 In the end, the window of opportunity which Solana 
perceived shut abruptly. One official spoke of Solana being “almost ousted” from Georgia.207 In the 
end, another official suggested, the idea that the EU held the key to peace “was all very naïve, 
simply because Russia could easily obstruct the implementation on the ground of whatever the EU 
would decide by simply telling the Abkhaz and the South Ossetians to block it.”208 
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Having examined the mistakes which the UN, OSCE and EU allegedly made prior to the war, we 
are better placed to reconsider the relative importance of Matthew Bryza’s peace plan. A sceptic 
may reasonably argue that nothing the above actors did differently would have prevented war. This 
critique helps to frame the counter-factual question of whether Matthew Bryza’s plan would have 
been any different, had the Western powers pursued it. Arguably, it would have made a major 
difference, but probably not a big enough one to prevent war. The most likely difference Bryza’s 
peace plan would have made, had Germany not taken over peace efforts in May 2008, was to 
neutralise Russia’s ability to veto this initiative at will.  
A major mystery of the Steinmeier plan is why Russia reversed course overnight. At first, 
Russian diplomats expressed public support for the Steinmeier plan.
209
 During Steinmeier’s visit, 
however, Russia ensured the diplomatic death of the Steinmeier plan. Bryza, who at this stage was 
still promoting his plan, critiqued Russia’s sudden volte face.210 On 21 July, he accused Russia of 
acting in bad faith.
211
 This anecdote reveals the fatal flaw in the Steinmeier plan: it gave Moscow a 
say on each step in this peace initiative.  When the plan did not go as Russia wanted, Moscow 
pulled the rug from under it. This point is crucial to understanding how Bryza’s plan may have 
affected the crisis. Both the Abkhaz and Georgians saw the U.S. as a credible mediator – 
uncontestably pro-Georgia, but uncontestably interested in peace. In fact, Bryza’s meeting with 
Abkhaz president Bagapsh revealed that the Abkhaz felt reassured by the involvement of the United 
States. The U.S. was practicing a strategy of double reassurance, giving guarantees to the Georgians 
and Abkhaz aimed at containing conflict.  
Hypothetically, had Bryza remained the leader of the Western peace initiative in early 2008, 
American leadership may have made a major difference. Evidently, Russia preferred a German 
initiative which it could more easily veto. This is the crucial difference: Bryza’s peace plan 
intentionally cut Russia out of the process. Had Russian leaders announced during Bryza’s visit – as 
they did – that the U.S. was not an impartial player, this would not so easily have pressured 
Bagapsh to reject the initiative. As Bryza had discovered, the Abkhaz leader was seriously worried 
about a possible Russian annexation. It was less Bryza’s actual plan, than the fact that he 
represented the U.S., which gave him such sway. The identity of mediators often counts for more 
than the specific measures they propose.
212
 The U.S., in May 2008, had a fierce independence from 
Russian foreign policy which Germany plainly lacked, and which may have bought time for peace 
proposals to gain traction. 
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In the end, Bryza’s plan may not have prevented the war. The U.S., like other diplomatic actors, 
“picked the wrong conflict zone.”213 It is noteworthy that violence exploded in South Ossetia just as 
peace efforts in Abkhazia were beginning to bear fruit. A meeting in Berlin was scheduled, and 
Georgia intended to sign a non-use of force pledge. Some have speculated that this timing was not 
coincidental at all.
214
 One UN official intimated a rumour that the “more independent-minded” 
Abkhaz leaders “were not willing to cooperate on attacking Georgia; the South Ossetians were.”215 
If this is true, Bryza’s peace plan may not ultimately have prevented some kind of war. However, 
the Bryza peace initiative might have pulled Abkhazia out of Russia’s orbit. This would have 
fundamentally changed the nature of the war.  
One interviewee, involved in negotiations with the Abkhaz, revealed that one of the reasons that 
peace talks seldom advanced was due to frequent death threats against Abkhaz leaders.
216
 Every 
time a leader made strong peace gestures, their political fortunes would suddenly end, or they would 
receive death threats from thugs pour encourager les autres. If true, this allegation would certainly 
explain why the Abkhaz felt so comforted by the U.S. mediators being in town. 
Bryza’s peace plan was not without flaws. For one, it took Saakashvili’s March 2008 plan as its 
basis, which senior Abkhaz leaders had already rejected. The Georgian plan was the departure point 
of the U.S. initiative. This is surprising, since American diplomats in Moscow had already 
concluded that Saakashvili’s March 2008 peace plan was “dead on arrival.” 217  Moreover, 
Saakashivili’s peace plan took Abkhazia’s status (autonomy) as a fixed end-point of negotiations, 
rather than a negotiable point. However, all international actors except Moscow took Georgia’s 
territorial integrity as the starting principle of peace talks.  
In the final analysis, the Bryza plan would probably not have succeeded in preventing war. The 
reason, as the opening quotation suggests, is simple: Russia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Georgia 
only wanted peace on their terms. The Russian government, first and foremost, appears to have 
systematically acted to undermine peace initiatives which did not favour its interests. For example, 
Saakashvili made a desperate proposal on 21 June, effectively putting Georgia’s territorial integrity 
on the negotiating table.
218
 Conspicuously, the proposal did not revoke Georgia’s NATO 
aspirations, which Putin had made clear was the only deal on offer. When the Russian government 
politely refused, a Georgian official commented: “We are going to have a hot summer.”219 As one 
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interviewee noted, the main issue was simply that Russia “did not want to negotiate.” 220  The 
Georgians were correct that time was not on their side.
221
 However, Tbilisi’s unilateral stationing of 
troops in the Kodori Valley was a constant impediment to peace initiatives in 2008.
222
 It was, as 
Bryza foresaw, a potential key to peace. 
While not faultless, the Abkhaz leadership, Heidi Tagliavini argues, “were totally afraid of a new 
war. They would have done everything to avoid that war.”223 The Abkhaz had agreed, in 1994, to 
negotiating Abkhazia’s integration with Georgia into a new Union state.224 Neither the Georgians 
nor the international community revived such an imaginative possibility. There was simply no 
institutional memory of various peace initiatives.
225
 International peace efforts in 2008 also suffered 
from this “lack of inventiveness”.226 As Heidi Tagliavini concluded, the May-July peace initiatives 
represented “old stuff rewarmed.”227 The failure of all diplomatic efforts in 2008 stemmed from a 
lack of good faith, which the most flawless peace plan could have done nothing to alter. In this very 
limited sense, and in this sense only, the August 2008 war was bound to happen. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter discussed the various efforts to prevent the August 2008 war. It explored in most depth 
the role of Matthew Bryza’s peace initiative in May. I argued that this initiative might have made a 
major difference to the crisis, had the Western powers supported it. Instead, Steinmeier’s plan failed 
before it began, partly because Russia discarded it. This case is the most vexing failure of 
preventive diplomacy covered in this dissertation. It reveals the near-impossibility of preventing 
war by diplomatic means when at least one party has decided to go to war. For years, Russia was 
remarkably clear on the choice it imposed: Georgia could reclaim its territories and forget NATO, 
or join NATO and forget its territories. War broke out because Saakashvili attempted to break out 
of this binary choice.  
Secondly, this case reveals that conflict prevention institutions are only as effective as the actors 
who make them up want them to be.
228
 Finally, the failure of preventive diplomacy in Georgia is 
particularly revealing of the personality politics of preventive diplomacy. Beyond this chapter, the 
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Georgia case also illustrates some of this dissertation’s philosophical arguments, and nuances 
others. 
Firstly, this case revealed the importance of an agent’s identity in peace efforts. Like General 
Scott in 1839, and Dag Hammarskjöld in 1956, Matthew Bryza, while skilled and influential in his 
own right, was immeasurably more effective for being a representative of the United States. His 
peace plan gained the sympathies of the Abkhaz, at least in part, because of the power he 
represented: the U.S. As I explained, both Abkhaz and Georgians distrusted Russian intentions. 
This is precisely the common ground which Bryza exploited. Since Steinmeier deferred to Russia, 
the parties distrusted his plan too. The United States was a powerful mediator in May 2008, and was 
uniquely placed to guarantee Abkhaz and Georgian security against threats from each other. Of 
course, this is partly a reflection of the United States’ preponderant power in world affairs.  
This case chapter suggests an important concession to structural theories: Bryza determined his 
own actions in 2008, but he did not alone causally determine the influence of his actions. I will 
explore this important nuance in the next chapter. 
This case study also ties into the last in an expected way: a death threat against Kivuitu, and one 
against the Abkhaz in 2008, may have undermined all hopes for peace. If allegations of such threats 
are well founded, we have discovered a cruel problem: the barrel of a gun may undermine an 
agent’s ability to do otherwise, and make war inevitable. Death threats, potential assassinations and 
successful ones have featured prominently in most of the previous case studies. In 1861, a potential 
assassin allegedly aimed to take Lincoln’s life. Franz Ferdinand’s assassination sparked a great 
power crisis in July 1914. Count Tisza almost suffered an assassin’s bullet during the war, and 
finally did so in 1918. An assassination attempt on Zhou’s life almost succeeded, potentially 
bringing the U.S. and China into another war. Finally, as we saw in the last two chapters, Kivuitu 
and the Abkhaz appeared to have been deterred from acting in a way that might have prevented war 
due, allegedly, to death threats. This all suggests that we ought to dive deeper into the question of 
coercion, and its relation to free agency, in the next chapter.  
For now, I conclude that the above evidence serves as a chilling reminder of the pivotal role of 
individuals in history. If individuals did not change the course of events, why have assassins long 
threatened or taken their lives to do so? Had assassins miscalculated the causal efficacy of their 
actions, their craft may have disappeared long ago. Unfortunately, however, they are not wrong. 
The above case studies have substantiated the point that individuals have an enormous, seemingly 
disproportionate, effect on war and peace. Attempts to coerce or kill influential people reveal, if 
nothing else, the causal role of individuals in history. As I argued earlier, Lincoln’s death in early 
1861 would have transformed the secession crisis. Similarly, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, had he 
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lived,
229
 would probably have cooperated with his enemy, Count Tisza, to restrain the Austrian war 
party. The argument that, in one individual’s place, another would simply take his place is over-
simplistic, as I will argue in the next chapter. While killing an individual may not rearrange larger 
structural power relations, it may catalyse a destructive war which does so. This conclusion is 
theoretically rich, so I now turn to discussing it, and other insights into human agency collected 
from the preceding case studies.  
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PART III 
Practical Theory 
 
 
“Experience without theory is blind, but theory  
without experience is mere intellectual play.” 
- Immanuel Kant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 162 
Agency in Preventive Diplomacy 
 
 “I wear the chain I forged in life.  
I made it link by link, and yard by yard;  
I girded it on of my own free will, and  
of my own free will I wore it.”1 
- Charles Dickens 
 
The previous chapters recounted six efforts to prevent war across diverse historical periods. They 
traced an American general’s machinations in Maine, William Henry Seward’s efforts to preserve 
the Union and Count Tisza’s heated meetings in Vienna. They followed Dag Hammarskjöld’s trip 
to China, Samuel Kivuitu’s fateful change of mind in 2007, and Matthew Bryza’s plan in 2008. The 
only constant across these cases was the sharp focus on specific individuals. I have therefore 
already addressed the first part of this dissertation’s research question, on how individuals have 
attempted to prevent war historically. I will now address the second part, by reflecting on which 
causal roles the diverse agents played in determining the outbreak, or prevention, of war. As such, 
this chapter is more than a summary of key findings. It distils the original contributions to 
knowledge in this dissertation, weaving diverse philosophical and historical threads into a coherent 
whole. Before proceeding, I will explain what this will involve.  
This dissertation focussed on the role of human agency in diplomatic attempts to prevent war. 
Towards that end, it produced a patchwork of historical and philosophical material. This material 
now serves to build the foundations of a practical theory of preventive diplomacy. A practical 
theory is a coherent chain of concepts designed to assist the judgments of practitioners. I begin by 
expanding on this ambition below, using Clausewitz’s seminal work as both an organising device 
and a theoretical influence.  
Thereafter, I structure discussion around the key concepts explored in CHAPTER 1: contingency, 
free will and individualism.
2
 I discuss how examples from the cases may support, nuance or 
undermine these theoretical premises. Finally, I consider three critiques, making concessions to 
structuralist theories of war. I conclude that the concept of agency may help scholars to appreciate 
the intensely agent-centric world of practitioners, and for both to begin to speak a common 
language. To achieve this end, we first turn to the most famous Western philosopher of war, Carl 
von Clausewitz, who combined deep theoretical acumen and practical experience in battle. It may 
seem counterintuitive to utilise the writings of Clausewitz when presenting a theory of preventive 
diplomacy, since he wrote about war, not peace, but I explain this choice below. 
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THE RELEVANCE OF CLAUSEWITZ 
 
Despite intense interest in this endeavour, a theory of preventive diplomacy remains elusive. As 
Wallensteen and Möller conclude, “nothing close to a prevention theory can be distilled.”3 This, I 
argue, is at least partly because the literature developed in isolation from broader debates on agency 
and on the causes of war. Why Clausewitz, an authority on war with a deep interest in agency, has 
been missing from these debates is puzzling. Clausewitz’s writings continue to be used in Western 
military academies around the world to teach officers how to plan, fight and win wars. He may 
therefore seem an awkward guest in this discussion. But this concern is unwarranted. Clausewitz’s 
theory of war is arguably the best guide to build a practical theory of preventive diplomacy. There 
are three reasons why On War is a compelling guide: its subject matter, its intellectual history and 
its focus on agency.  
Although Clausewitz did not concern himself with its causes, he saw war as political. Politics, 
Clausewitz observed, is “the womb in which war develops – where its outlines already exist in their 
hidden, rudimentary form, like the characteristics of living creatures in their embryos.”4 Clausewitz 
defined war as “an act of violence to compel the enemy to fulfil our will,” which was not over until 
the enemy’s will was subdued.5 The objective of war is not merely to destroy an army, but to 
compel leaders to abandon the will to fight. This is what Clausewitz meant by the enemy’s “final 
decision”. 6  Preventive diplomacy therefore pursues the same objective as war – neutralising 
leaders’ will to fight – by other means.  
Clausewitz is also relevant because he critiqued deterministic theories of war. On War emerged 
in reaction to three schools of thought. The first school consisted of those Clausewitz mocked as 
“the most erudite and scholarly officers”. Clausewitz also critiqued anti-theoretical writers on war 
who claimed that it was a fool’s errand to generalise lessons from the individual genius of a 
Napoleon.
7
 Clausewitz was most critical of a third group of writers, who did think that a 
generalisable theory of war was possible, but who attempted to find its immutable laws.
8
 According 
to such theorists, it was possible to discover precise mathematical formulae which would determine 
the exact logistical and technical conditions necessary to win war. “They aim at fixed values; but in 
war everything is uncertain,” Clausewitz wrote.9 Here we are reminded of one of the mechanical 
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metaphor of war, discussed in the INTRODUCTION. While Clausewitz “thinks like a scientist”,10 his 
view of the world is indeterministic. 
Thirdly, Clausewitz’s work aimed to supersede these dated theories with one that was 
representative of the inherent elements of chance, contingency and agency in every war. His famous 
concept of friction, which “distinguishes real War from War on paper,”11 was short-hand for the 
unpredictable role of human agency and chance. Clausewitz argued that “all military action is 
intertwined with psychological forces and effects.”12 Although he saw war as both a psychological 
and physical contest, he clearly saw the former – the will to fight – as the most important.13 Under 
the friction of war, he wrote, “the inertia of the whole [unit] gradually comes to rest on the 
commander’s will alone.”14 Clausewitz was critical of his superior during the Napoleonic wars, 
General Phull, whose mathematical approach to war ignored the crucial human element.
15
 On War 
is an agent-centric theory of war. 
I have set out three reasons why Clausewitz may guide our theory-building efforts. I will use this 
philosophical text, first and foremost, to connect the various philosophical links below. Drawing on 
Clausewitz’s concepts of the Will, moral forces, contingency and causation, I attempt to connect my 
conclusions into a chain of argumentation. This chapter, if successful, will lay the philosophical 
foundations of a practical theory of preventive diplomacy. If I fall short of this ambition, what 
follows will be a laundry list of isolated philosophical conclusions drawing on history. I will leave 
that judgment up to each reader.  
 
CONTINGENCY 
 
The six previous case studies have all demonstrated, to varying degrees, that the success or failure 
of efforts to prevent war is contingent upon seemingly minor events. Future events, as Aristotle 
argued, are innately contingent, undetermined and unknowable. In some sense, future events “seem 
to float in a wider sea of possibilities”.16  Poetically, we may see the future as a “garden of forking 
paths,” in which “time forks perpetually toward innumerable futures.”17 From this point of view, the 
future is inherently unpredictable because uncaused. This played out in several distinct ways across 
the case studies. We can generally distinguish between at least two classes of contingency: strong 
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and weak. What I call strong contingencies are those weaved into the very fabric of history: chance 
events. 
In 1838, General Scott knew his Canadian interlocutor by chance, having saved his life on the 
battlefield of 1812. It was not chancy that Scott saved an enemy officer’s life; this was  his 
conscious choice. What was entirely chancy is that he should save that specific soldier’s life, the 
soldier who would become, decades later, his negotiating partner. This strangest of bonds was 
crucial in finding a peaceful solution. In 1860, William Henry Seward lost the presidential 
nomination, in part, because of a printing error. When the ballot papers failed to print properly, an 
extra couple of days were needed to fix them. This gave Seward’s enemies sufficient time to 
negotiate a coalition in support of Lincoln. In July 1914, Russia’s anti-Austrian ambassador 
inadvertently worsened the crisis by dying of a heart attack on the floor of the Austrian embassy. 
This catalysed ultranationalist protests in Serbia, which further weakened Count Tisza’s resistance 
to the war party’s pressure. Had the ambassador’s heart failed a day earlier, the war party may have 
failed to pressure Tisza.  
In all of the above cases, chance played a crucial role. However, it would be misleading to see 
the role of chance as anything more than a causal influence. If the final step to war is always a 
conscious decision by human beings,
18
 chance cannot causally determine the outcome of crises. 
Presumably, no laws of nature dictate that enemy soldiers, printing errors, or heart attacks, under 
specific conditions, cause or prevent wars. At most, these contingencies were forking paths in the 
garden of time, but it took human agents to walk those paths. This raises an important question: Can 
policy-makers plan for chance events? By definition, I see strong contingencies as beyond 
conscious human control, not because we do not know anything about heart attacks and printing 
errors, but because their role in the complex chain of causation leading to war is unpredictable. 
There is, however, a weaker form of contingency which humans may arguably foresee and prepare 
to meet. 
Weak contingencies are those causal paths which open up as a result of purposive human 
actions, whether intentionally or not. By purposive actions, I exclude heart attacks and other 
involuntary movements. Several examples from the above cases demonstrate this distinction. In 
early 1861, an assassin allegedly plotted to kill Lincoln while he travelled to the capital; Seward and 
General Scott intervened to save his life. Had they not, Lincoln may have been killed in 1861, and 
the course of the secession crisis taken a radically different path. In this sense, Seward and Scott 
responded to an unexpected contingency – a potential assassin – and reacted in time to foil it. A 
very different example is from the July crisis. Franz Ferdinand’s assassination demonstrates that 
even purposive actions (driving a vehicle down one street) may have unintended consequences 
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(giving a waiting assassin a prime vantage point). His driver never intended to contribute to the 
Archduke’s assassination, but he inadvertently did.  
Using the example of the sleeping Kaiser, we can see that contingency is a fork in time which 
opens up a number of potential paths. On one key evening of the July crisis, for example, the 
German Kaiser went to bed blissfully ignorant of a crucial telegram from Vienna. Had the Kaiser 
woken up during the night, he would have read his mail in time to practically veto a planned 
Austrian attack on Serbia. The Kaiser’s opposition may have strengthened Tisza’s resistance to the 
Viennese war party. Which path becomes actualised depends upon either purposive actions of 
agents (not waking him up), the unintentional action of an agent (the Kaiser having a nightmare), or 
the intervention of a chance event (a bird shrieking at his window). It seems unbearably absurd to 
think that a nightmare may have changed the course of history. Its absurdity does not make it 
untrue. This discussion appears to corroborate Butterfield’s point that history sometimes pivots on 
minor events.
19
 
The complex interaction of chance events beyond human control, and soft contingencies, is the 
natural environment of crises. This environment resembles war in certain key respects: 
 
[It] is the province of chance… [which] increases the uncertainty of every circumstance, and deranges the course 
of events. [A commander] constantly finds things different from his expectations; and this cannot fail to have an 
influence on his plans, or at least on the presumptions connected with these plans.
20
 
 
Above, I argued that humans could not control chance events – such as shrieking birds – which 
are unpredictable. However, weak contingencies may fall within the scope of human foresight. 
Fortune, as Machiavelli called it, “is the mistress of one half of our actions, and yet leaves the 
control of the other half, or a little less, to ourselves.”21 By prudence and foresight, Machiavelli 
thought, agents might be able to tame Fortune.
22
 In the next chapter, I set out exactly how 
practitioners might prepare for such contingencies in efforts to prevent war, drawing on the military 
art of contingency-planning.  
For now, I conclude by reiterating a key insight for practical theory: the outcome of preventive 
diplomacy is indeterministic. This is an abstract point of great importance, as Clausewitz explains in 
his critique of deterministic theorists of war: 
 
They strive after determinate quantities, whilst in War all is undetermined... They direct their attention upon 
material forces, while the whole military action is penetrated throughout by intelligent forces and their effects. 
They only pay regard to activity on one side, while War is a constant state of reciprocal action, the effects of 
which are mutual.
23
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Wars are contingent precisely because of the human element.
24
 Although medicine is a 
complicated science, dealing with a complex organism, war is much more so.
25
 War deals with even 
more “mysterious agencies”.26 The “living reaction” of protagonists to each other’s actions is not 
only unpredictable, but “opposes anything like a regular plan.”27  Generals “do not make war with 
an abstraction but with a reality,” living, breathing, purposive agents in their own right.28 This 
makes war more art than science.  
 
FREE WILL 
 
In CHAPTER 1, I argued that human beings do not blindly obey the laws of nature, but add their own 
causal power to the world. One expression philosophers have long used to explain this difference is 
that humans possess “free will”. This is merely conceptual short-hand for the idea that humans are 
free agents. This should be boringly true, to use Elster’s expression. But it remains a remarkably 
unpopular view among philosophers. This section expands upon Aristotle’s notion that humans are 
primary movers unmoved, which I argue should be the second guiding assumption in building a 
practical theory of preventive diplomacy. 
The previous case studies have revealed an array of agents who were either unmoved or moved 
by other agents’ actions. I will return to the question of whether psychological pressures and 
coercion – staple diplomatic tactics – undermine an agent’s freedom to do otherwise. The previous 
case study chapters raised the question of why some leaders sometimes change their minds in the 
face of intense diplomatic and psychological pressure, while others do not. If the objective of 
preventive diplomacy is to compel an agent to give up the will to fight, this question is of real 
practical utility.  
The archetypal unmoved agent, in the previous case studies, was Lincoln. During the 1860 
secession crisis, Lincoln resisted intense pressures to accommodate the secessionist Southern states. 
Lincoln resisted when William Henry Seward urged him to desist. He resisted when Seward sent 
hundreds of influential business people to lobby him. Even when Lincoln appeared to be coming 
around to Seward’s view that compromise was necessary during the Fort Sumter incident, he 
resisted again, making his historic decision to relieve the fort. Lincoln is the archetypal unmoved 
agent.  
When we ask what made Lincoln so inflexible, we meet at least three explanations: his 
ideological commitments; his belief that compromise might harm the Union; and his own strength 
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of will. The first explanation, that Republican ideology, rigidly anti-slavery, determined Lincoln’s 
rigidity is unpersuasive. Similar ideological commitments did not deter moderate Republicans from 
supporting a peaceful compromise. The second explanation is intriguing, revealing a different 
interpretation of Lincoln’s stubbornness. In his inaugural address, we see a flexible Lincoln, not 
wishing to interfere with slavery, placing the military in a passive stance, reflecting on the futility of 
war.
 29
 However, we should recall that Seward strongly edited Lincoln’s draft speech, which was 
initially more bellicose. A third possibility is that Lincoln was simply strong-willed. This seems 
unsatisfactory. After all, Count Tisza, whose will was notoriously strong, finally changed his mind 
after immense pressure from his colleagues. The answer must lie elsewhere.  
The agents who moved after intense pressure in the above cases are numerous. Governor 
Fairfield saw war over the Aroostook Valley as inevitable and moved towards it – until General 
Scott persuaded him otherwise. Tisza was resolutely opposed to an Austro-Hungarian attack on 
Serbia – until his colleagues finally bent him. Kaiser Wilhelm II desperately attempted to prevent 
war – until he felt betrayed by his cousin. The weak-willed Tsar managed to order a total halt of 
mobilisation – until his hawkish advisers convinced him to relaunch it two days later. Kivuitu 
vowed to resign to bring down the new government if it attempted to rig the election – before 
changing his mind after probably being threatened. The Abkhaz leader, Bagapsh, was open to a 
mediated compromise with Georgia to avoid war – until the Russian leadership undermined the 
German mediation. In all of these cases, the pattern is the same: powerful and often strong-willed 
agents resisted psychological pressure, before finally bowing to that same pressure. Of all these 
cases, that of Count Tisza serves as the paradoxical example of a moved agent. 
I have already explored the question of why Tisza changed his position: a combination of his 
Germanophilia, sense of duty and pressure from his friends appear to have swayed him. However, 
this only answers why he changed his position; it does not answer why he did not resist. 
Paradoxically, both Lincoln and Tisza were notoriously stubborn, strong-willed and resistant to 
pressure, but one caved in and the other did not.
30
 Theoretically, Lincoln and Tisza are comparable 
units. A counter-factual question helps to solve this apparent paradox.  
To reconcile how agents can be either moved or unmoved by pressure, we need only imagine 
that we could strip Lincoln and Tisza of their personalities, character traits and lived experiences – 
everything which made them individuals. What would be left over from the individuality which 
clothed Lincoln’s and Tisza’s actions? There would, I argue, be nothing left. More precisely, there 
would be nothing besides “that original fountain and source of new things,” which is the human 
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mind, or will.
31
 A compelling explanation for why some strong-willed individuals resist all 
pressures, where others crumble, is that each a sovereign agent. That is, each agent causes their own 
actions independently of external pressures. Agents may therefore be primary movers unmoved, 
actors whose actions are uncaused.  
There is a common critique that agent-causal free will, to be possible, must be god-like. 
Admittedly, proponents of this viewpoint have sometimes encouraged the analogy.
32
 The 
philosopher, Simon Blackburn, has critiqued agent-causal free will. He sees this notion as 
representing a flawed Cartesian dualism, according to which our consciousness is a non-
materialistic ‘ghost in the machine’. He rejected the view of the agent “deciding and choosing in 
complete independence of the causally connected events that make up physical nature.”33 
 
On this conception, it would be as if the subject stands outside nature, in some kind of vacuum beyond the reach 
of chemistry or physics, but then from that uncontaminated vantage point can decide to step in to make things 
happen, to twirl the knobs one way or the other… the free subject intervenes in the ongoing course of the world, 
but is herself not caused to do so one way or the other by events in that course.
34
 
 
This critique appears formidable. How, indeed, can an agent stand outside of nature and yet act 
causally within it? Upon closer inspection, this argument exaggerates what philosophers mean by 
agent-causation. Blackburn argues that there “must be events that influence the choosing agent.”35 
That is evidently the case. No defenders of free will have suggested that agents stood outside nature, 
and were not influenced by anything other than their own wills.  Agents are certainly influenced and 
constrained by circumstances beyond their control, but their actions are not determined by them. 
This ‘ghost in the machine’ is a caricature, rather than representation of what we mean by free 
agency.  
So much for the philosophy, but how does this translate into practical efforts to prevent war? To 
answer this question, we first return to the role of the will in war. “If we desire to defeat the 
enemy,” Clausewitz wrote, “we must proportion our efforts to his powers of resistance.”36 That 
power to resist is reducible to two factors which “cannot be separated”: the material means, such as 
brute military strength, and “the strength of the Will.”37 The latter “is always a factor in the product 
of force.”38 An army’s objective is not only to exhaust the physical powers of an enemy’s force, but 
to undermine their will to fight.
39
 The enemy’s will is not an entirely unknown quantity, but 
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depends upon their object and determination.
40
 Beyond this, the effects of an enemy’s will “almost 
defy calculation”.41 In the case of an army’s defeat, for example, Clausewitz lay “special weight” on 
the causal role of moral forces, which 
lead to greater losses in physical force, which then in turn react on the moral element, and so they go on mutually 
supporting and intensifying each other… [Until there exists a] state of mental tension not only of the Commander 
but of his whole Army down to the lowest wagon-driver, no doubt in decreasing strength but also in decreasing 
importance.
42
 
 
The effects of all military actions, to Clausewitz, are mediated by the minds of soldiers. It is 
precisely in such a context of mental pressure that the will plays a determining role. A proponent of 
causal determinism may criticise the above notion of moral forces as a form of Cartesian dualism.
43
 
This is not the case. Clausewitz repeats, on many occasions, that the material and the mental cannot 
be split, and that there is no point doing so in practice.
44
 He distinguishes mental from physical 
forces to make the point that war is not necessarily won by the side with the most muscle power, but 
by that whose will to fight and mental acuity dominates. Physical force is “no more than the 
wooden handle, whilst the moral are the noble metal, the real bright-polished weapon.”45 
This points to the clearest limitation on all diplomatic efforts to prevent war: consent. No war 
can be prevented without the tacit or explicit consent of the disputants. No political solution can be 
imposed without it. If a third-party does seek to impose it without consent, it is now at war with the 
disputants. Even in war, Clausewitz teaches us, one can win either by destroying the enemy down to 
the last person – which is extremely rare in history, and often practically impossible – or one can 
compel the enemy to submit to one’s will, by conceding defeat. Therefore, the preventive actor 
must assume that disputants are in, principle, primary movers unmoved. I will return to this 
argument below, by exploring whether cases of coercion challenge this conclusion.   
 
INDIVIDUALISM 
 
This dissertation focussed narrowly on individuals attempting to prevent war. In CHAPTER 1, I 
justified this level of analysis by arguing that individuals are overlooked by IR theorists. I grounded 
this dissertation in the concept of methodological individualism, which takes all social events, 
including war, to be fully explainable with reference to individuals. I do not deny the immense 
historical influence of human collectivities. I deny that collectivities exercise causal powers which 
are more than the sum of their individual components. I now ask whether this argument is borne out 
by the facts of the case studies. I concede that it can never be empirically tested, since causes are 
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not physically-observable. However, structural theories of war, I argue, impose order upon chaos at 
the cost of unjustified abstraction.  
In the case of the Aroostook War (1838), I attributed the lack of an actual war to the mediation 
efforts of General Scott, as well as the consent of key Canadian and U.S. leaders. A structural 
explanation may stress that neither Britain nor the U.S. had an interest in major war after that of 
1812. From this perspective, no serious threat to peace existed in 1838, and General Scott’s mission 
does not suffice to explain the absence of war. This structural-level narrative erases crucial details 
of the case at hand. Firstly, this abstract level of analysis obscures the fact that both the British and 
American central governments did not fully control the situation on the ground. Most incidents 
were sparked by the actions of lumberjacks from Maine and New Brunswick. Secondly, both local 
leaders, Governors Fairfield and Harvey, were posturing for a fight. Finally, and crucially, the 
structural perspective misses the crucial role of General Scott and what he represented. As Scott 
realised, his reputation was one of his most important assets in defusing tensions. The structural 
level of analysis over-simplifies what was, in reality, a complex crisis playing out on multiple levels 
– international, national and local.  
A brief counter-factual supports this point. Imagine that a younger William Henry Seward, who 
was then a prominent Whig senator in New York, had attempted to mediate the Aroostook crisis in 
1838. This is not implausible, as Seward was a rising political star. In this scenario, a hypothetical 
Seward peace mission in 1838 would have likely failed. Seward did not possess Scott’s nation-wide 
prestige. Neither could Seward have enjoyed anything approximating Scott’s friendship with 
Governor Harvey of New Brunswick, whose life he had saved in 1812. Finally, Seward, a Whig 
politician, did not have the political impartiality necessary to mediate the local Whig-Democrat 
power struggle, which was Scott’s most important move. For these reasons, Scott’s intervention 
was arguably a necessary condition for the peaceful resolution of the Aroostook crisis. A structural 
level of analysis would miss this insight. The individual level of analysis fully accounts for the 
successful prevention of war. 
Let us now turn to the second case study, when the same two personalities occupied centre stage. 
Historian John Ashworth rejected the argument that the actors in the 1861 crisis, and the errors they 
made, are to blame for the outbreak of the U.S. civil war. Instead, he argues that their “world views 
were structured by the social, political and economic conditions from which they sprang.” 46 
Ashworth suggests that the actors were not to blame for the war, since their actions sprang from 
“intractable economic (or moral) differences between North and South” and “Republican 
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ideology.” 47  The test of this structuralist argument is whether it provides a more coherent 
explanation for the outbreak of war than an agent-centric focus. 
The structural explanation deflates the causal power of individuals like Lincoln, and empowers 
concepts such as “ideology” with the ability to act through individuals. From this perspective, 
Lincoln appeared beholden to Republican ideology. But this structural argument cannot explain 
why Seward, another Republican, broke the rigid constraints of this ideology. Seward, as we saw, 
attempted a peaceful reconciliation of Unionists and secessionists. In agent-causal terms, ideologies 
cannot exert control over human minds, since they cannot act at all. Evidently, agents may justify 
their actions with reference to ideologies, but may never outsource to them the moral responsibility 
and control of their actions.  
In a counter-factual universe, Seward may have won the Republican nomination in 1860. 
President-elect Seward would have used his inauguration speech to promote a peaceful 
reconciliation of the Union. Seward’s efforts may not have sufficed to prevent the secessionist 
crisis. However, his strategy may have split the secessionist movement, and set the conditions for 
peaceful reintegration. A structural explanation of war cannot explain key causes of the war, such as 
the actions of Lincoln and thousands of forgotten hardliners in the North and South. Structural 
explanations legitimately stress the deep conditions which can set the stage for war – conflicting 
ideologies, economic systems and slavery. But none of these sufficed to cause the civil war in an 
intelligible way. A deep ideological divide, an intractable economic dispute, military mobilisation 
and immense social pressures for war also existed between Maine and New Brunswick in 1838. 
These structural conditions did not suffice to cause war then. Hence, agents may well be not the 
superficial, but the most direct causes of war and peace.  
The First World War is often subjected to structural explanations. One theory holds that 
European powers failed to “efficiently” balance against Germany.48 This argument accepts the logic 
of French and Russian statesmen in July 1914: had Britain clearly threatened to side with the 
Entente, war would never have occurred. This is a tempting thought experiment. However, there is 
merit to Sir Edward Grey’s defence that, had Britain done so, war could have just occurred sooner.  
Balance-of-power theory has had a long shelf life, and retains an aura of stately credibility. It seems 
inherently more acceptable to argue that geopolitical units – states, alliances, the international 
system – were responsible for the millions of deaths in the carnage which ensued. It seems, 
conversely, almost unbelievable that, had Sir Edward Grey spent less time fly-fishing at his country 
cottage, the First World War may never have occurred. But belief ought not to get in the way of the 
facts. And the facts lead us to the conclusion that Grey’s personality was so intrinsically tied to his 
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management of the July crisis, that another personality may have made some difference to the shape 
and outcome of the crisis.
49
  
One compelling thought experiment is to imagine, hypothetically, that Grey’s character was 
much closer to that of the Hungarian president-elect, Count Tisza. Authoritarian, blunt in speech, 
fiery in temper, a British foreign secretary with these traits may have made a crucial difference. A 
Tisza in Grey’s shoes may have better managed the crisis by simply speaking with clarity and 
urgency to other leaders. There can be no factual evidence that this approach would have worked. 
But there is a strong possibility it could have steered events in a different direction. If Grey’s 
personality made a difference to the 1914 crisis, it is at best partial to conclude that structural forces 
such as alliances, train schedules and offensive war plans caused the war.
50
 Structural explanations 
are invaluable in pointing out why the crisis occurred as it did, the constraints which leaders faced, 
and the speed at which it developed. But none of these factors were sufficient causes of war. It took 
imprudent leaders, punctual train drivers, inflexible generals and millions of obedient soldiers to 
translate these conditions into war. 
Following the 2007 electoral violence which consumed Kenya, numerous Western journalists’ 
accounts blamed timeless tribal hatreds for causing the violence. The unasked question, however, is 
what exactly caused such hatreds in the first place. As we saw, political and tribal leaders 
intentionally stoked hatred to gain political power. Individual agency comes back into the picture if 
we do not crop it chronologically. In this context, electoral violence was likely in 2007. But its 
likelihood was offset by factors which gave peace a chance: first and foremost, how the leaders 
would react to electoral defeat; secondly, how Kivuitu might react in the event of rigging; and 
thirdly, how individual citizens would react. Across these levels of agency – at the top, middle and 
base of politics – no particular outcome was pre-determined by structural forces alone. Even the 
masses of youth, many of whom rationally chose to participate in killings in exchange for money, 
were masters of their fates. Butterfield’s comment on the role of everyday citizens in democracies, 
and in shaping historical events, is of particular relevance to the case of Kenya: 
 
One of the difficulties of modern democracy is not that individuals matter less than before but that they tend to 
think they matter less. The responsibility is so dispersed that each man can close his eyes to the significance of 
his own part in the events that take place… [with] the consequence that wars may be caused, or empires fall, or 
civilizations decline, not necessarily through some colossal criminality in the first place, but from multitudinous 
cases of petty betrayal and individual neglect.
51 
 
This insight restores the individuality of violent masses. Even in the maelstrom of group 
violence, individuals made a crucial difference over life and death. One such individual was a lone 
police officer in Dandora, whom survivors singled out for bravely ordering his men to form a 
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human barrier between Luo and Kikuyu combatants. This individual prevented massacres which 
other officers were abetting or ignoring.
52
 Thus, responsibility for the 2007 electoral violence was 
“dispersed” not only among the leaders, but among those who espoused hate speech, aided or 
participated in violence. In this context, it is obvious that Kivuitu does not bear the most important 
responsibility for the violence. If, as many suggest, he was under duress, we are not entitled to cast 
judgments on whether Kivuitu should have resigned after evidence of rigging became obvious. 
However, the fact stands that Kivuitu’s excruciating choice decisively influenced the course of 
events.  
In 2008, the prominence of personality politics became clear in the muffled recriminations at UN 
headquarters over which individuals were appointed to prevent war. Here too, a structural 
explanation of the war would efface the importance of individual agents. It would be practically 
impossible to accurately explain the crisis in Russian-Georgian relations of 2006-2008 without 
mentioning the profound, mutual hatred between Saakashvili and Putin.
53
 During President 
Sarkozy’s mediation, Putin reportedly threatened to hang Saakashvili by a certain body part.54 
Putin’s key demand for restoring diplomatic relations was officially that Saakashvili step down or, 
as Saakashvili claims, be killed or jailed.
55
 Sarkozy’s own negotiating style may also explain the 
outcome of his mediation.
56
 Finally, it was Steinmeier’s “condescending treatment” which the 
Abkhaz leaders deplored, rather than the content of any proposals he carried with him.
57
 All of these 
tangled webs of inter-personal relationships, character traits and individual agents are lost at a 
higher level of analysis. 
“What branch of human affairs is there,” Clausewitz asked, “in which these sparks of individual 
spirit have not made their appearance, surmounting all formal considerations?”58 Individuals play a 
decisive role “both in the cabinet and in the field,” he thought.59 It is precisely the “great diversity in 
mental individuality” which produces the multiple possible causal paths to war, and which gives 
such a prominent role to contingency.
60
 “Personality matters” is a recurring observation among 
practitioners interviewed for this thesis. Fascinatingly, where many theorists see abstract concepts, 
practitioners see people, their careers, personalities and positions.
61
 The negotiation process 
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reinforces diplomats’ view that humans, not acronyms, make decisions. One NATO diplomat 
reported on the intensely inter-personal aspect of negotiations with Russia: 
 
They feel encircled in this way… They have to come from another planet, downtown somewhere, to a building 
that they don’t know entirely – only to the conference rooms, and maybe the cafeteria. It’s psychological, and I 
think it has an impact…We are people.62 
 
The diplomatic world is one in which individuals who often know one another personally eat, 
exercise, drink, work and gossip together. This world, in all its rich, complex, nuanced and human 
dimensions forms the everyday lives of diplomats and policy-makers. It is a world to which many 
theorists pay little attention. In the theoretical world, concepts, acronyms, structural forces, norms, 
classes, genders and ideologies are the main units of analysis. This dissertation has consistently 
stressed the importance of personalities in preventive diplomacy, and the primacy of the individual 
over higher forms of abstraction.  
I now turn to three critiques of the above argument. Firstly, I explore the potential concern that 
such a theory revives the ‘great man’ view of history. Secondly, I concede that structural pressures 
inside an agent’s mind may feasibly explain all of the above cases. However, since neither 
consciousness nor structural forces are observable, the choice is between two untestable 
alternatives. Finally, I use the case of the alleged coercion of Kivuitu to clarify the point that 
structures constrain but do not necessarily determine individuals’ actions. 
 
CONCESSIONS TO STRUCTURALISM 
 
An intuitive reaction to the above is that it represents a resuscitated ‘great man’ view of history? 
Carr famously criticised the “cult of the individual”, which he saw as “one of the most pervasive of 
modern historical myths.”63 Carr was scathing of the view that individuals are decisive causal 
agents, calling this the “Bad King John theory of history”.64 He argued that the “desire to postulate 
individual genius as the creative force in history is characteristic of the primitive stages of historical 
consciousness.”65 I will explore this critique below. Carr correctly repudiated the quaint view that 
only powerful leaders, and particularly men, make history. However, I argue that Carr conflated the 
role of ‘great men’ with that of the millions of individuals who make history.  
Carr left no place for individuals in history, since he saw free will as juvenile.
66
 He tried to mix 
freedom with determinism but,
67
 like mixing fire and water, only ended up with the latter. Carr 
endorsed Hegel’s remark that the “great man of the age is the one who can put into words the will 
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of his age, tell his age what its will is, and accomplish it.”68 But this argument ignores the fact that 
politics is a contest of groups of individuals vying to define what the will of the collective ought to 
be. No historian can claim ever to know what “an age” wills, since an age has no will. In his haste 
to throw out ‘great men’, Carr threw out the agency of all individuals. His deterministic view of 
history could allow for no contingent events, which he dismissed as “irrelevant” not because they 
did not cause wars, but because they were unique and therefore not generalisable.
69
 For example, 
the Ottoman emperor Bayezid was deterred from invading Europe by an attack of gout. But Carr 
dismissed Gibbon’s conclusion that such a chance event as a leader’s gout “may prevent or suspend 
the misery of nations.”70 He did not see this episode as relevant, since gout is not a general cause of 
war. 
The Marxist philosopher, Plekhanov, also tried to reconcile a structural deterministic view of 
history with human agency.
71
 He denied that history could be reduced to the conscious actions of 
individuals.
72
 Plekhanov’s doctrine boils down to the idea that, although individuals influence the 
course of history, this influence is “determined by the internal structure of that society”.73 In short: 
 
Owing to the specific qualities of their minds and characters, influential individuals can change the individual 
features or events and some of their particular consequences, but they cannot change their general trend, which 
is determined by other forces.
74
 
 
To explain this argument, Plekhanov uses the historical example of the Seven Years’ War, which 
was allegedly brought about by the pernicious influence of Louis XV’s mistress.75 Rather than 
seeing this as evidence of a king’s mistress shaping history, Plekhanov sees her social position 
determining her influence. There is great merit to this argument, which I will return to below. 
Where the Marxist philosopher is less convincing is in attempting to explain why the king’s 
mistress, Madame de Pompadour, was able to withstand the pressure of other powerful people 
attempting to undermine her influence.
76
 This is only mysterious because Plekhanov has committed 
to the view that she had no free will, but was merely acting out the role assigned to her by her social 
class, rather than individual consciousness.  
The above critique of an individual level of analysis yields a very important nuance, which we 
may grant to structuralist theories without entailing determinism. In stark contrast to Carr, 
Plekhanov thought that individuals had a causal role to play in history. He even agreed that King 
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Louis’ lasciviousness was a cause of the Seven Years’ War.77 In fact, Plekhanov’s view, if we 
discard its deterministic Marxist baggage, is a strong counter-point to the arguments I have 
advanced in this dissertation. Even if history is contingent, even if humans have free will, and even 
if individuals are among the major causes of war, the influence they wield is not determined by their 
will, but by the social influence of their positions. We see this nuance clearly in the six case studies 
above. 
The agent-centric view of world politics is about all causally efficacious agents – that is, all 
humans with a capacity to reason. An agent need not occupy the highest throne of political power in 
order to exert influence upon history. In 1838, lumberjacks brought Britain and the U.S. to the brink 
of war over trees. In 1861, a handful of Federal troops at Fort Sumter deliberated on a decision 
which could have removed the catalyst of an incipient civil war. In 1914, a group of assassins were 
able to throw Europe into the most dangerous crisis in a generation. In 1954, domestic public 
opinion in the U.S. – the voices of millions – emboldened the U.S. president to take strong actions 
against Communist China. In Georgia, a handful of snipers in South Ossetia brought Georgia and 
Russia closer to war.  
Plekhanov’s critique allows us to bring nuance to the above idea, to avoid suggesting that all 
agents are equal in the causal power they bring to bear on world politics. This is clearly not the 
case. Theoretically, of course, all agents are equal. In practice, some are more equal than others. 
There are two reasons for the asymmetric power which agents exert in the world. The first is simply 
that some individuals have weaker or stronger wills than others. Compare Lincoln’s steely resolve 
with Sir Edward Grey’s indecisive nature, for example. Aside from this difference, Plekhanov 
points out a more practical difference. Simply put, not every strong-willed agent is in a social 
position of influence, and those agents who do impact historical events the most do tend to be more 
powerful. All six case studies in this dissertation confirm this point. The individuals who attempted 
to prevent war, and especially those who succeeded, enjoyed immense social and political 
influence. These individuals included a general, governors, foreign ministers, a Secretary-General 
of the UN, the Chairman of an electoral commission and a U.S. Assistant Secretary of State.  
Thus, as Plekhanov concludes, “ever many [or woman] of talent who becomes a social force, is 
the product of social relations.”78 Were it not for the social trends and social power on which their 
influence rests, such agents “would never have crossed the threshold that divides the potential from 
the real.” 79  Many talented individuals never become agents of social change, but are instead 
forgotten by history. Had Napoleon died prematurely, he would most likely have been replaced by 
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another talented and strong-willed individual.
80
 To illustrate this point, imagine that two people 
announce a declaration of war: one man, standing on a soapbox in a public square, is met only with 
ridicule. The second woman, standing in the Oval Office, catalyses the movements of millions and 
propels nations to war. Across the two cases, both individuals were free agents, but the former 
enjoyed no social position allowing him to magnify his influence, whereas the latter did.  
Plekhanov correctly pointed out that social relations may determine the influence of an agent’s 
actions. But this in no way entails that social relations determine the content of that action. This 
nuance is important. In rejecting Plekhanov’s deterministic streak, we also reject his idea that 
individuals only affect the individual features of events rather than their general trend. This view is 
entirely compatible with the classic statement that individuals “make their own history, but they do 
not make it as they please, under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing 
already, given and transmitted from the past.”81 This concession reconciles social structure with the 
causal power of agents since social relations, in themselves, do not determine human action.
82
 This 
discussion has rehabilitated what Carr threw out with the ‘great man’ view of history: the fact that 
individuals do cause and prevent wars, and that some individuals are simply more influential in 
their efforts to do so due to social position. 
This conclusion does not present a revived ‘great man’ view of history. Instead, it suggests an 
individual-centric view which argues that all people carry equal causal power, which is unequal in 
its influence. Nevertheless, the influence of any citizen’s actions can be magnified by the 
contingency of history. “The levers and pulleys in the historical process work so trickily,” 
Butterfield argues, that mere trifles may have an incalculable “magnified effect”. 83  History 
“represents a field in which big decisions can be carried by a narrow margin.”84 The hijackers of 
September 11, 2001 come to mind, as does the name of Mohammed Bouazizi.
85
 Even politically 
weak individuals can force disproportionate change, especially when they choose to go “against the 
crowd”.86  
This conclusion sides with Plekhanov, rather than Carr, in seeing contingent events – shrieking 
owls, flasks of whiskey, gout and mistresses – as possible contributing causes to wars. Another 
critic wrote that only “simple souls…take apparent and superficial causes of wars for their real 
causes.”87 He mocked causal explanations for the French conquest of Algeria which mentioned the 
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fact that the Algerian ruler had struck the French consul with a fan.
88
 Carr would ignore such 
events, since striking a diplomat with a fan is not a timeless cause of war. Tolstoy also mocked 
explanations for war which focussed on individuals and contingencies and, like Carr, searched for 
the order, meaning, and deeper causes in history.
89
 To these thinkers, individuals and contingencies 
were only trifles in history, not its real causes. However, it is only because Carr and Tolstoy were 
committed to determinism, and assumed that history had to obey a certain order and had to have a 
deeper meaning, that they downplayed the role of individuals. I conclude that history may have no 
broader meaning or governing logic, and that trifles, contingencies and individuals all truly affect 
war and peace. 
This concession to structural theories of war entails another, which adds a crucial nuance to the 
thesis that agents and minor incidents may cause wars, due to the contingency of history. 
Contingency cuts both ways. Even though an individual who makes a conscious choice may be the 
cause of their action, they may not cause the consequences of that action. While common-sensical, 
the implications of this concession are far-reaching for IR theorists and historians. Scholars looking 
back upon history, according to an historian of the American civil war, “try to be rational beings 
and tend to write about history as if it were a rational process.” This, he suggests, is problematic: 
 
they number the alternatives, and talk about choices and decisions, and equate decisions with what the decisions 
led to. But if we examine the record of modern wars, it would seem that the way people get into a war is seldom 
by choosing it; usually it is by choosing a course that leads to it – which is a different thing altogether.90 
 
Ironically, the contingent and open-ended nature of history – if we accept that it is such – leads us to 
conclude that leaders and agents cannot possibly control the consequences of their actions. This is a 
sobering and important reminder to diplomatic practitioners, and it is a crucial nuance for any 
agent-centric theory of preventive diplomacy. This concession implies the frightful admission that 
 
one can get into a war without in any way foreseeing it or imagining it, which is easy. But to avert a war 
successfully, it has to be foreseen or imagined, which is quite difficult.
91
 
 
The above does not entail that structural-deterministic theories of war are true by any means. But it 
does suggest that even perfectly free and rational leaders, in full control of their faculties, who make 
a conscious choice without intending it to escalate tensions, may easily and inadvertently do so. 
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This is a humbling point, and one which influences the practical conclusions in the next chapter. I 
now turn to another possible critique of this dissertation. 
 
FREEDOM IN COERCION? 
 
A second critique of the above arguments is that agents appear to act in a psychological vacuum – 
affected by weak external pressures, which they effortlessly overcome. Such agents, a critic might 
charge, have nothing to do with the imperfect human beings in world politics who may be swayed, 
influenced or coerced. Real people, leaders, diplomats, generals must make decisions in conditions 
of uncertainty and great stress, with imperfect information and while enemy armies mobilise at 
great speeds. In sum, real-life agents do not have the luxury of the philosopher’s calm, composed, 
hyper-rational agent. I will now explore this critique. I will use the case of Samuel Kivuitu’s crucial 
decision in 2007 to argue that, Kivuitu, a real-life agent, can still logically be said to have acted 
freely, even under duress.  
In this debate, coercion is a paradigmatic case. If a free agent were able to act one way or another 
despite external coercion, we could expect them to resist weaker pressures. As an example, I will 
explore the role of coercion in influencing Kivuitu in 2007. Philosophers generally agree that 
agents, when acting under coercion, are excused of some degree of moral responsibility.
92
 
However, it is much more contested whether coercion “constrains individual freedom and 
undermines individual autonomy.”93 Defining coercion helps to shine light on this problem. For an 
agent to effectively coerce another agent, there must be “a coercive will”.94 That is, an effective 
case of coercion must include three key ingredients. Firstly, a coercer must desire to bend the will 
of his or her victim.
95
 Secondly, the coercer must be prepared to act on this desire. Finally, the 
coercer must successfully bend the victim’s will to his or her will through psychological 
compulsion.
96
 With these definitions in mind, we can proceed. 
The first question we must answer is whether Kivuitu was coerced to announce in December 
2007. Secondly, if he was coerced, we must ask whether Kivuitu could still have done otherwise. 
Regarding the first question, details are scant, so we must rely on the corroborated suspicion that 
Kivuitu was personally threatened to announce the results of the 2007 election. The choice Kivuitu 
would have faced, in this situation, is clear: comply, knowing it might spark violence; or defect, and 
risk endangering his family. This situation clearly matched the first two elements of the above 
definition of coercion. However, the missing element is compliance. Even in this extreme case, it 
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took the voluntary movement of Kivuitu’s own will to successfully coerce him. A coercer’s desire, 
therefore, “can only be fulfilled through the will of another person.”97  
The question of moral responsibility is independent from that of free agency.
98
 While a threat to 
Kivuitu’s person would diminish his moral responsibility, it would not necessarily diminish his 
agency. In similar situations, other agents have resisted coercion in acts of defiance or despair. “The 
act of choosing under circumstances of extraordinary duress,” Arnold concludes, “is an assertion of 
power in the face of powerlessness.”99 Successful coercion does not destroy or take control of 
another’s will. An agent effectively faces an unsavoury choice, but a choice nevertheless. To be 
clear, I am not arguing that Kivuitu should have acted differently. Rather, I am arguing that Kivuitu 
could still have defied his coercer’s attempts to influence his will. So long as Kivuitu was not 
“physically compelled”100 – his limbs tied, his mouth gagged, his liberty constrained – he was still 
able to act otherwise.  
Real humans, like Lincoln and Tisza, have reacted extremely differently under conditions of 
intense external psychological pressure. As I showed with reference to Kivuitu above, attempted 
coercion does not impair an agent’s ability to do otherwise. Kivuitu’s grim choice represents the 
“inequalities of fortune” which leaders face in world politics.101 As Richard Holton concludes, a 
“coerced action is a free action, but it is either justifiable or excusable.”102 This implies that humans 
retain their agency and freedom in the face of lower order psychological pressures. Agents are, in 
principle, free to resist such pressures, even unto death. “Come and take them,” as King Leonidas 
famously replied when the Persian sovereign instructed his army to lay down their arms.
103
 This 
demonstrates that there is a degree of consent in all successful coercion.  
Finally, the above conclusion helps us to feel the outer ring of possibility which agents face in 
attempting to prevent war. Often, the most solid brick wall which diplomats are likely to encounter 
is the iron-clad will of a committed agent. In other words, a committed Lincoln and a committed 
Tisza can make all the difference in world history, by blocking or facilitating efforts to prevent war. 
This reality is reinforced when, unlike historians, diplomats are forced to face the future with no 
hindsight, poor foresight and only awareness of the key decision-makers.
104
 This conclusion may 
appear to suggest that if world leaders are truly primary movers unmoved, influencing their 
decisions would be close to impossible. Their psychological defences would appear unassailable to 
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the humble diplomat. This concern is unwarranted. That agents are primary movers unmoved does 
not imply that influence is impossible, only that it is extraordinarily difficult. This, to me, appears to 
be a rather representative view of foreign affairs. In the above cases, each attempt to prevent war 
encountered extraordinary friction in the shape of other agents. Free agency helps to explain the 
real-life difficulty of preventive diplomacy. 
 
AGENCY IS UNOBSERVABLE 
 
The above theoretical arguments hinge upon the premise that events which lead to wars are caused 
by purposive agents, and spring from their minds. However, this is an assumption which – like 
causation – we can only infer from nature. As Clausewitz wrote, “the intelligent forces are only 
visible to the inner eye”.105 This has important implications for preventive diplomacy, if its aim is to 
influence the wills of conscious agents. We can only infer that consciousness exists from the 
outward behaviour of agents. Descartes pondered whether the hats and cloaks he saw outside his 
window “might cover artificial machines, whose motions might be determined by springs.”106 Like 
Descartes,
107
 Clausewitz invites us to use our judgment to assume that the beings we observe in war 
are not automatons, but conscious beings. 
A critic may charge that an agent-centric bias was front-loaded in CHAPTER 1, and pre-
determined the conclusion I would reach regardless of the empirical cases. This reveals a potential 
objection to the use of historical examples to illustrate a philosophical argument. The problem is as 
follows: the concept of structure, which I have consistently critiqued, is also invisible to the eye.
108
 
It, too, is only inferred to causally determine the actions of human beings from their behaviour. In 
Giddens’ formulation, social structure is not something which exists in the outside world, but exerts 
causal power through the consciousness of individuals.
109
 In this regard, two competing accounts of 
the origins of the human behaviour leading to war – individual consciousness or structure – are on 
even footing. This leads Colin Wight to critique any attempt to “settle the matter in advance of 
concrete research”.110 Wight argues that the question of how much structural or individual factors 
determine social outcomes is an empirical one, rather than a philosophical one.  
Since agency and structure are both invisible, I concede that all of the previous case studies 
might be explained by structural forces acting through the consciousness of agents. Objectively, 
there is no factual basis to choose either way. But this admission reveals a weakness in Wight’s 
argument. Since both consciousness and structures are unobservable, how can historians possibly 
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study either concept? Science does not offer a solution either. Brain scans are crude instruments, 
depicting the physiological traces of mental activity. One day, a ‘mind scanner’ may be invented 
allowing social scientists to observe the mental events which individuals like James Blunt 
experience: their thoughts, beliefs and volitions.
111
 On that day, it may be possible to objectively 
distinguish between structural forces and an agent’s own consciousness. Until then, this debate will 
remain irreducibly metaphysical. The question of whether wars are caused by conscious human 
beings, unconscious agents acting out structural forces, or a mysterious blend of agency and 
structure cannot be tested empirically. An answer can only be deduced by constructing the most 
plausible explanation of historical efforts to prevent war. This dissertation sought to provide one 
such agent-centric answer. I leave readers to judge the outcome of this attempt. 
This discussion has practical implications beyond academic circles. It leads us to a crucial 
assumption for the practice of preventive diplomacy. What Clausewitz wrote on causation in war 
may inform practitioners attempting to control its causes: 
 
events are seldom fully known, and still less motives, as the latter have been, perhaps purposively, concealed by 
the chief actor, or have been of such a transient and accidental character that they have been lost for history.
112
 
 
The conscious desires of leaders and generals are often hidden from plain sight, since “no human 
eye can trace the thread of the necessary connexion of events up to the determination 
of…Princes.”113 There is “nothing objective intervening” between a Prince’s volition and their 
action which the scientist may grasp.
114
 An easy solution to this problem is to conclude, like 
Tolstoy, that these desires are trifles. This in no way helps practitioners, who cannot dismiss 
volitions as trifles, since they know from experience that “however small a cause may be in itself, 
its effects reach to the end…and modify or influence the final result in some degree,” in diplomacy 
as in war.
115
  
We can draw another practical conclusion from this theoretical discussion. Invisible though it 
may be, consciousness, from which agency springs, is more than a trifling cause of war: it may be 
the fundamental cause of war. Power transitions, strategic competitions, alliances, poverty, ideology 
and crises are always mediated by consciousness. Not all power transitions end in war; not all 
hostile alliance systems cause wars; and not all countries with disparities in wealth are plagued by 
violent conflict. In contrast, most wars reflect, in the context preceding them, conscious agents 
vying to bring it about, or prevent it. Evidently, structural conditions – as I conceded above – may 
explain why the war of July 1914 had such destructive and far-reaching consequences. These 
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consequences were certainly not the result of a conscious choice. But the causal power which 
sparked the war cannot be attributed to the structures themselves, just as a pile of gunpowder cannot 
ignite itself.  
A major implication of this dissertation is that the wills of other agents are the most constraining 
forces facing any leader in a crisis. Paradoxically, free will not only empowers agency; it also 
constrains it. In which ratio, and to which extent, no one knows exactly. And that is exactly the job 
of diplomats: to feel the outer limits of the possible, delimited by the wills of others, to act within 
those confines, and to renegotiate them when possible. But other human beings are arguably the 
only natural limits of the art of the possible. These limits are not static, but are constantly changing, 
opportunities opening and closing, as the actions of individuals interact in a kaleidoscopic show of 
free will, agency and contingency.  
 
CONCLUSION 
  
This chapter has explored the theoretical implications of this dissertation for the role of human 
agency in efforts to prevent war. Drawing on the philosophical and historical insights of this thesis, 
I articulated general conclusions on the role of agency in efforts to prevent war. For now, these 
conclusions are largely theoretical. However, as I argued in CHAPTER 1, our analysis of the causes 
of war directly affects policy prescriptions to prevent it. If the above discussion misled policy-
makers into assuming that gout caused wars, and devoted resources to combat this imaginary threat 
to world peace, the social consequences might be measured in human lives. This example is absurd, 
but the real-life implications are not. In the next chapter, I sketch the embryonic form of a practical 
theory of preventive diplomacy, drawn from the above conclusions. Our military guide, Carl von 
Clausewitz, leads us to consider how the military arts may serve to inform the diplomatic arts. 
Specifically, I seek to demonstrate how the method of military contingency-planning may serve the 
cause of peace. 
 185 
Towards a Practical Theory 
 
“As the human eye in a dark room dilates 
its pupil, draws in the light that there is, 
partially distinguishes objects by degrees… 
so it is in War with the experienced soldier,  
whilst the novice is only met by pitch black.” 
- Clausewitz
1
 
 
We now leave abstractions behind, not because they are useless, but precisely because the 
philosophical ground we have covered allows us to engage fully with its practical implications. In 
this final chapter, I invite scholars and practitioners to engage with the question of how we should 
go about attempting to prevent an incipient war. What are the practical lessons from this study? 
This chapter draws out the real-life, practical implications of this dissertation. It also serves as an 
executive summary of my research findings for policy-makers and scholars. 
The last chapter synthesised various conclusions from the philosophical and historical parts of 
this dissertation. In this chapter, I propose tentative features of a practical theory of preventive 
diplomacy. “[I]nstead of a finished building of theory, there are only materials” to be found in the 
present treatise.
2
 Concretely, this chapter proposes a practical methodology to aid practitioners to 
plan and carry out preventive diplomacy. I first begin by reiterating what a practical theory is, and 
what a finished one might resemble. Secondly, I draw on the military art of contingency-planning to 
advance debate.  Finally, I draw practical lessons for preventive diplomacy from this dissertation. I 
must begin by exploring how two words which are often held to be antonyms – practice and theory 
– can possibly work together. Clausewitz explained how theory could be practical.  
 
WHAT IS A PRACTICAL THEORY? 
 
I have already laid out the reasons, in the last chapter, for which Clausewitz’s On War is a useful 
theoretical guide. In this section, I set out the principles which can guide our efforts to craft a 
practical theory of preventive diplomacy. As we saw in the Introduction, the literature on preventive 
diplomacy has not developed a coherent theoretical statement. At best, theorists have proposed 
generic advice to policy-makers, such as: 
 “Act early!” 
 
“Study the conflict!” 
 
“Consult with those involved on the ground!”3 
 
“Act as early as possible, preferably even before a triggering event has occurred.”4  
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“It is important to develop norms, institutions and instruments relating to strengthening societal structures, in 
particular, democratic institutions, judicial bodies and civil society in general.”5 
 
As Stedman wrote, the urge to “do something, anything” is evident in the early literature on 
preventive diplomacy.
6
 Wallensteen and Möller argue that “it is now time to be more nuanced and 
ask which actions by whom are more likely to get an effective response.”7 In response, scholars 
have called for context-specific strategies of preventive diplomacy.
8
 Others have identified the need 
for contingency “action plans” based on empirical case studies.9 However, the strategic planning of 
diplomatic actors, such as the UN, remains “rudimentary” at best.10 This is where Clausewitz can 
help. 
Clausewitz’s On War has been described as a remarkably “practical theory of war”.11 I define a 
practical theory as a coherent chain of concepts designed to assist the judgments of practitioners. 
This is the manner in which Clausewitz envisaged the utility of theory for practitioners. His theory 
of war was based on at least three major assumptions about the relation of theory to practice. The 
first assumption is that, in the art of war, “experience counts for more than any number of abstract 
truths.”12 A good theorist, he said,  
 
is like a swimming master, who teaches on dry land movements which are required in the water, which must 
appear grotesque and ludicrous to those who forget about the water. This is also why theorists, who have never 
plunged in themselves, or who cannot deduce any generalities from their experience, are unpractical and even 
absurd, because they only teach what everyone knows...
13
 
 
Such a theory ought to bridge the philosophical and practical worlds of international politics.
14
 A 
practitioner “should never use the results of theory as laws or standards but only…as the soldier 
does – as aids to judgment.”15 Clausewitz rejected the idea that theorists could deduce specific 
courses of action from general principles, as if derived from a “truth machine”.16 He warned against 
the “mechanical application of theory”.17 This means avoiding the search for “certain and positive” 
maxims.
18
 At best, such a theory must only attempt “to distinguish from amongst the endless 
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connexions of events those which are really essential.”19 Applying this theory must be left to each 
practitioner’s judgment.  
What such a theory is not, as should be clear, is a guide which diplomats ought to consult in a 
crisis. A practical theory should “educate the mind of the future leader…but not accompany him to 
the field of battle.” 20  Diplomats should not apply truth from “dusty books” 21  like “mental 
appliances”.22  A practical theory is, at its core, about the power of knowledge: 
 
The moral reaction, the ever-changeful form of things, makes it necessary for the chief actor to carry in himself 
the whole mental apparatus of his knowledge, that everywhere and at every pulse-beat he may be capable of 
giving the requisite decision from himself. Knowledge must, by this complete assimilation with his own mind 
and life, be converted into real power.
23
 
 
Such knowledge must permeate the agent’s mind. “Science must become art,” Clausewitz writes.24 
He stressed that military exercises, while useful, were ultimately a weak substitute for actual 
military experience.
25
 A practical theory, it might be objected, simply instructs policy-makers to 
learn from experience. This is true. For Clausewitz, practice ought to be the basis of all theories of 
real-life utility. However, a practical theory is about more than experiencing diplomacy or war for 
oneself. It is about ordering the chaos of experience in a logical, concise and policy-relevant way. 
This is where theorists can help. In this chapter, I aim to offer the foundations of such a theory. I 
will begin by arguing that diplomats can learn from the military arts. 
  
LEARNING FROM THE MILITARY ARTS 
 
At first sight, the military may seem a counter-intuitive inspiration for preventive diplomacy. 
Military planning brings to mind the rigid, self-fulfilling European wars plans of 1914. With 
hindsight, war plans often attain an absurd character. Until 1939, for example, U.S. War Plan Red 
prepared for a global confrontation with the British Empire.
26
 Similarly, Canada’s Defence Scheme 
No. 1 planned a pre-emptive invasion of the U.S.
27
 But contingency planning remains a cornerstone 
of military preparations in peace-time. Chinese and American defence planners have prepared for 
war against the other since the 1950s.
28
 Military planning follows the Roman proverb: if you want 
peace, prepare for war.
29
 Scholars, as I mentioned above, have called for context-specific plans of 
preventive diplomacy. This ambition is precisely where the academic literature may make the most 
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practical difference in the conduct of preventive diplomacy. To date, the practical advice of the 
academic literature largely resembles that of poet Joseph Malins:  
 
Then an old sage remarked: ‘It’s a marvel to me 
that people give far more attention 
to repairing results than to stopping the cause,  
when they’d much better aim at prevention’.30 
 
While intuitive, the advice to act early is of little practical use. The military tradition offers a 
practical guide to diplomatic practitioners on how to plan for and execute preventive missions. As 
one NGO official noted, conflict prevention ought to “take a page out of the military.”31 The rest of 
this chapter seeks to propose a model for planning and carrying out preventive diplomacy. 
Machiavelli gives a vivid depiction of the military art of contingency planning. The ancient Greek 
statesman and general Philopoemon, Machiavelli noted, was a model military planner: 
 
in times of peace he was always thinking of methods of warfare, so that when walking in the country with his 
friends he would often stop and talk with them on the subject. ‘If the enemy,’ he would say, ‘were posted on that 
hill, and we found ourselves here with our army, which of us would have the better position? How could we most 
safely and in the best order advance to meet them? If we had to retreat, what direction should we take? If they 
retired, how should we pursue?’  
 
Philopoemon, while perhaps a dull friend, was a brilliant military mind for one reason. He did not 
plan for a war; he planned for any war imaginable: 
 
In this way he put to his friends, as he went along, all the contingencies that can befall an army. He listened to 
their opinions, stated his own, and supported them with reasons; and from his being constantly occupied with 
such meditations, it resulted, that when in actual command no complication could ever present itself with which 
he was not prepared to deal.
32
 
 
Similarly, for Clausewitz strategic planning had to be as consequentialist as war itself.
33
 “Every 
major war plan grows out of so many individual circumstances,” he wrote, “that it is impossible to 
devise a hypothetical case with such specificity that it could be taken as real.”34 Clausewitz’s theory 
of war was a reaction to deterministic theories of war. His contemporaries, including Napoleon, 
held the erroneous view that the “science of war consists of effectively calculating all the chances 
first and then working out exactly, mathematically, the part which luck will play.”35 Clausewitz’s 
approach to military planning has three essential features: foresight, dynamism and flexibility. 
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Military planning, to be useful, necessitates a prescient degree of foresight.
36
 Foresight can be 
defined as a type of “mental time travel”. 37  This accords with the concept of prudence. The 
Ancients saw this as the virtue which “regulates the present, foresees the future and remembers the 
past.”38 Philopoemon’s example can inspire a prudential approach to preventive diplomacy. Such 
foresight is a crucial means to winning a contest of wills. As in chess, a strong player foresees 
moves and counter-moves numerous rounds ahead of time, and adapts to the other player’s actual 
moves. 
Dynamism is the second core element of useful military plans. A theory of war which aspires to 
mathematical certainties, Clausewitz thought, “is of no practical use.”39 What gives war its inherent 
dynamism is the bold, rash, unpredictable “human element”.40 In sum, war is dynamic because “the 
enemy gets a vote,” as a U.S. general said.41 Failures in military planning arose from the misguided 
assumption that the enemy’s will was a known quantity.42 For example, U.S. nuclear plans during 
the Cold War failed “to appreciate sufficiently that the enemy was a reactive entity, whose aim was 
to frustrate the other side’s plans, not to fall in with them.”43 Military plans which assumes an 
essentially static, black-and-white, deterministic world are likely to fail.
44
 Real war, unlike war on 
paper, is dynamic.  
This dynamic is not only evident in war. Military brinkmanship in a crisis “tends to develop a 
momentum of its own,” as Thomas Schelling wrote.45 This momentum, however, derives not from 
structural forces, but from the iterative actions of political, diplomatic and military actors. 46 
According to Schelling, it is “our sheer inability to predict the consequences of our own 
actions…and the enemy’s similar inability” which injects risk into a crisis.47 Crises demonstrate the 
cumulative, constraining effect of decision-making under conditions of uncertainty. All sound 
military plans must reckon with the inherently dynamic, constraining role of an adversary’s 
decisions.  
The action-reaction cycle in war leads to the third principle of successful military plans: 
flexibility. As General Jim Molan wrote, “military planning must retain an infinite flexibility.”48 
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Von Moltke the Elder, whose advice the German general staff failed to heed in 1914, famously said 
that no plan survives contact with the enemy.
49
 Clausewitz also argued that chance and human 
agency dictated that a commander would need to adapt to changing situations.
50
 In the maelstrom of 
chance, human agencies and friction, a successful commander would need “an intellect which, even 
in the midst of this intense obscurity, is not without some traces of inner light… and then the 
courage to follow this faint light.”51 This gut feeling, or professional judgment, should be sovereign. 
Having established how the military arts can inform diplomatic efforts to prevent war, I now turn to 
the crux of this chapter. I propose a method of contingency planning for such missions, built on the 
theoretical conclusions of the last chapter                                  
 
A FIVE-POINT PLAN 
 
Having established the assumptions of a practical theory of preventive diplomacy, I will now sketch 
an example of how it can be used to develop a diplomatic action plan. A lasting practical theory of 
preventive diplomacy can only be written by a practitioner with a wealth of experience. In the 
meantime, this chapter seeks to show how the conclusions of this dissertation could be applied in a 
practical scenario. Policy recommendations can only be derived from an understanding of the 
specific context of an actual crisis. Hence, this section will “individualize the conception”, so that it 
does not “dissolve into a generalization.”52  I therefore anchor this chapter to a specific crisis 
scenario.  
I now set out a diplomatic mission in response to a fictitious crisis scenario around the disputed 
Senkaku-Diaoyu islands. These rocky outcrops in the East China Sea, solely inhabited by goats and 
moles, are administered by Japan and claimed by China. Between 2012 and 2014, increasing 
confrontations between both powers fed talk of possible war.
53
 Many analysts predicted that such a 
war would almost inevitably involve the United States.
54
 I now expand on this scenario by 
hypothesising a dangerous new bout of escalation in 2015. The basic scenario I propose is a surprise 
occupation of the contested islands by Chinese civilian protestors under the cover of darkness. This 
is a plausible scenario, which would place Japanese decision-makers in the position of either 
accepting this fait accompli or risking conflict with China.
55
 I will focus on UN Secretary-General 
Ban Ki-moon’s potential actions to prevent war.  
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1. Buy time 
 
History is full of ‘inevitable wars’ which never occurred.56 Since tomorrow does not yet exist, Ban 
Ki-moon still has time, and can potentially buy more. As one statesman noted, “the first 24, 48 or 
72 hours are critical.”57 But in a crisis, time is not a finite substance, like so many grains of sand, 
counting down to some inevitable event. It is misleading to think of crises being governed by a 
mechanical countdown to war. If this device existed, the value it displays would jump erratically 
from hours, to seconds, to minutes, based on no higher law than the interactions of the key decision-
makers. Time, in a crisis, is relative to the actors: the perceived time pressures in Beijing and 
Tokyo, the media’s attention, the sailing distance of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, etc. Ban Ki-moon’s 
own actions will causally affect the nature and duration of the crisis.  
Buying time might mean nothing more than the humble diplomatic ritual of urging restraint on 
all sides. But there are more sophisticated tactics. The first is to tie up the key players in diplomatic 
procedures which may slow down their decision-making process. In 1838, General Scott injected 
himself into the middle of partisan politics in Maine’s capital, physically co-locating his office 
within the governor’s own. This ensured that he had access to key decision-makers, and could drag 
out discussions by virtue of being physically present on the ground. Dag Hammarskjöld used a 
similar tactic in his mission to China in 1955, giving him influence over the tempo of events by 
simply interceding at a delicate moment in the crisis.  
In a hypothetical Senkaku-Diaoyu crisis, the Secretary-General may have several tactics at his 
disposal. The first could be to dispatch a Special Envoy to East Asia, on a quiet mission to ensure 
that Sino-Japanese crisis communication continued unimpeded during the crisis. In support of this 
mission, Ban Ki-moon may call the national leaders of both states at crucial turning points when 
diplomatic failure threatened. The Secretary-General would likely seek to enmesh the parties in 
diplomatic rituals, processes and initiatives – official and unofficial – to attempt to buy as much 
time as possible by delaying each side’s final decision. 
 
2. Move individuals to move the whole 
 
Ban Ki-moon would know, from experience, that people are the hinges of war and peace. 
Governments, businesses, international organisations construct a façade of unity. Constitutions and 
mission statements exist to give the appearance of an unbroken social whole, where only 
individuals exist. Talking points give the impression of unity, where none exists naturally. Like 
actors on a stage, officials repeat lines they may or may not believe, not only to convince others, but 
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to convince themselves, that they are part of a greater body of men, women, one of higher purpose 
than the mere pushes and pulls of individual ambitions. 
Political, psychological and diplomatic constraints inevitably limit the scope of Japanese and 
Chinese leaders’ manoeuvring room, and Ban Ki-moon’s own. 58  However, the seemingly 
uncontrollable forces facing him, when disaggregated, are merely the cumulative sum of individual 
actors and decisions.
59
 It is therefore to individuals that he must look. Ban Ki-moon should attempt 
to behold the tapestry of internal factions in both Japan and China, in all their details, mentally 
divide this sea of actors into power factions, then sub-divide these down to the single atom of 
individual human beings. This is practically impossible to know in the imperfect world of 
practitioners. In practice, the Secretary-General need not worry about all the possibly relevant 
agents. Cognitive, time and budgetary constraints will force him to perform triage. At minimum, 
Ban Ki-moon should write a shortlist of key decision-makers in the crisis.
60
 
In the July 1914 crisis, as we saw above, Sir Edward Grey conceived of the crisis in terms of 
groups of hawks and doves vying for control of foreign policy in various capitals, especially Berlin. 
This is a realistic a model of foreign policy decision-making, particularly in crises. Some actors on 
the scene, or behind them, pursue personal and national agendas, some leading to confrontation, 
others to compromise. The key, therefore, is to clearly identify which actors are pursuing which 
goals. Moreover, practitioners should never under-estimate the extent to which personal, petty and 
careerist motives may influences the most important diplomatic events. Greeley’s careerist vendetta 
against Seward decisively influenced the outcome of the 1861 secession crisis, as we saw. In 1999, 
as I discussed in Chapter 1, one frustrated Russian military’s bureaucrat professional grievance 
sufficed to bring NATO and Russia into their most dangerous confrontation in decades. Finally, as 
we saw in Chapter 7, career motives may have played a key role in how senior UN officials dealt 
with the Abkhaz-Georgian crises in early 2008. In short, careerist motives may sometimes be 
among the direct causes of war and peace. 
The Secretary-General’s second action would therefore be to compile a list of actors with the 
will to fight, those working for peace, and the influential ones in between. Next to their names, he 
would write their contact details, positions and, if known, character traits. He would also judge 
which actors were acting in good faith, and those who might not be.61 Ban Ki-moon would then 
seek to find those agents who may be responsible for the current crisis. In writing this list, he would 
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not fail to add the names of influential foreign ministers who may help, such as Indonesia’s Marty 
Natalegawa, South Korean officials who may assist him, media representatives and even 
backchannel contacts close to Xi Jinping and Shinzo Abe. He would also channel civil society 
organisations on each side, include think tanks, NGOs and women’s groups lobbying for peace – as 
Kofi Annan did so skilfully in his 2008 Kenyan mediation. The Secretary-General, like a conductor, 
would attempt to synchronise diplomatic efforts. 
 
3. Craft a Strategy, Expect it to Change 
 
A critical step in Ban Ki-moon’s efforts to prevent a Sino-Japanese war is to craft a game plan. Just 
as William Henry Seward put pen to paper in 1861, and Matthew Bryza did likewise in 2008, the 
Secretary-General and his staff will form a plan. By way of example, he may judge that the current 
crisis has least five critical decision points: 
 
1. Shinzo Abe’s decision in reaction to the Chinese protestors’ incursion on the islands. 
2. Xi Jinping’s decision, in case Japan sends coast guard vessels or arrests protestors. 
3. The U.S. president’s decision regarding whether to support Japan militarily. 
4. The shared decision of how to deal with the protestors. 
5. The shared decision of how to resolve this dispute in the long-term. 
 
This list could grow exponentially, based on the reactions of each actor to the last decision. For the 
sake of convenience, we therefore consider only these five critical decision points. Any strategy 
must begin from what Clausewitz called the final decision. In war, the final decision is to subdue an 
enemy’s will to fight. Ban Ki-moon is pursuing the same goal, by diplomatic means. But that goal 
has human faces, and is specific to each context. As such, the UN Secretary-General may decide 
that the five main objectives of his strategy are to: 
 
1. Convince Abe to wait 48 hours, while he negotiates with the Chinese leadership. 
2. Extract a statement from Xi that these protestors do not represent Chinese policy. 
3. Entreat the U.S. to avoid any strong public statements.  
4. Coordinate an extraction of the protestors. 
5. Propose future talks hosted by Indonesia on dispute resolution. 
 
These are only the starting points of a diplomatic strategy. A real-life strategy, to be of any use, 
must be flexible enough to adapt to future events. There are two types of contingencies to worry 
about: the unpredictable actions of other agents and pure chance. Successive developments could 
render this plan moot. For example, if Abe ordered coast guard vessels to arrest Chinese protestors 
on the islands, Ban Ki-moon would be back to square one. A rigid strategy, too wedded to any key 
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point, is as fragile as glass. To survive the impact with reality, it must be elastic. A second factor 
which may undermine the above strategy consists of unpredictable elements of chance: an incoming 
storm which prompts or delays one actor’s decision, a war in the Middle East, or a natural disaster 
in China. A military theorist’s advice applies to Ban Ki-moon’s own East China Sea peace plan: 
 
as your knowledge improves, you will get a better idea both of what needs to be done and of your own 
limitations. Like any plan, this plan will change once you hit the ground, and may need to be scrapped if there is 
a major shift in the environment. But you still need a plan, and the process of planning will give you a simple 
robust idea of what to achieve, even if the methods change.
62
 
 
Ban Ki-moon ought sooner to violate his own plan than let this essentially static mental map give 
him a misleading, ossified view of reality. Reality will keep changing with the strategic interactions 
of the key actors, including his own.
 63
 A valid contingency plan can never be worked out in detail 
ahead of time, stored in a cupboard, and dusted off when necessary. The League of Nations 
operated under this mistaken assumption.
64
 In an international crisis, the “enormous friction” is not 
concentrated at a few known points, as in mechanics, but is an immanent part of the crisis itself, its 
“chief origin being chance”.65 Ban Ki-moon ought to adapt to change, just as a field Commander 
adapts to the ever-changing conditions of war. 
 
4. By Any Means Necessary 
 
Ban Ki-moon now has the outline of a dynamic and flexible strategy. What his strategy will not tell 
him is exactly how to act. This is the realm of tactics – the lower-level moves in negotiations with 
the key actors.
66
 It is impossible to catalogue an exhaustive list of possible tactics. A Persian general 
reportedly deployed cats in a fight against Egyptians, who held the animal sacred and therefore 
avoided killing them. (The Egyptians lost). Similarly, in his efforts to prevent civil war in 1861, 
William Henry Seward bribed contacts at the New York port to hire out vessels which Lincoln had 
intended to use to resupply Fort Sumter, a clear act of sedition. Yet war cats and sedition are not 
timeless tactics. Tactics of preventive diplomacy may range from a mere telephone conversation to 
deploying a fact-finding mission.
67
 But they are ultimately limited solely by the imagination. 
While Ban Ki-moon’s tactical options are limitless, there are key tactical considerations: time, 
incentives, threats and partnerships. Time pressure is often the main sources of leverage of 
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mediators.
68
 Ban Ki-moon may, for example, manufacture a deadline or increase the antagonists’ 
perception of urgency to facilitate a peaceful compromise.
69
 He may cultivate the parties’ sense of a 
stalemate in a press conference or on the phone.
70
 He could appeal to the risks of conflict, 
reputation, world opinion and the verdict of history.
71
 Incentives are another self-evident tactical 
consideration. Simply put, there must be some reward for parties to abandon the resort to the use of 
force.
72
 His leverage is evidently more limited in dealing with two great powers than with two 
warring factions in a civil war, but Ban Ki-moon may have non-material sources of leverage. Many 
relatively weak mediators have succeeded, such as the Vatican’s role in mediating the Cuban 
Missile Crisis in 1962,
73
 and in preventing an escalation to war between Chile and Argentina in 
1978.
74
  
More controversially, he may make use of tactical threats. While academics are divided on this 
question, carefully-designed threats may often be effective in preventing war.
75
 “Diplomacy without 
force is like an orchestra without a score,” as Frederick the Great said.76 In Burundi, Ambassador 
Ould-Abdallah prevented a coup d’état by threatening “to expose unsavoury details of the personal 
lives of would-be troublemakers.”77 Ban Ki-moon would have limited coercive means to pressure 
Japan and China. However, if individuals in either government obstructed his diplomatic efforts, he 
could refer the dispute to the Security Council or to an international court. Alternatively, he may 
isolate specific peace spoilers by leaking their names to international media.
78
  
A fourth tactical consideration concerns Ban Ki-moon’s relationship and coordination with other 
international actors, including diplomats, NGOs, the media, etc. Studies suggest that diplomatic 
missions led by a strong actor are more likely to succeed.
79
 In theory, this sounds like a sensible 
recommendation. In practice, it is extremely difficult. Preventive diplomacy is a popular and 
crowded field. But the growing competition in this business may ultimately undermine the goal of 
preventing violent conflicts. As Ould-Abdallah concluded, “Preventive Diplomacy is virtually 
impossible when you have a multiplication of mediators.” 80  This proliferation of diplomatic 
initiatives gives rise to “forum-shopping”. 81 A lead preventive actor like the UN Secretary-General 
should marshal other actors to support his preventive plan, just as Kofi Annan did effectively in 
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Kenya. In 1954, for example, Dag Hammarskjöld cultivated a media blackout to help settle a 
dangerous U.S.-China crisis.
82
 Ultimately, the above is only a cursory oversight of possible tactical 
issues. Ban Ki-moon will need every ounce of tactical skill he can muster to attempt to sway the 
wills of his interlocutors. 
 
5. Know Your Limits 
 
The Delphic maxim “know thyself” should remind Ban Ki-moon of three limitations. The first is 
that even the Secretary-General of the UN has limited influence in this situation. He is but an actor 
in a broader international web, and not an island unto himself. His mission is mandated, 
empowered, or enfeebled by a bureaucracy of thousands, and by the great powers, at least three of 
which are involved in the present crisis. The UN defines the official scope of his mandate and 
freedom of manoeuvre. His mission would certainly benefit from a Napoleonic mandate which is 
“short and obscure”.83 But that is not within his control. There is a less obvious limitation which 
many high-level diplomatic actors report. 
In his mission, Ban Ki-moon would face immense psychological pressure, as well as prolonged 
sleep deprivation. In 1830, an elderly Talleyrand frequently worked to the point of exhaustion, 
negotiating until 4am or 5am – for close to a year – to prevent a European war over Belgium.84 
General Scott was sleepless during much of his mediation in 1838.
85
 Sir Edward Grey, during the 
July 1914 crisis, was at wit’s end from his lack of sleep.86 Dag Hammarskjöld worked 20 hour days 
for weeks at a time during crises.
87
 In 1962, John F. Kennedy and his advisors barely slept for 
thirteen days during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
88
 This is hardly trivial. Even short-term sleep 
deprivation has deleterious effects on one’s decision-making processes, cognition, flexible thinking 
and adaptability to new information – all of which the Secretary-General will need.89  
This is what Clausewitz meant by the weight of war gradually coming to rest on a Commander’s 
will. By the “spark of purpose, the light of hope, must be kindled afresh in others,” as he wrote.90 
To cope with stresses, one senior diplomat imbued his work with “a quasi-spiritual dimension” and 
lived “like a monk”.91 Dag Hammarskjöld famously found solace in the writings of the “great 
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medieval mystics”.92 In the present crisis, Ban Ki-moon will be navigating blindly, sleep-walking 
from meetings to phone calls and back. He may even recall, in a quiet moment, what Dag 
Hammarskjöld wrote in his diary, Markings: 
 
Sleepless questions 
In the small hours: 
Have I done right? 
Why did I act 
Just as I did? 
Over and over again 
The same steps, 
The same words: 
Never the answer.
93
 
 
A final limitation which Ban Ki-moon ought to remember is that his interlocutors are free agents. A 
committed leader who had made up his or her mind to resort to force may resist virtually all 
attempts at persuasion. In this context, Ban Ki-moon could truly do nothing to change their minds 
by force of arguments. However, he may find solace in two points. Firstly, for the most part, he 
most likely would not know for sure which decision-makers harboured war-like intentions. He 
should therefore persevere against all odds. Secondly, if he did identify which actors were 
committed to the use of force, Ban Ki-moon might not change their minds, but may perhaps be able 
to undermine their influence. For example, he could utilise the mediator’s last card: stepping 
down.
94
 This is not generally advisable so long as he is not certain that one or more actors are 
committed to violence. But if he is certain, the threat of walking away from a peace effort may be 
the last source of Ban Ki-moon’s influence, which he could use to lay the blame at one or both sides 
for making war inevitable. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter set out a five-stage planning process for preventive diplomacy, based on Clausewitz’s 
insights into military planning. This model represents the apex of the practical insights of this 
dissertation, reflecting a marriage of philosophical and empirical enquiry. However, this chapter 
revealed several limitations in the ambition of crafting a practical theory of preventive diplomacy. 
Firstly, this dissertation has not been honed by first-hand experience, although its author has 
consulted extensively with practitioners. I therefore conclude, as suggested earlier in this chapter, 
that an enduring practical theory of preventive diplomacy will lie dormant until the likes of a Ban 
Ki-moon takes it up. In the mean-time, future research might consist of interviewing practitioners to 
critique, complement and complete the above planning model into a more detailed one.  
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Secondly, the above section may – in the name of brevity – have insufficiently explored a 
potential tension between the last and the present chapter: If agents are truly primary movers 
unmoved, how can diplomatic actors possibly seek to sway their wills? This question merits a more 
specialised treatment, which cannot take place in this dissertation. I suspect, however, that the sheer 
immovability of free agents is borne out by practitioners’ experiences. This hypothesis, if correct, 
would explain the difficulty of persuading leaders to change their minds, especially when they have 
decided to go to war.
95
 As such, future research might seek to complement the above theory – 
drawn chiefly from philosophy and history – with cutting-edge research on decision-making 
psychology. 
A third crucial limitation is innate to the idea of a practical theory. As the above section suggests, 
a practical theory cannot offer generic advice in the form of timeless injunctions. A practical theory 
could only tell Ban Ki-moon what he could do, not what he should. Even then, all these options 
were intimately tied to the context of the Senkaku-Diaoyu crisis, to the actions of the disputants, 
and to Ban Ki-moon’s role. The UN Secretary-General might be expected to play an entirely 
different role in mediating a coup d’état in the Central African Republic, rather than a great power 
stand-off between Japan and China. This partly speaks to the missing aspect of power relations, 
which future researchers may weave into the debate on preventive diplomacy. But this also reveals 
that Ban Ki-moon’s own agency – or, more specifically, the influence he could bring to bear – was 
dependent on his own personality, agency and relation to the disputants.  
This insight strengthens an argument I made in the Introduction: preventing war requires more 
than selecting the required diplomatic tool, and implementing it with bureaucratic efficiency. To 
advance a theoretically-informed and practical debate on preventive diplomacy, it is to human 
beings, not abstractions, which we must look. I set out how this point may inform future research in 
the conclusion to this dissertation. 
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Conclusion 
  
“[F]reedom of the mind…is indispensable 
if it is to dominate events, not to  
be overpowered by them.” 
- Clausewitz
1
 
 
To avoid tedium, I will not summarise previous arguments. The threads into which this dissertation 
converged are well summed up by Clausewitz above. Rather than abusing the patience of readers 
any longer, I will explain what this means, exploring the implications of this dissertation for three 
audiences: scholars of preventive diplomacy and International Relations, diplomatic practitioners 
and my grandmother. To begin, we must return to the question with which this dissertation began: 
 
How have individual agents attempted to prevent war historically, and to which extent did individuals 
causally determine the outbreak, or prevention, of war? 
 
I see at least three implications of this dissertation’s arguments for future research. In the first 
instance, one implication is that there may be as many answers to the first part of this question as 
there were attempts to prevent war. I have only studied a score or so of such cases, some of which 
did not fit into this dissertation; there are thousands more. Preventive diplomacy is a difficult field 
to study empirically. However, trained and perhaps biased as I am by historical scholarship, my 
research into preventive diplomacy has led me to the view that there may be as many causes of war 
as there are wars.
2
 In other words, I am sceptical of the value of searching for the general causes of 
war. I do not see War as a singular, universal phenomenon, but as a human activity whose 
character, causes and consequences depend upon its context, origins and the interactions of the 
agents fighting it. Each war, I think, may be sui generis, of its own kind. 
This sceptical position arose from my rejection of causal determinism, and my emphasis on the 
causal role of agents and chance in war and peace. If, as I think is true, a shrieking owl, gout or a 
king’s mistress may make a decisive influence between war and peace, then I cannot accept that the 
structural causes of war can be causes in an ordinary sense. This conclusion – which I enter tepidly, 
rather than affirming confidently – raises important questions about the IR debate on the causes of 
war. There may be a case for paying more explicit attention to the problem of ranking the causes of 
war, as Waltz attempted to do, and which most historians engage in tacitly.
3
 A hypothesis to 
investigate further may be that what we call the ‘structural causes’ of war may well be its ‘structural 
conditions’. These may simply be the circumstances which make war possible, rather than actual. 
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This suggestion grows out of the argument that, in the final analysis, only people can cause or 
prevent wars.  
A critic may reject this conclusion. They would have to substantiate the idea that wars have 
sometimes arisen seemingly without the conscious choice of human beings. Alternatively, they 
might argue that the pressures certain individuals faced were so overwhelming as to overcome their 
ability to do otherwise, or to shrink their freedom of manoeuvre to 0 percent.
4
 If Aristotle is correct, 
there is always a remaining 1 percent (if not much more), which we call free will or consciousness. 
Where people can act, Aristotle said, they can also not act. Theoretically, critics would need to 
disprove that people always have at least two options left. 
This opens up an important research question. If every agent is the cause of their own actions, 
and if the interactions of agents alone determine the occurrence of war or peace, then we would 
need to explain how such causal interactions occur. To use a crude metaphor, I have only argued 
that humans are the theoretical atoms of war and peace – its indivisible unit5 – without explaining 
precisely how they interact to bring it about. I will leave this task to future research. However, this 
leads to questions regarding the originality of my argument. Hans Morgenthau argued that ‘human 
nature’ was the fundamental cause of war, 6  which Waltz rejected for being a mono-causal 
explanation. Human nature cannot be the cause of all wars because war and peace alternate while it 
remains constant. This raises the question of whether there is any difference in arguing that humans, 
rather than human nature, cause wars. 
The difference is simple: humans are plural. Whereas human nature attempts to explain all wars 
in one singular concept, my argument tends towards the opposite extreme. We can take the Second 
World War as an example. Theoretically, the causes of the Allied victory, I argue, may have been as 
numerous as the soldiers fighting, the individuals working on the home front, and any others whose 
actions contributed to the war effort. Every human being whose causal power contributed, however 
minutely, to the war was a cause of its outcome. It is only because most of these individuals’ 
identities are forgotten that historians refer to broad collective concepts, such as ‘the Allies’ or 
‘economic power’, as the causes of victory. The same logic can be applied to the individuals whose 
actions contribute to preventing war. All the case studies above focussed only on a handful of 
individuals not because they were the only agents who made a difference to war and peace, but 
because they were the identifiable ones. It is only to avoid pedantry that we do not count all the 
possible causes of war. This would turn narrative history into dry and boring chronologies. Such 
                                                          
4
 If this response comes, I only hope it is more nuanced than Sir Edward Grey’s argument that his efforts to prevent war 
were doomed by “the deliberate, relentless strokes of Fate, determined on human misfortune, as they are represented in 
Greek tragedy.” Grey (1935a: 174). 
5
 The Greek term atomos meant ‘indivisible’. Of course, the metaphor is imperfect because 1) atoms have no 
conscience, so far as we know, and 2) they are divisible. 
6
 Morgenthau (1948: 4). 
Conclusion   
201 
chronologies would never be complete, since the historical record simply forgets most individuals 
who ever lived. Concepts are useful for the sake of simplification, and to avoid mind-boggling and 
futile calculations, rather than to lead us to assume that a single cause determines the actions of all 
human beings. 
Next, with regards to the specific literature on preventive diplomacy, I began this dissertation 
compelled by Stedman’s argument that agency was plainly missing from the debate. I hope to have 
contributed to addressing this missing element. I began by critiquing the two most popular 
metaphors in the literature: war as a disease, and war as a mechanical problem. This critique was 
intended to be constructive, by providing a third tentative metaphor: that of war as a contest of 
wills. This metaphor captures the elements of dynamism, agency, chance and unpredictability 
inherent in war. Metaphors may limit our imaginativeness in designing solutions to policy 
problems. The militaristic metaphor which I developed at length in the previous chapter may also 
have downfalls, such as unduly militarising the debate. However, I think this risk is justifiable. I 
conclude that theorists ought to shamelessly think like generals, if they wish to influence their 
actions. Generally, my hope is to have breathed new debates into the hopeful literature of 
preventive diplomacy which, after such a promising start in the 1990s, is now largely silent. 
At a broader disciplinary level of International Relations scholarship, this dissertation has 
indirectly challenged some foundations of the field, especially the idea that states are purposive 
agents and the most important causal units of international life. This critique has been a collateral 
effect of my endeavour, rather than its primary purpose. As Wight brilliantly put it, for IR to 
question this is akin to Descartes questioning his existence.
7
 But I think this question needs to be 
asked not out of irreverence towards disciplinary mythology, but to avoid building elegant theories 
on the quicksand of unchallenged assumptions. By arguing for individualism, I tacitly rejected the 
assumption that states are agents at all. I hope for this commitment to methodological individualism 
to be received less as a gauntlet than a collaborative problem: namely, how the legal fiction of states 
being agents can be reconciled, if at all, with human agency. Every fibre of this dissertation has 
been woven around a strong and, at times, bald critique of the assumption that social structures can 
ever cause humans to do anything. This rejection, of course, had determinism in its sights, and a 
commitment to free will. Although I am far from advocating a ‘metaphysical turn’ in IR, I 
nevertheless think that IR may gain in richness by drawing on this millennia-old philosophical 
debate, which is an endless source of wonder, confusion but, arguably, insights of practical utility. 
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Thirdly, the arguments in this dissertation have implications for diplomatic practitioners. In 
international institutions, such as NATO and the UN,
8
 academic concepts do sometimes pierce into 
the practitioners’ realm, often lingering as slogans or rules of thumb. Indeed, the preventive 
diplomacy literature is notable for having featured such a promising exchange between practitioners 
and theorists. This cooperative model, however, has since stagnated. Working towards practical 
theories for this and other areas of international affairs, including aid and development programmes, 
may be a promising avenue of theorist-practitioner cooperation. At the very least, it may provide a 
common language for theorists to understand practitioners’ concerns, and vice versa. I conclude this 
chapter not confident that I have proposed such a practical theory. At minimum, I hope to have 
cleared and cemented a philosophical foundation on which future scholars and practitioners may 
build this theory collaboratively.  
To conclude, I reflect on what this would all mean for my ninety-two year old grandmother who 
lived through the Second World War, and remembers the steel din of German boots on the 
cobblestone streets of Paris. My grandmother, since her experience in the war, has read voraciously 
about the various individuals – from the obvious leaders to the less-obvious translators and 
bureaucrats – who made the Third Reich possible, and who enabled the Second World War to 
happen. Intuitively, without having pursued doctoral research or plunged into philosophy, she views 
individuals as ultimately responsible for the war which marked her entire life, and those of millions 
of other men and women. My grandmother’s pre-theoretical views on war and peace are borne out 
by the facts. She, and many lay people uninitiated to the esoteric world of International Relations, 
understands what is so easy to lose from sight: that people make history. The crises of tomorrow 
will be managed by individuals. Those which end in war will be the result of interactions among 
individuals. The thousands or millions of civilians and soldiers whose lives will be affected, and 
subsequently forgotten, will be individuals. There is no more boring truth, I conclude, than that 
humans cause and prevent wars. It is therefore to individuals that we should look to prevent future 
wars.  
This dissertation contributed to knowledge by enthroning human agency at the core of preventive 
diplomacy, where I argue it belongs. To summarise this entire dissertation in five words: humans, 
not concepts, cause wars. Humans upset all the laws, and all the expectations, of social science. 
They are the free, stubborn, unpredictable masters of their fates, the causes of war and peace. They 
are also the creators of innumerable intellectual theories downplaying, if not denying, this fact. 
Scholars of preventive diplomacy, I argue, should therefore study and understand human agency as 
introspectively as does the philosopher, but as pragmatically as does the practitioner. The previous 
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two chapters, taken together, do not approximate the title of a theory in the grandest sense. Instead, 
the main ambition of this dissertation has been to craft the foundations for what I term a practical 
theory of preventive diplomacy. The aim of a practical theory is to remain as close to the ground of 
experience as possible, and to assist the judgment of practitioners, not to substitute it. I conclude 
that the way to prevent future wars lies not in designing perfect schemes for world peace, but in 
understanding our imperfect minds. This simple truth may help individuals attempting to prevent 
war. 
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